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I.   INTRODUCTION
Discussions of whether workplace equality has been achieved in
American society can be both vexing and painful. While few would
dispute that the civil rights revolution has produced significant re-
sults,1 there is considerable and often heated disagreement about the
                                                                                                                      
* Associate Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. B.S., Cornell Univer-
sity, 1983; J.D., University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall), 1987; LL.M., Columbia
University, 1994; J.S.D., Columbia University, 1997.
So many people offered advice and commentary for this project over the last two years
that it is difficult to recognize them all. William Bielby, Julie Greenberg, Linda Hamilton
Krieger, Daniel Linz, Martha McCluskey, Marc Rosenblum, Douglas Scherer, Kenneth
Vandevelde, Ellen Waldman, and Bryan Wildenthal read and offered commentary on prior
drafts of this Article. Robert Belton, Frederick Golder, Barbara Gutek, and Maureen
O’Connor provided insight and expertise on the development of the survey described
herein. Terisa Chaw and Mary Anne Sedey of the National Employment Lawyers Associa-
tion provided invaluable institutional support for that same survey. My wonderful col-
leagues at Thomas Jefferson offered significant feedback at my Faculty Roundtable presen-
tation in 1997. William Bielby graciously invited me in 1997 to present a version of this Ar-
ticle at the U.C. Santa Barbara Sociology Department Weekly Colloquim, where the com-
ments of all assembled were gratefully received. Dean Kenneth Vandevelde provided two
law school research stipends to support work on this Article. Bryon Mulligan and Scott Star
consistently gave me top-notch research assistance. Reference librarian Brent Bernau per-
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extent to which some employees continue to confront discrimination
in employment and what, if anything, the law can and should do
about it. Empirical evidence indicates that discrimination in em-
ployment, while not as overt as in the past, is nevertheless quite
prevalent.2 Despite these findings, however, much of the popular de-
bate is characterized by anecdote. For every story of an employer
that operates like Texaco or Mitsubishi,3 there is a comparable tale of
                                                                                                                      
formed yeoman service in filling my never-ending requests for interlibrary loans. Cara
Lockwood and Debbie Russo provided much needed administrative support. Most signifi-
cant, however, was the assistance of Charles Bisom-Rapp, who designed the database for
the survey and performed the statistical analysis. Thank you to all.
1. Members of many protected groups have experienced economic gains; it remains
unclear, however, to what extent civil rights law is responsible for that progress. See, e.g.,
FRANCINE D. BLAU ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF WOMEN, MEN, AND WORK 220-21 (3d ed.
1998) (discussing studies examining the effectiveness of antidiscrimination law in reducing
gender and race-based pay differentials); Paul Burstein & Mark Evan Edwards, The Impact
of Employment Discrimination Litigation on Racial Disparity in Earnings: Evidence and
Unresolved Issues, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 79 (1994) (concluding that litigation victories are
associated with long-term increases in African-American earnings); John J. Donohue III &
James Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on
the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1603, 1603-04 (1991) (suggesting
that African-American economic advancement may be due to government antidiscrimina-
tion efforts).
2. The recent Federal Glass Ceiling Commission report describes in detail the barri-
ers to employment advancement that many women and people of color still face, including
stereotypes, prejudice, and bias. See FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMM’N, GOOD FOR
BUSINESS: MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION’S HUMAN CAPITAL 27-28 (1995). The earnings
gap between these groups and white males makes the problem concrete. Studies of the
male/female earnings gap find that “labor market discrimination may explain as much as
half or more of the pay differential between men and women.” BLAU ET AL., supra note 1, at
193. One recent study found that on average, women’s wages are 72% that of men. See
Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, Swimming Upstream: Trends in the Gender Wage
Differential in the 1980s, 15 J. LABOR ECON. 1, 12 (1997). The Glass Ceiling Commission
Report notes that “African[-]American men with professional degrees earn 79% of the
amount earned by white males who hold the same degrees and are in the same job catego-
ries.” FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMM’N, supra, at iv. African-American women earn only
60% of the compensation garnered by their white male counterparts. See id. at 80. The
Glass Ceiling Report also notes that “when promoted to middle- or upper-levels of manage-
ment, [Asian and Pacific Islanders] are more likely to receive lower economic returns com-
pared to whites occupying similar positions.” Id. at 112. This is so even though Asian and
Pacific Islanders are more likely to possess superior qualifications in terms of education and
work experience. See id. In addition to depressing the compensation and promotional op-
portunities of minorities and women, employment discrimination is often manifest in the
hiring process. Hiring audits demonstrate persistent racism and sexism. See, e.g., Judith
Olans Brown et al., Some Thoughts About Social Perception and Employment Discrimina-
tion Law: A Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY L.J. 1487,
1498-99 (1997) (discussing studies of racism in the hiring process); David Neumark et al.,
Sex Discrimination in Restaurant Hiring: An Audit Study, 111 Q.J. ECON. 915 (1996) (find-
ing statistically significant evidence of sex discrimination in the hiring of servers by high-
priced restaurants).
3. Top executives of Texaco found themselves in the limelight after a former execu-
tive revealed tape recordings of a meeting at which a pending class action race discrimina-
tion suit against the company was discussed. As initially reported, it appeared the tapes
contained derogatory racial remarks and evidence of document tampering. See Kurt
Eichenwald, Texaco Executives, on Tape, Discussed Impending Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
4, 1996, at A1. Although Texaco disputed both allegations, it shortly thereafter reached a
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an employee who has abused the legal system by filing a frivolous
discrimination lawsuit.4
On the surface, there seems to be a yawning chasm separating the
abusive employer narrative from the parable of the disgruntled em-
ployee. Yet the stories share a common reference point. In both, a po-
tential or actual lawsuit serves as the vehicle for expressing percep-
tions of workplace conditions. Tacit celebration or indictment of civil
rights law turns on the perceived validity of a legal cause of action.
But what makes the taleteller discern discrimination in one case and
malicious prosecution in another? Certainly, personal experience
and perspective play a role. Human beings, though, do not interpret
in a vacuum. Rather, they train their interpretive skills, such as
they may be, with available data.5
This Article examines how employment lawyers representing
management play a role in creating data and affect the perception of
employment disputes. More specifically, it explores how defense law-
yers attempt to strategically position employers to safeguard these
clients against discrimination and other employment-related litiga-
tion. A primary focus of their advice is on producing an evidentiary
record that an employer can use defensively should the need ever
arise.6 Defense attorneys, therefore, counsel employers to implement
                                                                                                                      
landmark settlement with the plaintiffs for over $170 million. See Nadya Aswad & John
Herzfeld, Texaco Corp. Agrees to Spend $176 Million to Settle Race Bias Suit, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) AA1 (Nov. 18, 1996). A federal jury acquitted two former Texaco executives of
conspiracy and obstruction of justice charges in the matter. See John Herzfeld, Race Dis-
crimination: Jury Acquits Former Texaco Executives in Criminal Obstruction of Justice
Case, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A9 (May 14, 1998).
Mitsubishi recently settled a sexual harassment suit for $34 million, brought by a class of
350 current and former women employees. At the time, the suit was filed, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) referred to the company’s work environment as
“outrageous” and “egregious.” Michael Bologna, Sexual Harassment: Mitsubishi Settles
EEOC Suit for $34 Million; Agency Says Class, Amount Largest Ever, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) AA1 (June 12, 1998).
4. One popular writer recently made such anecdotal references a central part of his
lengthy condemnation of American employment law. See generally WALTER OLSON, THE
EXCUSE FACTORY: HOW EMPLOYMENT LAW IS PARALYZING THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE
(1997). Some federal district court judges appear to hold similar views. See, e.g., Tschappat
v. Reich, 957 F. Supp. 297, 299 (D.C. 1997) (“It seems that almost anyone not selected for a
job can maintain a court action. It is for this reason that the federal courts are flooded with
employment cases.”); Edwards v. Interboro Inst., 840 F. Supp. 222, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
(“[Antidiscrimination law has] unquestionably served to embolden disgruntled employees,
who have been legitimately discharged because they were incompetent, insubordinate, or
dishonest, to file suits alleging that they have been the victims of discrimination.”). Em-
ployment discrimination horror stories are not unique. Such anecdotes are frequently used
in attacks on the civil justice system and in calls for tort reform. See Marc Galanter, Real
World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1094-98 (1996).
5. For a comprehensive description of how causal attribution and other forms of social
inference function, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Rela-
tions After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251 (1998).
6. See infra Part C.III.1.
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and carefully administer standardized employee evaluation systems
and train supervisors how to write up and terminate employees
without running afoul of the law.7
It goes without saying that defense strategies, where effective,
can significantly alter the way a given discharge or failure to pro-
mote is understood in both personal and legal terms. Additionally,
regardless of merit, management attorneys’ collective actions may
influence public attitudes concerning workplace equality achieve-
ments more broadly. Most importantly, however, litigation preven-
tion strategies may impact employment discrimination law’s effec-
tiveness as a remedial tool.8 While these strategies may prompt
managers to identify and remedy certain biased actions, preventa-
tive practices may mask rather than eliminate some discriminatory
decisions. In fact, the central premise of the advice, that one eradi-
cates bias by ignoring immutable characteristics such as race, sex,
and age,9 runs counter to the conscious process that social scientists
claim is necessary to correct the subconscious effects of stereotypes
disadvantaging minorities, women, and members of other protected
groups.10
To place defense advice in context and highlight its potential ef-
fect, one must examine employers’ responses to antidiscrimination
law. Beginning in the 1960s, ambiguities in equal employment op-
portunity (EEO) law created an unstable legal environment for em-
ployers.11 This instability prompted human resource professionals
and employment lawyers to recommend that corporations embrace a
range of EEO compliance mechanisms,12 including grievance proce-
                                                                                                                      
7. See id.
8. Through everyday practices, legal actors may ignore, re-interpret, or alter formal
law. See Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Beyond the Great Divide: Forms of Legal
Scholarship and Everyday Life, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 21, 55 (Austin Sarat & Thomas
R. Kearns eds., 1993).
9. This proposition is, in fact, pivotal to discrimination law doctrine. See Hazen Paper
Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612 (1993) (“Th[e] law requires the employer to ignore an em-
ployee’s age . . . .”).
10. See infra Part IV.A.
11. See Frank Dobbin et al., Equal Opportunity Law and the Construction of Internal
Labor Markets, 99 AM. J. SOC. 396, 402-03 (1993) (discussing employer responses to the
Civil Rights Act and the Act’s subsequent judicial and administrative clarification); see also
Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The Expansion
of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1401, 1406 (1990).
12. See John R. Sutton & Frank Dobbin, The Two Faces of Governance: Responses to
Legal Uncertainty in U.S. Firms, 1955 to 1985, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 794, 800-01 (1996) (sug-
gesting also that companies influenced by legal and personnel professionals were more in-
clined to administer compliance mechanisms).
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dures,13 formal hiring and promotion procedures,14 and specialized
corporate EEO/affirmative action (AA) offices.15
Many workplaces now have presumably nondiscriminatory proce-
dures and make seemingly fair, merit-based employment decisions.16
These policies were adopted out of a sincere desire to prevent organi-
zations from running afoul of antidiscrimination law and to advance
the goals of antidiscrimination legislation.17 Nonetheless, as de-
scribed below, there are incentives for organizations adopting such
structures to do so in minimally disruptive ways.18 Employers fre-
quently demonstrate fidelity to EEO law through symbolic rather
than substantive actions.19 Organizations with workplace conditions
and cultures favoring white males may make procedural alterations
yet fail to significantly alter the status of protected groups.20
One might view the changed corporate landscape and the preva-
lence of EEO compliance practices as indisputable evidence that
workplace discrimination has been eliminated or greatly reduced.
These mechanisms cannot help but influence assessments of the
prevalence of workplace bias. Corporations that eliminate supervi-
sors’ arbitrary discretion and provide avenues for employees to voice
complaints certainly look unbiased. Employees may derive some real
benefits from these organizational changes.21 Symbolic, legal confor-
mity also ensures that, in the aggregate, there will be less evidence
                                                                                                                      
13. See Edelman, supra note 11, at 1422-35.
14. See Dobbin et al., supra note 11, at 402.
15. See PETER REUTER, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF EXPANDED CORPORATE LIABILITY: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY at vii (1988)
(noting that concern over wrongful discharge litigation has caused employers to change em-
ployment practices); ALAN F. WESTIN & ALFRED G. FELIU, RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT
DISPUTES WITHOUT LITIGATION 4-13, 247 (1988) (discussing changes in personnel practices
prompted by employment litigation trends); Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and
Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531,
1547 (1992); see also Dobbin et al., supra note 11, at 421; Sutton & Dobbin, supra note 12, at
795.
16. For example, one study examining 495 large organizations found that formal per-
formance appraisal programs covered more than 80% of all managers and nonunion em-
ployees. See JOHN THOMAS DELANEY ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, HUMAN RESOURCE
POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN AMERICAN FIRMS 18 (1989).
17. See Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New In-
stitutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 903, 923-24 (1996).
18. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
19. See Edelman, supra note 15, at 1542-44; Suchman & Edelman, supra note 17, at
924.
20. See infra notes 297-303 and accompanying text.
21. See Suchman & Edelman, supra note 17, at 924 (“[A]lthough affirmative action
plans and EEO offices exert little direct impact on the workforce representation of minori-
ties and women, these gestures appear to engender stronger organizational commitments to
affirmative action goals.” (emphasis added)); see also Sutton & Dobbin, supra note 12, at 807
(noting that organizational responses produce both “rights-generating” and “rights-limiting”
rules for employees).
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of discriminatory decision making and practices.22 What one sees
may well affect one’s perception of employment conditions, whether
one is a judge, a juror, or a cocktail party conversationalist.
Adoption of grievance procedures, standard employee evaluation
systems, and affirmative action offices, however, may be read an-
other way. While perhaps representing improvements in personnel
procedures, these devices, in some cases, may also hinder the detec-
tion of workplace discrimination. This alternative interpretation re-
quires asking whether a decrease in evidence of bias signifies a co-
terminous decrease of discrimination in the workplace.
While this Article cannot answer that question empirically, it
troubles the waters by describing how certain compliance mecha-
nisms, specifically those recommended by defense attorneys, may ob-
scure conditions of inequality. Part of the problem is psychological:
the recommended strategies teach managers to bulletproof their de-
cisions but may do nothing to alter the conscious and subconscious
discriminatory impulses that can drive decision making.23 Yet there
is also a sociological component to explore. By producing evidence
that appears nondiscriminatory, litigation prevention techniques
may affect the perceptions of outsiders reviewing employment deci-
sions, such as courts, administrative agencies, and the plaintiffs’
bar.24
Plaintiffs’ attorneys are of particular concern. While both defense
and plaintiffs’ attorneys hold strikingly similar conceptions of the
factors giving rise to viable discrimination claims, client representa-
tion does not occur on a level playing field.25 My analysis exposes
employers’ tactical advantages and examines whether current legal
frameworks for evaluating evidence acknowledge and compensate for
that strategic superiority.26
                                                                                                                      
22. Many commentators note that it is increasingly rare to find probative evidence of
discrimination. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX 159 (1997); Cynthia L.
Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1679
(1996).
23. See infra Part IV.A-B.
24. See infra Part V.A-C.
25. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (highlighting advantages held by repeat play-
ers in their encounters with formal law); see also Elizabeth Mertz, A New Social Construc-
tionism for Sociolegal Studies, 28 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1243, 1246 (1994).
26. A recent American Bar Association (ABA) study confirmed employers’ tactical ad-
vantages in disability discrimination cases. See John Parry, American Bar Association Sur-
vey on Court Rulings Under Title I of Americans with Disabilities Act, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) E1 (June 22, 1998) (summarizing the results of a 1998 ABA survey). The ABA survey
of cases decided under the Americans with Disabilities Act since 1992 found that employers
prevail in “approximately 92% of the final case decisions.” Id. at E1. This is due, in part, to
employers using “procedural devices that favor defendants.” Id. at E3.
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This Article does not seek to portray employers and defense at-
torneys as villainous characters who are out to subvert civil rights
mandates, nor does it attempt to imply that all employees are de-
serving, helpless victims of bias.27 Discrimination is a subtle, com-
plex, and often unconscious phenomenon.28 Moreover, employment
decision making can be a complicated process subject to a broad
range of influences, some legitimate, some illegitimate. Given these
premises, however, one may wonder about the net effects of the so-
cial practices that developed after the legal prohibition of employ-
ment discrimination. Many unquestioningly assume that EEO com-
pliance mechanisms necessarily produce nondiscriminatory work
environments. We should pause and think before accepting that as-
sumption as true.
Part II of this Article reviews the sociological literature on em-
ployer responses to civil rights law and discusses the role of human
resource professionals and employment lawyers in developing and
promoting EEO compliance mechanisms. These personnel practices
certainly produce some benefits for employees by rationalizing em-
ployment decision making and limiting supervisor discretion. The
literature, however, reveals that compliance is often achieved
through symbolic rather than substantive exhibits of adherence to
legal principles. Furthermore, these symbolic responses may under-
mine the goals of civil rights law and stymie the efforts of discrimi-
nation victims seeking outside redress.
Part III describes how management lawyers use compliance prin-
ciples in practice. It discusses the ubiquity of litigation prevention
advice proffered by the defense bar and explains why employers are
receptive to such suggestions. Part III then presents the results of
my content analysis of the defense literature advocating preventa-
                                                                                                                      
27. I feel it is necessary to make these points explicit for two reasons. First, in sharing
my ideas with management attorneys, I have invariably provoked extremely defensive and
angry responses. Second, a student Note warning that employers are tempted to abuse per-
formance appraisal systems faced a similar response. A management lawyer’s review of the
Note curtly dismissed the student author’s contention as based on “a dark, conspiratorial
vision of the American workplace [that] has no basis in reality.” James A. Burns, Jr., Use
and Abuse of Performance Appraisals, 22 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 165, 170 (1996) (responding
to John Edward Davidson, Note, The Temptation of Performance Appraisal Abuse in Em-
ployment Litigation, 81 VA. L. REV. 1605 (1995)). I ask those who experience such senti-
ments to put them aside, open their minds, and judge this Article on its merits.
28. Relying on social cognition theory, Linda Krieger argues that many biased em-
ployment decisions are produced unconsciously, the result of “categorization-related judg-
ment errors” that affect all people, not only those who are prejudiced. Linda Hamilton
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1161 (1995). Other legal scholars
discuss unconscious discrimination in different terms. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III,
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 317 (1987) (utilizing Freudian psychology).
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tive practices.29 Through recommendations, management attorneys
attempt to ensure the generation of documentation and oral testi-
mony that would support employers’ decisions in the event of an ad-
verse employment action, such as discharge or discipline.30 Much of
the advice evidences an overriding concern for creating the appear-
ance of nondiscriminatory decision making without an equivalent
emphasis on facilitating substantive change for protected groups. In
other words, the defense bar speaks to employers in symbolic
terms.31
Part IV examines the psychological implications of litigation pre-
vention advice. Clearly, the vast majority of attorneys proffering this
advice hope their clients will implement consistent, objective per-
formance measures, thus eliminating employment bias. Yet there are
ways in which these practices can mask discriminatory conditions.
In part, this is because evaluation devices are susceptible to uncon-
scious influences that disadvantage minorities, women and members
of other protected groups. Perhaps supervisors are being trained to
write and speak in “neutral” language but are not significantly
changing their ability to evaluate employees. Indeed, some preventa-
tive suggestions run counter to what social psychologists deem nec-
essary to eliminate stereotypical responses in evaluation.32 With this
in mind, Part IV reviews empirical research on evaluation bias.
Part V describes how compliance mechanisms may obscure work-
place bias. The trouble people have discerning discrimination33 could
well result in bulletproofing biased decisions that would otherwise be
                                                                                                                      
29. The initial results from the content analysis were published in a different form. See
Susan Bisom-Rapp, Scripting Reality in the Legal Workplace: Women Lawyers, Litigation
Prevention Measures, and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 6 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
323 (1996). Since publication of that article, I have updated and greatly expanded the
analysis. My final results appear below.
30. There are two major theories of discrimination available to aggrieved employees
under civil rights law. The first theory, disparate treatment, encompasses acts of inten-
tional discrimination. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
335 n.15 (1977). The second, disparate impact, addresses facially neutral employment poli-
cies with a disproportionate negative effect on protected groups that cannot be justified on
the basis of business necessity. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). This
Article is concerned mainly with the effects of compliance practices on plaintiffs’ use of the
former theory and on public perception of the extent to which discrimination continues to
be a problem in the American workplace.
31. This observation does not imply that defense attorneys are equipped to train em-
ployers on the subtleties of discrimination or the mechanics of achieving substantive im-
provements for people of color and women. Little empirical attention has been paid to the
effects of in-service education such as diversity training. In fact, such efforts may produce
backlash against protected groups. See infra note 225.
32. See infra Part IV.B.
33. In fact, people have difficulty discerning bias in individual cases. See Faye J.
Crosby et al., The Denial of Personal Disadvantage Among You, Me, and All the Other Os-
triches, in GENDER AND THOUGHT: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 79, 80 (Mary Crawford
& Margaret Gentry eds., 1989).
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viable claims. This type of alteration may not only affect a formal le-
gal outcome in the sense of convincing a judge or jury that no legal
violation exists, it may make it difficult for an employee to obtain le-
gal representation when the evidentiary record favors the employer’s
explanation for the action. In short, as implemented, defense advice
may cause symbolic rather than substantive compliance with anti-
discrimination law.34
Part V considers the response of the plaintiff’s bar to litigation
prevention techniques. It presents the results of a survey I distrib-
uted to over 1200 members of the plaintiffs’ bar in the summer of
1997.35 My study data shed light on how employee advocates evalu-
ate and react to compliance strategies. Analysis reveals that plain-
tiffs’ attorneys not only acknowledge the employer’s evidentiary ad-
vantage in discrimination cases, they conceptualize claim viability in
ways that mirror the defense bar. The fact that compliance mecha-
nisms incorporate these shared conceptions is an indication of their
power to forestall litigation.
In Part VI, the Article concludes by noting that formal law is in-
creasingly limited in its ability to remedy workplace discrimination.
While this result is undoubtedly due to the increasingly subtle na-
ture of bias itself and to case law considered favorable to employers,36
it is also a product of the effective efforts of those subject to the law
to demonstrate symbolic adherence to it. In a sense, employment at-
torneys are trading in symbols:37 where symbolic compliance mecha-
nisms function, no discrimination is perceived; where they break
down or are underutilized, a viable discrimination claim exists. A
possible solution to the problem is to challenge the symbols them-
selves. More important than any symbol is a careful assessment of
the work environment in which it was produced. This Article con-
cludes with proposals for making relevant social science research on
this topic available to plaintiffs’ lawyers, for correcting the informa-
tion asymmetry by making employment law strategies available to
employees, and for suggestions for further research.
                                                                                                                      
34. See Edelman, supra note 15, at 1542-43 (noting that symbolic compliance with
equal opportunity law does not guarantee real change for women and minorities).
35. The survey questions are reproduced infra Appendix I.
36. See infra notes 386-87 and accompanying text.
37. I borrow this terminology from Maureen Cain, who describes all lawyers as “sym-
bol traders.” Maureen Cain, The Symbol Traders, in LAWYERS IN A POSTMODERN WORLD:
TRANSLATION AND TRANSGRESSION 15, 15 (Maureen Cain & Christine B. Harrington eds.,
1994).
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II.   LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE: EMPLOYER RESPONSES
TO CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
Management lawyers’ advice regarding recommended compliance
strategies must be placed in context for full understanding. In par-
ticular, one must consider historical shifts in American public policy
and examine how employment practices have changed in response.
Over the last ten years, a small but impressive body of sociological
literature has begun to document and explain how and why corpo-
rate personnel policies were altered in the wake of the 1960s civil
rights revolution. These studies show that organizations reacted not
just to changes in the law, but to changes in societal conceptions of
the individual, fairness, and efficiency. The studies also illustrate the
ways in which employers’ everyday actions impact the legal meaning
of discrimination itself.
Sociologists mark the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (Title VII)38 as a watershed event in employment relations.39
Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, and national origin, represented a new and
significant limitation on managerial authority over workplace terms
and conditions.40 Moreover, Title VII and the social movements that
gave rise to it provided a basis for criticizing employment decisions
made in exercise of that authority.41
The hallmark of the new legislation was its ambiguity.42 Title VII
did not explicitly require new policies or procedures.43 Instead, it set
forth a broad prohibition of “discrimination” without defining the
                                                                                                                      
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e–17 (1994).
39. See Dobbin et al., supra note 11, at 402; Edelman, supra note 15, at 1532; Edelman,
supra note 11, at 1407; see also John R. Sutton et al., The Legalization of the Workplace, 99
AM. J. SOC. 944, 948-49 (1994) (noting Title VII’s importance but attributing the subsequent
adoption of corporate due process governance mechanisms to actions of all three branches
of government). Sociologists also see President Lyndon Johnson’s issuance of Executive Or-
der No. 11,246 in 1965 as having had a great effect on employers. See Dobbin et al., supra
note 11, at 402-03; Edelman, supra note 11, at 1407. Under Executive Order No. 11,246, 3
C.F.R. 567, 568 (1964-1965), federal contractors are required to take “affirmative action” to
ensure that applicants and employees are treated without regard to race, color, religion,
sex, and national origin.
40. See Edelman, supra note 15, at 1532. A similarly great legal intrusion on tradi-
tional management prerogatives dates back to the New Deal period of the 1930s. Congress
and the states passed a number of statutes regulating the workplace, which the Supreme
Court subsequently deemed constitutional. Of particular significance was the National La-
bor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994), which gave employees the right to
unionize, and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. 201-19 (1994), which regu-
lates wages and hours of employment.
41. See Edelman, supra note 11, at 1406-07.
42. See Edelman, supra note 15, at 1536-38; Sutton & Dobbin, supra note 12, at 798.
43. See Edelman, supra note 15, at 1537. Edelman notes that the regulations imple-
menting Title VII contain workforce composition reporting requirements. However, these
rules do not require any specific alteration of personnel policies or procedures. See id.
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term. This hole or absence left the statute subject to varying inter-
pretations. For example, the scope of the practices prohibited by Title
VII was unclear.44 Whether Title VII embodied a procedural notion of
equality demanding no more than equal treatment of similarly situ-
ated individuals or envisioned a more substantive form of equality
aimed at redistributing jobs to members of disadvantaged groups
remained to be seen.45 Additionally, Title VII lacked definitions of
the enumerated protected categories thereby creating a host of ques-
tions. Did the category “race,” for example, include people of Cauca-
sian ancestry?46 Did the prohibition against sex discrimination in-
clude pregnancy discrimination?47
These ambiguities created tremendous uncertainty for employ-
ers.48 The lack of clarity, however, enabled employers to play a cen-
tral role in helping to define compliance with the terms of the am-
biguous law to which they found themselves subject.49 Indeed, Title
VII’s passage marked the beginning of a period of corporate experi-
mentation with various approaches to achieving bias-free work envi-
ronments.50
Persuasive evidence demonstrates that EEO law catalyzed the
development and broad dispersal of a range of personnel practices
most people now take for granted. Frank Dobbin and his colleagues,
for example, analyzed data from 279 organizations and concluded
that after 1964, antidiscrimination law facilitated the spread of for-
mal promotion mechanisms including performance evaluations, job
                                                                                                                      
44. See Robert Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private En-
forcement and Judicial Developments, 20 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 225, 228 (1976).
45. See Robert Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action: An Analysis of Compet-
ing Theories of Equality and Weber, 59 N.C. L. REV. 531, 539 (1981) (noting that there are
“two basic concepts of equality” discussed in Title VII case law and academic literature);
Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII: Some
Contemporary Influences, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2370, 2370 (1994) (discussing the “contest” in
Title VII “over the meaning of workplace equality”); Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Em-
ployment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 237-40 (1971) (arguing that both senses of equality
are imbedded within our fair employment laws).
46. The Supreme Court answered that question affirmatively in McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transport. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
47. The Supreme Court answered that question negatively in General Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). Congress subsequently amended Title VII to expressly include
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy within the definition of sex discrimination. See
Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (1978) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(1994)).
48. See Dobbin et al., supra note 11, at 402-03; Edelman, supra note 11, at 1406.
49. See Suchman & Edelman, supra note 17, at 924.
50. See Dobbin et al., supra note 11, at 402. Subsequent passage of additional antidis-
crimination legislation undoubtedly provided continued inducement for corporate reform.
Some of the major statutes passed after Title VII include the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29
U.S.C. § 206(d); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 706-796; the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b; the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-12213; and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654.
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descriptions, and job ladders.51 In a later study, Dobbin and John
Sutton surveyed 154 private, for-profit firms and determined that
the adoption rates of corporate grievance procedures correspond to
trends in antidiscrimination law enforcement and wrongful dis-
charge litigation.52 Lauren Edelman’s investigation of the growth of
affirmative action offices and antidiscrimination rules in 346 organi-
zations found similar effects.53
Personnel professionals and management lawyers played a criti-
cal role in developing and disseminating these practices.54 Respond-
ing opportunistically to the changing legal landscape, in the 1970s,
human resource managers began arguing that employers must up-
grade personnel procedures.55 Defense attorneys joined in calls for
reform, albeit a bit later.56 Formal evaluation and promotion proce-
dures were touted as mechanisms for defeating discrimination and
efficiently determining the use of human resources.57 Mechanisms
fostering procedural due process, such as grievance procedures, were
extolled as efficient and profit enhancing.58 By articulating the exis-
tence of a looming legal threat and offering solutions to reduce em-
ployers’ consequent risk, these allied professions enhanced their
prestige and authority.59
Yet there is more to the story of how and why these corporate
changes occurred.60 Edelman uses the “legal environment” concept to
                                                                                                                      
51. See Dobbin et al., supra note 11, at 396. These mechanisms received their first
push in response to 1930s federal labor legislation and federal labor market controls
adopted during World War II. See id. at 422.
52. See Sutton & Dobbin, supra note 12, at 807.
53. See Edelman, supra note 15, at 1567-69.
54. See Dobbin et al., supra note 11, at 404-05; Edelman, supra note 11, at 1410-11;
Edelman, supra note 15, at 1546; Suchman & Edelman, supra note 17, at 924; Sutton &
Dobbin, supra note 12, at 800.
55. See Sutton & Dobbin, supra note 12, at 800.
56. See id. at 800-01.
57. See Dobbin et al., supra note 11, at 404.
58. See Edelman, supra note 11, at 1411-12.
59. See Suchman & Edelman, supra note 17, at 935; Sutton & Dobbin, supra note 12,
at 795; see also Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated
Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 L. & SOC’Y REV. 47, 74-76 (1992) (describing how the legal
profession has helped to create and solve these employment conflicts).
60. One can draw from a number of theories to devise an account of the phenomenon
described above. For example, Sutton and Dobbin advanced the hypothesis that firms
adopted formal personnel procedures on efficiency grounds. See Sutton & Dobbin, supra
note 12, at 807. In the face of labor market uncertainty created by EEO laws, employers re-
sponded with compliance mechanisms calculated to reduce legal risks and protect firm in-
vestments in human capital. See id. at 796-97.
Critical theorists could offer another possible account in that they might view the changes
in corporate policy as mechanisms for simultaneously preserving and obscuring the pre-
rogatives of the dominant race and class in America. See, e.g., Alan David Freeman, Legiti-
mizing Racial Discrimination Through Anti-Discrimination Law: A Critical Review of Su-
preme Court Doctrine, in MARXISM AND LAW 210 (Piers Beirne & Richard Quinney eds.,
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explain the process of organizational response to civil rights law.61 A
legal environment consists of the indirect effects that formal law can
produce in society’s norms and values.62 Edelman posits that EEO
law affected the legal environment by altering the public perception
of employee entitlement.63 Not only did Title VII give rise to an ex-
pectation of bias-free employment decision making, it created an ex-
pectation of fair treatment.64 This change in the culture at-large
threatened the legitimacy of employers, who, until this time, gener-
ally had no need to justify or explain how employment decisions were
made. The quest to maintain public approval became a motivating
force in the development of EEO compliance mechanisms.65
The legal environment, however, was not the only force that in-
fluenced employers. Managerial resistance existed in tension with
changing public expectations.66 Management prerogative, in the form
of unfettered discretion over employment decision making, did not
simply evaporate in the face of the new legal environment. Instead,
it affected the forms of compliance. As Edelman notes:
     The conflict between EEO/AA law and managerial interests
poses a dilemma to organizations: they must demonstrate compli-
ance in order to maintain legitimacy and at the same time they
must minimize law’s encroachment on managerial power. This di-
lemma motivates a process of response to law in which organiza-
tions test, negotiate, and collectively institutionalize forms of
compliance that, to the greatest extent possible, maximize both
interests . . . .67
In other words, employers are driven to create compliance mecha-
nisms that are “minimally disruptive to the status quo.”68
One way of harmonizing the opposing forces described above is to
adopt personnel policies and procedures symbolically demonstrating
                                                                                                                      
1982); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
61. Some describe Edelman’s work as drawing from neo-institutional theory. See Sut-
ton & Dobbin, supra note 12, at 794-95. This branch of organizational theory sees organiza-
tions as complex social actors responding to changes in the culture at-large through sym-
bolic gestures. See generally THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS
(Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991). See Suchman & Edelman, supra note 17,
at 917-18.
62. See Edelman, supra note 11, at 1402.
63. See Edelman, supra note 15, at 1535.
64. See Edelman, supra note 11, at 1402.
65. See Edelman, supra note 15, at 1534-35. Edelman notes that the changed legal en-
vironment was a primary impetus for the development of compliance mechanisms, though
certainly not the only such factor. See Edelman, supra note 11, at 1403.
66. See Edelman, supra note 15, at 1535.
67. Id. at 1535-36 (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 1535.
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commitment to EEO law and principles.69 These symbols, such as the
creation of corporate affirmative action offices70 and employee griev-
ance procedures,71 should not be seen as efforts to evade the law.72
Actually they may be immensely beneficial to employees. For exam-
ple, Edelman and Stephen Petterson report that while affirmative
action plans and EEO offices do not directly impact the position of
minorities and women in an organization, they do inspire stronger
institutional commitments to EEO goals.73 Dobbin and his colleagues
also argue that formal promotion mechanisms “symbolically trans-
formed” members of disadvantaged groups, previously viewed as
uninterested in career advancement, into “ambitious, occupationally
mobile individuals.”74 This new way of thinking about individuals
traditionally relegated to a narrow range of jobs certainly accrues to
the advantage of those employees.75
Nonetheless, the implementation of symbolic policies and proce-
dures in no way guarantees substantive change for members of the
groups that EEO law is designed to protect.76 In fact, symbolic poli-
cies and procedures may provide unjustified optimism that an or-
ganization is governed fairly. For example, Edelman notes the dan-
ger of grievance procedures: they may be powerful symbols of equity
and simultaneously channel employee complaints into avenues pro-
ducing few significant results.77
Moreover, the compliance mechanisms may actually undermine
the legal rights of employees. Edelman, Howard Erlanger, and John
Lande conducted a study of personnel specialists who administer dis-
crimination complaint handling procedures that illustrates the po-
tential undermining effects of compliance mechanisms.78 Employers
commonly adopt internal dispute resolution (IDR) procedures for
handling discrimination complaints. Through use of these proce-
                                                                                                                      
69. See Suchman & Edelman, supra note 17, at 920-21.
70. See Edelman, supra note 15, at 1567-69.
71. See Edelman, supra note 11, at 1423-35.
72. Of course “window dressing” or sham efforts are possible. However, Edelman’s ap-
proach to understanding organizational response to civil rights law views employer reforms
as sincere, for the most part. See Suchman & Edelman, supra note 17, at 923-24.
73. See Lauren B. Edelman & Stephen Petterson, Symbols and Substance in Organ-
izational Response to Civil Rights Law, in RESEARCH IN SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND
MOBILITY (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author).
74. Dobbin et al., supra note 11, at 400.
75. Theoretical and even actual access to previously unattainable positions may coexist
with experiences of prejudice and marginalization on the part of those who occupy the jobs.
See generally ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS 159-79 (1993) (examining the
experiences of Black, middle class professionals and managers).
76. See Edelman, supra note 11, at 1436; Edelman, supra note 15, at 1542-43.
77. See Edelman, supra note 11, at 1436.
78. See Lauren B. Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of
Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 L. & SOC’Y REV. 497 (1993). The study focused on “com-
plaint handlers” in 10 large organizations. See id. at 498.
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dures, organizations buffer their core activities from outside intru-
sion.79 IDR procedures help employers “avoid the cost, time, and
harm to public image” occasioned when an employee ventures out-
side the organization for more formal redress.80 Discrimination com-
plaint procedures are also powerful symbols signifying concern for
EEO law and procedural fairness.81 Employers are likely to create
such structures with both legitimacy and efficiency in mind.82
Whether complainants benefit equally from internal complaint
procedures and external legal processes greatly depends on who ad-
ministers the internal mechanisms. While administrators may be
sincerely committed to equal employment opportunity, their position
as middle managers, concerned for their own careers, may hamper
their abilities to bring about significant change.83 To mediate these
competing concerns, complaint handlers may administrate in a way
that is minimally intrusive in an organizational sense yet shows con-
cern for legal ideals.84
Indeed, semistructured interviews of such personnel specialists
found that they were not concerned with actual legal rights and out-
comes.85 Instead, personnel specialists narrowed the range of claims
and remedies by recasting most disputes as individual personality
clashes rather than instances of possible discrimination.86 The goal of
racial and gender equality was exchanged for a goal of good manage-
rial practice and a rather unspecified notion that decisions should be
fair.87 Complaints were resolved, constituting a true gain for employ-
ees. However, complaint handlers viewed the procedures as mecha-
nisms for venting frustrations and healing relationships rather than
                                                                                                                      
79. See id. at 499, 502.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 501.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 501; see also Lauren B. Edelman et al., Legal Ambiguity and the Politics
of Compliance: Affirmative Action Officers’ Dilemma, 13 LAW & POL’Y 73, 77 (1991) (noting
that “[t]oo many challenges to organizational practices might result in conflict with top
management and the affirmative action officer’s loss of authority or dismissal”).
84. See Edelman et al., supra note 78, at 498, 502.
85. See id. at 513-17.
86. See id. at 515-16. The tendency of alternative dispute resolution practitioners to
recast broad social problems as interpersonal difficulties has been noted in other settings.
See, e.g., RICHARD HOFRICHTER, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY: THE
EXPANSION OF THE INFORMAL STATE (1987) (examining neighborhood dispute resolution);
SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS
AMONG WORKING CLASS AMERICANS (1990) (examining family and neighborhood dispute
resolution).
87. See Edelman et al., supra note 78, at 515-16.
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punishing perpetrators or compensating complainants for actual
losses.88
This approach to complaint resolution can undermine legal rights
in several ways. First, the punitive, compensatory, and deterrence
goals of civil rights law will typically remain unfulfilled by these
procedures.89 Next, the systemic reach of discrimination can be ob-
scured by the focus on individual problems.90 In other words, reduc-
ing a supervisor-subordinate conflict to a mere lack of rapport can
conceal group-based biases that affect many employees. Further-
more, the study’s authors posit that discrimination complaint proce-
dures can encourage complainants not to take legal action even
though there may be grounds for it; that is to say, the process itself
may convince the complainant that further action is unwarranted or
futile.91
The final, most significant way in which complaint procedures can
undermine legal rights is that agencies or courts may view these
procedures themselves as evidence that discrimination was not pres-
ent.92 In another recent study, Edelman and her colleagues found
evidence that courts may be using employers’ symbolic responses as
“ready-made yardsticks for compliance.”93 If these sociologists are
correct, then human resource professionals and management attor-
neys can be seen, in a roundabout way, as providing a definition for
the once ambiguous term “discrimination.” These professionals’ eve-
ryday practices create a judicially accepted form of legal compliance
that is symbolic and procedural rather than substantive and result-
oriented. In other words, to the extent that compliance mechanisms
are equated with nondiscriminatory working conditions, the proce-
dures provide a kind of counter-definition for discrimination itself.
                                                                                                                      
88. See id. at 526-28. In fact, the IDR mechanisms examined in the study did not in-
corporate traditional legal remedies for complainants even where discrimination was found.
See id. at 523.
89. Sexual harassment complaints, however, are an exception. The study found that
virtually all of the terminations reported by complaint handlers involved cases where they
concluded that sexual harassment had occurred. See id. at 523-24.
90. See id. at 519.
91. See id. at 528.
92. See id. at 530. Vicki Schultz has noted a similar phenomenon in job segregation
cases. Employers defending against such suits strengthen their arguments that women
were not interested in nontraditional occupations by pointing to antidiscrimination person-
nel policies such as affirmative action plans. See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women
and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases
Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1750 (1990).
93.  Suchman & Edelman, supra note 17, at 924; see also Edelman, supra note 11, at
1412; Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures
as Rational Myth (paper presented at the 1995 Law & Society Association Annual Meeting,
on file with author).
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Evidence of this phenomenon may be found in Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. El-
lerth.94 In Ellerth, the Supreme Court held that employers are vi-
cariously liable for hostile environment sexual harassment perpe-
trated by supervisors.95 However, where no tangible employment ac-
tion is taken against the victim, an affirmative defense is available to
the employer. The employer may avoid liability by demonstrating the
following: (1) it acted reasonably to prevent and rectify any harass-
ing behavior, for example, by promulgating a sexual harassment
complaint procedure; and (2) the plaintiff unreasonably failed to use
the procedure or otherwise avoid harm.96
In setting forth the justification for the affirmative defense, Jus-
tice Kennedy noted that “Title VII is designed to encourage the crea-
tion of anti-harassment policies and effective grievance mecha-
nisms.”97 This statement is fascinating in light of the sociological lit-
erature discussed above. Kennedy does not simply say that legal
compliance can be achieved through employment practices long rec-
ommended by personnel managers and defense attorneys.98 Rather,
he reflexively states that a central purpose of this once ambiguous
antidiscrimination statute is to promote practices recommended by
these professionals.
The affirmative defense described in Ellerth, at least as inter-
preted by some courts, represents an affirmation of symbolic compli-
ance and a turn away from mandating a truly discrimination-free
working environment. Achieving the latter goal would require hold-
ing employers strictly liable for supervisor harassment.99 In contrast,
recent judicial analyses view the standard for legal compliance as
based on the existence of appropriate personnel policies rather than
based on the work environment itself.100 Thus, an employer will not
                                                                                                                      
94. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
95. See id. at 2265-68.
96. See id. at 2270.
97. Id. The Court recently expanded its view of Title VII’s preventative purposes along
similar lines. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, No. 98-208, 1999 WL 407481, at *12
(U.S. June 22, 1999) (“The purposes underlying Title VII are . . . advanced where employers
are encouraged to adopt antidiscrimination policies and to educate their personnel on Title
VII's prohibitions.”).
98. The Supreme Court first addressed the relevance of complaint procedures as a po-
tential defense in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-73 (1986).
99. Where the supervisor’s conduct results in a tangible employment action, like ter-
mination or demotion, the employer is strictly liable. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
118 S.Ct. 2275, 2284 (1998).
100. See, e.g., Duran v. Flagstar Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (D. Colo. 1998)
(granting summary judgment for an employer on a Title VII claim when the company’s pol-
icy prohibited harassment, described complaint procedure, and was distributed to employ-
ees via handbook); Jones v. USA Petroleum Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1386 (S.D. Ga. 1998)
(granting summary judgment for the employer on all Title VII claims after finding a har-
assment grievance procedure “legally sufficient”). But cf. Lancaster v. Sheffler Enters., 19
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be said to discriminate, notwithstanding its supervisor’s creation of a
hostile environment, if a standard harassment policy exists and has
been communicated to employees.101 An employee whose fear of using
the policy is judged unreasonable is without redress.102
This discussion does not suggest that sexual harassment proce-
dures are inconsequential. They are certainly important symbols
that demonstrate commitment to EEO principles. These procedures
may also be valuable mechanisms for venting frustrations, resolving
disputes, and even for punishing perpetrators when employees com-
plain and discrimination is recognized.103 However, even in the best
of cases, these procedures do not provide compensation to victims.
Nor are they likely to have as great a deterrent effect as that pro-
duced by litigation.104
The next section examines the degree to which management law-
yers use compliance principles in legal practice today and considers
the effect this may produce in popular and legal perceptions of dis-
crimination. As noted above, by offering litigation prevention advice,
defense attorneys attempt to ensure that their clients’ employment
decisions can withstand legal challenges. Precepts gleaned from the
prior discussion, however, are important for understanding the pos-
sible ramifications of this defense strategy.
One should view litigation prevention advice as part of the effort
to create antidiscrimination compliance mechanisms. Therefore, the
strategies recommended may well tend to produce symbolic rather
than substantive results. We might also expect that employers’ adop-
tion of the attorneys’ suggestions would make it increasingly difficult
to discern discrimination in any given situation. Because bullet-
proofed employment decisions do not bear the traditional markers of
discriminatory process, aggrieved employees may be persuaded not
to take formal legal action even when there are grounds for it.
Moreover, outsiders reviewing bulletproofed decisions—whether
courts, administrative agencies, or plaintiffs’ attorneys—may regard
                                                                                                                      
F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1003 (W.D. Mo. 1998) (“[Employer r]easonableness requires more than is-
suing a policy.”).
101. See Jones, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1386; Duran, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 1203.
102. See Jones, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1386; Duran, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 1203.
103. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying discussion.
104. The lack of a public declaration that rights have been violated may well impede the
deterrence goals of civil rights laws. In fact, Edelman and her colleagues found that dis-
crimination complaint handlers tend to handle disciplinary cases with utmost discretion out
of concern for the privacy of the accused and fear that the accused will sue the employer for
wrongful discharge or discipline. See Edelman et al., supra note 78, at 524. Employer-
protective court decisions barring suits where the employer acted fairly, honestly, and in
good faith may ameliorate some of the complaint handlers’ concerns. See, e.g., McKnight v.
Kimberly Clark Corp., 149 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir. 1998); Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int’l.,
Inc., 948 P.2d 412 (Cal. 1998); Southwest Gas v. Vargas, 901 P.2d 693 (Nev. 1995).
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the way the decisions were produced as evidence that discrimination
did not infect them. In short, just as the actions of discrimination
complaint handlers may undermine the rights of employees, the
strategies of defense attorneys may significantly alter the ability of
employees, plaintiffs’ counsel, and the public-at-large to discern con-
tinuing conditions of inequality in the workplace.
III.   DEFENSE PRACTICE IN EVERYDAY LIFE
To determine how practitioners’ everyday actions may affect anti-
discrimination law, it makes sense to examine what they say about
it. This project, therefore, began with a content analysis of advice
and training materials published by employment lawyers. I studied a
sample of the literature created by these professionals—both those
who represent defendants and those who represent plaintiffs—and
analyzed the publications’ themes.105 Materials were plentiful, a
bounty that reflects the extent to which the American workplace has
been infiltrated by formal law. Most striking, however, was the reali-
zation that defense attorneys are producing much of the literature.
This is due to the role that management lawyers play for their cli-
ents.
Employers rely extensively on the legal profession for advice
about the ambiguities of employment law.106 This is in great part be-
cause the legal system lacks a simple method for conveying informa-
tion on legal developments to nonlawyers.107 As workplace regulation
proliferates, navigating its complexities becomes increasingly diffi-
cult. Out of necessity, employers turn to individuals with the time
and expertise to make sense of the ever-evolving legal climate within
which they must operate.
Management attorneys transmit their impressions of the legal
environment to managers in a number of ways. One obvious method
is by offering client-specific legal advice on a tangible problem con-
fronting the organization.108 Such legal problem solving addresses far
more than the particular dilemma at hand and educates manage-
ment about how particular kinds of problems fit into the larger legal
context.
                                                                                                                      
105. Content analysis involves systematically studying a set of objects to interpret the
themes contained in the set. See MICHAEL QUINN PATTON, QUALITATIVE EVALUATION AND
RESEARCH METHODS 381 (1990) (“Content analysis is the process of identifying, coding, and
categorizing the primary patterns in the data.”); CELIA C. REAVES, QUANTITATIVE
RESEARCH FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 349 (1992) (“Content analysis [is] a type of un-
obtrusive research that analyzes the meanings of recorded messages, including books, dia-
ries, letters, songs, and television commercials.”).
106. See Edelman et al., supra note 59, at 60-62.
107. See id. at 47.
108. See id. at 61.
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Another transmission mechanism involves providing formal
classroom training on employment law. Many defense attorneys con-
duct workshops on legal topics for managers.109 At least one study
has noted that corporate personnel professionals regard such presen-
tations highly:
[Personnel professionals] repeatedly emphasized the value of the
increasingly prevalent personnel workshops (often organized by
lawyers) that are intended to demystify many types of federal
regulation, especially Title VII. A common theme of such work-
shops is that by formalizing evaluation and discipline procedures,
documenting unsatisfactory work and behavioral problems, and
giving written warning before terminating an employee, organiza-
tions are more likely to appear to have acted fairly and therefore
to prevail in lawsuits.110
In fact, evidence indicates an increasing demand for such training.111
Many defense lawyers also publish what I refer to as general ad-
visory material. These publications include legal reference books
aimed at human resource managers112 and articles in frequently read
legal and business trade journals.113 The books and articles generally
discuss employment law topics and often provide “tips” on legal com-
pliance.
A great deal of the literature for my analysis, however, came from
continuing legal education (CLE) programs dedicated to instructing
attorneys on workplace law. These seminars provide study guides
and training materials to participants.114 The materials, typically a
                                                                                                                      
109. See id. at 76-77.
110. Edelman, supra note 11, at 1435. The Wall Street Journal reports that “[f]iring les-
sons may be the hottest trend in management seminars.” Andrea Gerlin, Seminars Teach
Managers Finer Points of Firing, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1995, at B1. The main thrust of these
seminars is “minimizing employers’ legal exposure.” Id.
111. See Susan J. Wells, Supervisors Learn Rules of Hiring, Firing Game, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, Mar. 8, 1998, at B1 (noting the need and increased demand for employment
law training); see also Employers Wage War on Workplace Lawsuits, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov.
11, 1998 (discussing training programs as part of employers’ “increasingly aggressive war
against employee lawsuits”).
112. See, e.g., STEVEN C. KAHN ET AL., LEGAL GUIDE TO HUMAN RESOURCES (1994).
113. See, e.g., Jonathan Segal, EEO Policies: Walking the Razor’s Edge, HR MAGAZINE,
Dec. 1997, at 109; Simon Malko, On the Defensive with the ADA, HR FOCUS, Feb. 1998, at 5;
James Seaman, An Extension of the ADA, in GETTING RESULTS FOR THE HANDS ON
MANAGER, Oct. 1997, at 5; John J. Myers, Reduce the Risk of Frivolous Law Suits, in
GETTING RESULTS FOR THE HANDS ON MANAGER, Oct. 1997, at 7; Dave Pelland, Employ-
ment Practices Liability: Coverage Expands as Claims Increase, RISK MGMT., May 1996, at
60; Stephen Ruffino, An Ounce of Prevention, SMALL BUS. REP., Feb. 1994, at 9; Employ-
ment Audits Reduce Chance of Litigation, SUPERVISORY MGMT., Sept. 1994, at 14 [hereinaf-
ter, Employment Audits].
114. ALI-ABA’s brochure for its Current Developments in Employment Law course
notes that “[a]n important aspect of this course has been the study materials, which have
averaged nearly a thousand pages.” ALI-ABA, Current Developments in Employment Law,
July 17-19, 1997 (brochure on file with author).
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compilation of individual papers authored by faculty members, me-
morialize the advice and information given at the course.
Employment law CLE programs have proliferated in recent years.
Some courses specifically offer instruction to both plaintiffs’ and de-
fense attorneys. For example, a 1997 American Law Institute-
American Bar Association (ALI-ABA) course entitled Current Devel-
opments in Employment Law was promoted as an “Advanced . . .
Course of Study for Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ Bars.”115 Other semi-
nars are targeted to a particular legal audience. The Greater New
York Chapter of the American Corporate Counsel Association
(ACCA) recently sponsored a course, Trends in Employment Litiga-
tion, providing instruction on “preventative labor and employment
law.”116 Across the aisle so to speak, the National Employment Law-
yers Association (NELA) hosts an annual convention that facilitates
the ongoing education of the plaintiffs’ bar.117
The conference and course materials from these programs reveal
a great deal about the practice of employment discrimination law in
the 1990s. There are two points to consider in this respect. First, the
instructors generally are highly accomplished legal professionals,
and most are experienced attorneys. However, law professors and
judges might be listed on faculty rosters as well.118 The recommended
                                                                                                                      
115. ALI-ABA CLE Review, May 30, 1997, at 5 (brochure on file with author). A bro-
chure for Georgetown University’s annual, bipartisan conference attempts to entice partici-
pants as follows: “Learn how your adversaries analyze issues by receiving BOTH the
PLAINTIFF and DEFENSE perspective on almost every subject.” Continuing Legal Educa-
tion Division, Georgetown University Law Center, Employment Law & Litigation Update,
Apr. 10–11, 1997 (brochure on file with author). The brochure for the Practicing Law Insti-
tute’s (PLI’s) 27th Annual Institute on Employment Law describes its preventative law
workshop as offering something for both plaintiffs’ lawyers and defense counsel: “Learn how
far-sighted employers ‘paper’ themselves out of trouble with policies which lower workforce
expectations, and how plaintiff lawyers in many jurisdictions can block these safe harbors.”
PLI, 27th Annual Institute on Employment Law, Oct. 5-6, 1998 (brochure on file with
author).
116. Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman, in TRENDS IN EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION 1
(American Corporate Counsel Association, 1995). A brochure for a recent seminar aimed at
in-house attorneys had a similar slant: “Counsel’s job . . . is to avoid litigation. So this
course discusses how to handle investigations and avoid or defend potentially ‘mega’ claims
in the wake of such uncertain law.” ALI-ABA, Employment and Labor Relations Law for the
Corporate Counsel and the General Practitioner, Apr. 23-25, 1998 (brochure on file with
author).
117. The line between the defense and plaintiffs’ bar is apparently semipermeable. One
defense attorney recently noted that “more and more defense lawyers have ‘made the
switch’ to practicing at least some employment law . . . representing plaintiffs.” Gary R.
Kessler, A View from the Other Side—Favorite Defense Lawyer Tactics in Defending Em-
ployment Cases, in 1998 NINTH ANNUAL CONVENTION 1224 (NELA, 1998). The reverse phe-
nomenon, plaintiffs’ attorneys who occasionally represent employers, was one finding of my
survey of the plaintiffs’ bar described herein. See infra note 426 and accompanying text.
118. The faculty for ALI-ABA’s course on Advanced Employment Law and Litigation,
held on Dec. 7-9, 1995, included: the late Honorable Charles Richey, a well-respected fed-
eral district court judge; Gilbert Casellas, then Chairman of the EEOC; and Charles Sha-
nor, a professor at Emory University School of Law. See ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAW AND
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strategies and advice rendered in the study guides represent views of
those considered among the most highly skilled in the legal profes-
sion.
Second, the views presented in these programs are widely dis-
seminated. Many of the courses provide credit hours to participating
attorneys who practice in mandatory continuing legal education ju-
risdictions.119 Significant numbers of lawyers take the courses for
both the CLE credit and the practice pointers they receive.120 Moreo-
ver, the dissemination of this information likely influences legal
practice around the country. Lawyers rely on experts within their
field for their interpretations of legal developments.121 Professional
meetings like the employment law CLE courses “create a fairly
strong consensus . . . as to what problems (or opportunities) the law
creates and what the appropriate responses are.”122 Thus, by exam-
ining the course and study guides, one gains a sense of how employ-
ment lawyers view and utilize antidiscrimination law.
A.   The Ubiquity of Litigation Prevention Advice
Examination of the materials described above reveals a striking
number of recurring themes and topics that fall roughly into three
broad categories: general reviews of the law,123 litigation strategy,124
                                                                                                                      
LITIGATION at xv-xvi (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Dec. 7-9, 1995) (faculty roster). Another
ALI-ABA course listed on its faculty roster no less than eight judges. See ALI-ABA, Em-
ployment Discrimination and Civil Rights Actions in Federal and State Courts (brochure for
Mar. 1998 seminar, on file with author).
119. For example, a Federal Publications course, entitled Avoiding Liability in the
Workplace, was announced in an advertising brochure as being eligible for 11 continuing le-
gal education credit hours in the following states: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Wash-
ington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. See Federal Publications Inc., Avoiding Li-
ability in the Workplace (May 1995) (brochure on file with author).
120. ALI-ABA, for example, reports that its approximately 100 courses, which cover a
broad range of substantive areas, are taken by thousands of lawyers each year. Preface to
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW at ii (ALI-ABA Course of Study, July 25-27,
1997).
121. See Edelman et al., supra note 59, at 61.
122. Id. at 62.
123. See, e.g., Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Review of Supreme Court’s Employment and Other
Significant Cases and Emerging Employment Issues, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
EMPLOYMENT LAW 1 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, July 17-19, 1997); Delores Y. Leal, Devel-
opments in Sexual Harassment Law, in GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CENTER CLE DIV., THE
TWELFTH ANNUAL EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY UPDATE 113 (1994); Mary K.
O’Melveny, Recent Developments Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, in 1996
SEVENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION 287 (NELA, 1996) (on file with author); Merrick T. Rossein,
Recent Developments in Employment Law, in 1998 NINTH ANNUAL CONVENTION 5 (NELA,
1998) (on file with author); Charles A. Shanor, Recent Developments in Age Discrimination
Litigation, in ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION 309 (ALI-ABA Course of
Study, Dec. 7-9, 1995); William R. Sullivan, Jr., Litigation Issues Arising Under the Ameri-
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and litigation prevention strategies. Both plaintiffs’ and defense at-
torneys offer advice and analysis in the first two categories. How-
ever, defense lawyers almost exclusively author recipes for legal
compliance, and their suggestions are comprehensive and detailed.
There are, of course, logical reasons why employee advocates
rarely publish litigation prevention advice. The most obvious reason
is that they practice employment discrimination law under con-
straints that do not affect defense attorneys. Unlike management
lawyers, plaintiffs’ attorneys are usually unable to market their
skills to employees before a specific workplace problem materializes.
The majority of employees seeking their assistance do so because
they have a specific workplace problem. In most cases, the plaintiffs’
attorney does not meet a client until that individual has been fired,
demoted, or passed over for promotion.125 At that point, as plaintiffs’
lawyer Paul Merry notes, “the facts are established, an inalterable
part of the case, and nothing we can tell the client will change this
history.”126
Some employees, however, are more legally sophisticated and
proactive and contact counsel when they begin to fear for their jobs,
                                                                                                                      
cans with Disabilities Act, in BENEFIT AND EMPLOYMENT LAW LITIGATION § VII (American
Confidence Institute, 1994).
124. For materials on discovery, see Mark S. Dichter & Deidre A. Grossman, Discovery
and the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LITIGATION 51, 67–106 (PLI, 1994); Thomas P. Murphy, Managing Discovery in Employ-
ment Litigation: The Employer’s Perspective, in SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIV. SCHOOL OF
LAW CLE PROGRAM, TWELFTH ANNUAL MULTI-STATE LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
SEMINAR at B1-12 (1994); Robert J. Truhlar, Discovery: Invading Their Space, in 1997
EIGHTH ANNUAL CONVENTION 141 (NELA, 1997) (on file with author). For materials on
summary judgment, see Katherine L. Butler, Avoiding Summary Judgment: Practical Tips
and Current Developments, in 1997 EIGHTH ANNUAL CONVENTION 49 (NELA, 1997) (on file
with author); Mark S. Dichter, The Rush to Summary Judgment in Employment Cases, in
THIRD ANNUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW & LITIGATION CONFERENCE 775-824 (Law Journal Semi-
nars Press, 1994); Ellen M. Martin, Dispositive Motions in Federal Employment Discrimina-
tion Cases, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN FEDERAL AND
STATE COURTS 859, 872–900 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, June 3-5, 1993). For materials on
opening and closing statements at trial, see Robert L. Bell, “Ready for the Plaintiff!” and
Other First Impressions in an Employment Discrimination Trial: Voir Dire and Opening
Statement, in, THE TWELFTH ANNUAL EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY UPDATE:
SUPPLEMENTAL COURSE MATERIALS § VIII (CLE Division, Georgetown Univ. Law Center,
1994); Roxanne Barton Conlin, Opening Statement: First Impressions Count Most in Em-
ployment Cases, in 1997 EIGHTH ANNUAL CONVENTION 20 (NELA, 1997) (on file with
author); John R. McCall, Trying an Employment Case to a Jury, in SOUTHERN METHODIST
UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW CLE PROGRAM, § I (Southern Methodist Univ. School of Law CLE
Program, 1994); Keith M. Pyburn, Jr., Sex Discrimination: Demonstration of Effective Open-
ing and Closing Statements, in THE THIRD ANNUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW & LITIGATION
CONFERENCE 827 (Law Journal Seminars Press, 1994).
125. See Paul H. Merry, Thoughts on Counseling the Current Employee, in 1996
SEVENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION 797 (NELA, 1996) (on file with author).
126. Id.
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but before formal action is taken against them.127 When this occurs,
the plaintiffs’ lawyer may be able to assist the employee in obtaining
a satisfactory outcome that avoids litigation.
There are risks and significant limitations for the attorney who
plays such a role. First, a danger exists that the employer will dis-
cover the employee has hired a lawyer, a fact likely to escalate the
existing conflict and prompt the employer to adopt an adversarial
posture.128 Next, some advocates worry that attorneys who focus on
providing advice short of litigation may overlook the running of the
statute of limitations on some types of claims, thereby exposing
themselves to malpractice claims.129 Moreover, if the employee is ul-
timately terminated or otherwise adversely affected, the employee
may attribute it to the advice that was given by the lawyer.130 Thus,
one attorney cautions his colleagues to give only general advice “that
may or may not apply to a given situation.”131
Finally, the issue of attorney compensation may be problematic.
Because employees often cannot afford to pay counsel on an hourly
basis, plaintiffs’ lawyers frequently rely on contingency fees for com-
pensation.132 Determining what an employee has recovered in a case,
for the purposes of obtaining a percentage, may be difficult absent a
damage award or settlement.133 How does one calculate the value of a
transfer, for example?
This is not to say that plaintiffs’ lawyers see no value in consult-
ing with employees before adverse action has been taken against the
employees. Nor are plaintiffs’ lawyers averse to obtaining positive
results for clients without resorting to litigation. Nonetheless, un-
derstanding the constraints under which these practitioners labor
helps explain why one finds little litigation prevention advice pub-
lished by the plaintiffs’ bar in comparison to their defense counter-
parts.
                                                                                                                      
127. See infra text accompanying note 427 (describing the percentage of my survey re-
spondents who reported having counseled employees before adverse employment actions
are taken against them).
128. See Stephen M. Murphy, What to Advise an Employee on the Firing Line, in 1996
SEVENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION 818 (NELA, 1996) (on file with author) (reprinted from
Lawyers Weekly USA, 1993).
129. See Merry, supra note 125, at 802; William Quackenbush et al., Problems Encoun-
tered When Representing Current Employees, in 1996 SEVENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION 791
(NELA, 1996) (on file with author).
130. See Merry, supra note 125, at 802; Quakenbush et al., supra note 129, at 791.
131. Joseph Posner, Counseling the About to be Terminated Employee, L.A. TRIAL LAW.
ASS’N ADVOC., May 1987, at 5.
132. See PAUL H. TOBIAS & SUSAN SAUTER, JOB RIGHTS & SURVIVAL STRATEGIES: A
HANDBOOK FOR TERMINATED EMPLOYEES 107 (1997). Many attorneys require clients to pay
costs and a retainer fee. See id.
133. See Merry, supra note 125, at 804.
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In contrast, defense attorneys find a tremendous market for their
services as expert interpreters of employment law.134 As legal regula-
tion of the workplace continues to expand, employers increasingly
seek the assistance of management attorneys in helping them make
sense of it. Indeed, a recent survey by the Bureau of National Affairs
indicates that human resource managers have grown more depend-
ent on lawyers over the past several years.135
It should surprise no one that defense attorneys engage in the
discussion and dissemination of compliance strategies. Both associ-
ates and partners are under tremendous pressure to generate reve-
nues for their firms.136 Business development not only takes the form
of servicing old clients, it also requires that attorneys attract new
clients.
Providing litigation avoidance advice facilitates business genera-
tion in two ways. First, this advice operates as a form of advertise-
ment for the attorney and his or her firm. Not only does a publica-
tion or speech place one’s name before the public; it can also estab-
lish professional status and expertise.137 For example, a well-written
article in a personnel management journal can help a lawyer demon-
strate the breadth of his or her legal knowledge and skill.
Second, articles on compliance strategies attempt to set the stage
for corporate action. Discussions aimed at managers often make the
threat of employer liability explicit. A recent article, for example,
asks ominously, “Could your company become the victim of judicial
blackmail?”138 It then continues:
                                                                                                                      
134. Management attorneys can be creative marketers. For example, mega-
management firm Littler, Mendelsohn, Fastiff & Tishy recently joined with an insurance
company that supplies a new insurance product: employment practices liability insurance.
See Jenna Ward, Program Links Littler with Insurer, THE RECORDER, Nov. 19, 1997 at A1;
Albert R. Karr, Insurers Press Firms to Ensure Against Litigation, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18,
1997, at A1. The insurance policy, which protects employers from workplace-related law
suits brought by employees, comes with a risk management audit performed by Littler. The
law firm reviews corporate policies and practices, and issues a report on the company’s vul-
nerability to suit. Obviously, for Littler this is more than a one-shot evaluation; rather, it is
an opportunity to establish an ongoing relationship with a new corporate client.
135. See HR Managers Turn to Counsel More Often in Wake of New Laws, BNA Survey
Finds, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D27 (Feb. 15, 1995). Fifty-five percent of the human resource
executives responding to the survey described their companies as “somewhat more reliant”
or “much more reliant” on legal counsel than they were in 1989. Ninety-three percent of the
managers seek legal review of some of their human resource policies and procedures, 66%
consult with attorneys about new laws, and 62% seek advice in response to employee and
applicant complaints, such as discrimination claims.
136. Many commentators bemoan that legal practice, rather than being a civic-calling,
now functions primarily as a profit-making endeavor. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE
LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 1-2 (1993).
137. This is known as “reputation marketing” and consists of “speeches, articles and
seminars that will build [the attorney’s] reputation.” Barbara Lewis & Dan Otto, Marketing
Techniques: A Contact Sport, CAL. LITIG., Winter 1998, at 10.
138. Myers, supra note 113, at 7.
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All too often, terminated employees will retaliate against their
former employers by bringing frivolous discrimination lawsuits.
Those who file these suits are banking—literally—on the com-
pany’s willingness to make a payoff rather than risk the costs and
embarrassment of a public trial. Even a frivolous lawsuit, after
all, generates high expenses and negative press.139
This sort of pitch, followed by extensive recommendations for al-
teration of company practices, makes the need for legal expertise
palpable. In the business law context, Donald Langevoort and Robert
Rasmussen posit that lawyers overstate legal risk to demonstrate the
necessity and value of legal services.140 Lauren Edelman, Steven
Abraham, and Howard Erlanger find this phenomenon present in
employment law counseling as well.141 Even if one does not believe
that the threat to employers from discrimination litigation is over-
estimated, preventative strategies in both content and tone are cal-
culated to drum up business for the lawyers offering them.142
The proliferation of litigation avoidance advice is thus easy to ex-
plain. Management lawyers dispense it in order to create a market
for their services. An important issue, however, is whether employ-
ers assimilate the suggestions they receive. I suggest that to a great,
but admittedly imperfect, extent they do.143 One need not argue that
employers slavishly follow litigation prevention advice to understand
that compliance activity is enormously consequential. The reasons
corporate clients are receptive to the compliance strategies recom-
mended by defense attorneys are considered below.
                                                                                                                      
139. Id.
140. See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role
of Lawyers Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 377 (1997).
141. See Edelman et al., supra note 59, at 74-75. This study argues that employment at-
torneys inflate the threat of wrongful discharge litigation and then “claim to be able to con-
tain that threat” in order to create a market for their services. Id.
142. Edelman and her colleagues did not analyze attorney rhetoric regarding employ-
ment discrimination litigation. Indeed, perceptions of the amount of federal civil rights liti-
gation activity differ significantly depending upon who is asked. See Julie Davies, Federal
Civil Rights Practice in the 1990’s: The Dichotomy Between Reality and Theory, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 197, 202-03 (1997). Some portray the federal civil rights docket as inundated
by an avalanche of claims. See id. Others note that civil rights may be “among the least in-
voked of all laws.” David M. Engel & Frank W. Munger, Rights, Remembrance, and the Rec-
onciliation of Difference, 30 L. & SOC’Y REV. 7, 10 (1996); see also KRISTEN BUMILLER, THE
CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY 1-4 (1988) (arguing, inter alia, that people tend not to pursue civil
rights claims because they resist defining themselves as victims). Nonetheless, raw num-
bers provide a sense of how much formal litigation is taking place. In 1997 the number of
EEO case filings in federal court was 24,174, a 4.4% increase from 1996. See Nancy
Montwieler, Rate of EEO Litigation Eased in ‘97, But Government Cases Jumped Sharply,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) B2 (Mar. 27, 1998).
143. See Suchman & Edelman, supra note 17, at 931 (noting that organizations give
formal law selective, imperfect attention).
1999]                         BULLETPROOFING THE WORKPLACE 985
B.   Why Employers Listen
Corporations are receptive to litigation prevention advice for a
number of reasons. The first reason is the existence of a sympatheti-
cally allied group of professionals who work on the inside: human re-
source managers. As noted above, in the early 1970s, personnel pro-
fessionals and management attorneys began to respond opportunisti-
cally to the threats posed by an expanding field of employment
regulation.144 Interestingly, the legal profession initially reacted in a
more measured way than the personnel profession.145 For example,
human resource managers actively advocated for the use of nonun-
ion grievance procedures and employment at will clauses146 as com-
pliance mechanisms before employment lawyers advocated their
use.147
The enthusiasm of human resource professionals for legal compli-
ance strategies is in part attributable to the desire of this group to
enhance its standing within the corporation.148 Personnel managers,
occupying in many respects marginal roles within organizations,
need to demonstrate their importance and expertise.149 By offering
solutions to the perceived threat of litigation, they extend their in-
fluence over corporate affairs. In fact, Sutton and Dobbin note that
some human resource professionals in the 1970s quite consciously
advocated using “managers’ uncertainty over standards of compli-
ance as leverage for upgrading and formalizing the personnel func-
tion within firms.”150
Management attorneys assist human resource managers in main-
taining their jurisdiction over corporate employment relations.151 The
affiliation between the professional groups has been described this
way:
[R]ather than competing with lawyers for jurisdiction over organ-
izational response to the legal environment, the personnel profes-
sion has developed an informal alliance with the legal profession.
Because the legal profession’s expertise over law-related matters
enjoys widespread social acceptance, the personnel profession
                                                                                                                      
144. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text; see also Sutton & Dobbin, supra
note 12, at 800.
145. See Sutton & Dobbin, supra note 12, at 801.
146. These clauses, also called disclaimers of contractual liability, expressly state that
the employer may terminate the employee without just cause. See id. at 796. They are often
published in employee handbooks and employment applications. See id. For examples of
such clauses, see CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
LAW 182 (1993).
147. See Sutton & Dobbin, supra note 12, at 801.
148. See id. at 800; Sutton et al., supra note 38, at 949-50.
149. See Edelman et al., supra note 59, at 74-76.
150. Sutton & Dobbin, supra note 12, at 800.
151. See Edelman et al., supra note 59, at 61.
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benefits from, and is legitimated by, the alliance between the two
professions.152
In return, the presence of a receptive audience inside the corporation
helps defense attorneys secure a market for legal services.153
A second reason why employers are receptive to litigation avoid-
ance strategies concerns the nature of corporate response to legal
regulation itself: organizations are resistant to the intrusion of for-
mal law. Writing about tax regulation, Doreen McBarnet notes that
the imposition of legal rules often prompts corporations to use legal
services to achieve their goals.154 Corporate lawyers minimize the ef-
fects of law on their clients by developing creative legal strategies for
avoiding the law’s consequences, a technique McBarnet calls “crea-
tive compliance.”155
Creative compliance is also a way of managing legal regulation of
the workplace. Corporate responses to union organizing efforts are a
useful example. While, by law, an employer cannot prohibit the con-
certed activities of its employees, an employer can take steps to di-
minish the chances that an organizing effort will be successful.156 In-
deed, employers typically offer active resistance to the attempts of
their employees to unionize.
One recent analysis of union organizing campaigns concluded
that union busting, an aggressive and often unlawful form of em-
ployer resistance, is a widespread occurrence among employers.157
Moreover, the study found that employers routinely hire manage-
ment attorneys and consultants to help them defeat organizing ef-
                                                                                                                      
152. Id. at 76.
153. The alliance between the two professional groups is nicely illustrated by the Soci-
ety for Human Resource Management’s annual employment law and legislative conference.
The conference sessions, which are designed to educate personnel managers, often show-
case attorneys who discuss legal developments and compliance strategies. See, e.g., ADA,
FMLA May Frustrate Human Resources, But Laws Can Be Dealt With, Attorneys Say, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) C2 (March 12, 1998) (discussing the compliance strategies recommended
by attorneys at two different conference sessions).
154. See Doreen McBarnet, Legal Creativity: Law, Capital and Legal Avoidance, in
LAWYERS IN A POSTMODERN WORLD: TRANSLATION AND TRANSGRESSION 73, 75 (Maureen
Cain & Christine B. Harrington eds., 1994).
155. Id.
156. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) grants to employees, inter alia, the right
“to form, join, or assist labor organizations.” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994). Section 158(a)(1) of the
NLRA prohibits employer interference with restraint or coercion in the exercise of that
right. See id. § 158(a)(1). Additionally, section 158(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to discriminate “in regard to hire or tenure of employment” to “discourage
membership in any labor organization.” Id. § 158(a)(3). Nonetheless, employers are entitled
to make their views on unionization known to employees so long as those views are not ex-
pressed coercively. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969).
157. See Richard W. Hurd & Joseph B. Uehlein, Patterned Responses to Organizing:
Case Studies of the Union Busting Convention, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN
LABOR LAW 61, 62 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994).
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forts.158 These specialists frequently employ strategies that “test the
legal and technical limits” of the law’s protection of workers rights.159
In other words, they assist employers in achieving union avoidance
by practicing creative compliance.
One labor and employment law firm has coined a phrase to de-
scribe a particular type of workplace creative compliance. Jackson,
Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman refers to the technique it helped de-
velop as preventive employment relations.160 The goal of preventative
employment relations is to create a workplace environment free from
the factors that trigger outside regulation. Note the firm’s pitch for
its services: “perhaps our proudest accomplishment is the number of
clients who have relied on our expertise in developing issue-free en-
vironments, thereby making intervention of a union unnecessary.”161
At its best, the technique inoculates the employees against the desire
to explore the benefits of union representation.
From an employer’s perspective, practicing union avoidance
makes sense because unions restrain the decision-making ability of
corporate management. Employment discrimination law offers a
similar challenge to managerial authority.162 Given the proliferation
of antidiscrimination laws,163 it is not possible to hire, fire, or pro-
mote without considering potential liability. Moreover, workplace le-
gal regulation potentially opens up to scrutiny and reevaluation
every employment decision an employer makes, an outcome viewed
as both inefficient and antithetical to the business interests of the
firm.164
                                                                                                                      
158. See id. A recent study of 261 National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) union certifi-
cation elections found that 86% of the employers used outside management consultants or
lawyers to help orchestrate their campaigns. See Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behav-
ior in Certification Elections and First-Contract Campaigns: Implications for Labor Law
Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW, supra note 157, at 75, 80.
However, the study determined that only 15% of the outside experts were lawyers. See id.
159. Gordon R. Pavy, Winning NLRB Elections and Establishing Collective Bargaining
Relationships, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW, supra note 157, at
110, 115.
160. As the firm notes in its promotional materials:
Jackson Lewis has been, in many respects, a pioneer. We are probably the
first firm actively to practice preventive labor and employment law. From our
beginning 37 years ago, Jackson Lewis has advocated that the education of
management is the key to avoiding legal problems. This preventive approach
continues to be the foundation of our practice.
Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman, supra note 116, at 1.
161. Id.
162. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 29, at 361; see also Edelman, supra note 15, at 1532-
33.
163. See supra note 50 (listing the major federal statutes passed after Title VII).
164. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 29, at 361; Edelman, supra note 15, at 1535. Many
management attorneys stress that defending suits is a costly and time-consuming process.
See, e.g., David A. Cathcart, Employment Termination Litigation: Collateral Tort Theories
and the Multimillion Dollar Verdict, in RESOURCE MATERIALS: EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR
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A partial solution to this problem can be obtained by enlisting the
services of management attorneys or, at the very least, reading and
absorbing their general advice. What do these lawyers recommend
organizations do to decrease the risk of costly legal challenges? They
advocate the adoption of compliance strategies that greatly increase
an employer’s ability to defend the decisions the employer makes.
A third reason employers are receptive to management attorneys’
advice has been discussed previously: organizations experience nor-
mative pressures to comply with equal opportunity law and preven-
tative strategies are compliance mechanisms. By adopting the prac-
tices lawyers recommend, organizations demonstrate adherence to
antidiscrimination principles. Organizations are complex social ac-
tors that react not only to efficiency concerns, but also to society’s
cultural norms.165 Support for equal employment opportunity is
widespread in American society166 and has had a decided impact on
corporate practices.167 These compliance mechanisms are adopted be-
cause, inter alia, organizations view adoption as “the proper, legiti-
mate, or natural thing to do.”168
Finally, employers likely assimilate the suggestions they receive
from defense lawyers because they gain a great deal by doing so. As
Lauren Edelman notes:
[O]rganizations that appear attentive to EEO/AA law are less
likely to provoke protest by protected classes of employees within
the firm or community members who seek jobs, they are more
likely to secure government resources (contracts, grants, etc.), and
they are less likely to trigger audits by regulatory agencies. And,
if sued, organizations can point to the structural changes as evi-
dence of the non-discriminatory nature of their policies and prac-
tices.169
                                                                                                                      
LAW 309, 328 (ALI-ABA, 1995) (describing “substantial risks and costs arising from litiga-
tion”); Peter M. Panken & Stacey B. Babson, Avoiding Employment Litigation: Alternative
Dispute Resolution of Employment Disputes in the 90’s, in ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAW
AND LITIGATION 61, 64 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Dec. 1-3, 1994) (“It is time to stop this
proliferation of litigation, find a faster method of resolving disputes and get on with produc-
tive pursuits.”); Stephen M. Paskoff, Members of the Jury: Aftershocks of New Employment
Laws 6 (June 1994) (warning that litigation saps “financial and human resources which
should be devoted to business”) (training materials distributed at the Society for Human
Resource Management Annual Conference, on file with author).
165. See Suchman & Edelman, supra note 17, at 918.
166. One commentator aptly notes, “Civil rights laws in our secular culture play a role
analogous to that of a sacred text.” D. Marvin Jones, The Death of the Employer: Image,
Text, and Title VII, 45 VAND. L. REV. 349, 350 n.4 (1992).
167. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
168. Suchman & Edelman, supra note 17, at 919.
169. Edelman, supra note 15, at 1542.
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In short, listening to what management lawyers say about how to
comply with employment discrimination law and avoid litigation
makes good sense. A little compliance can go a long way.
The harder question, however, is the net effect of compliance
mechanisms on conditions of workplace inequality. To the extent
that litigation prevention advice promotes symbolic rather than sub-
stantive gestures, it may mask discrimination and make it difficult
for aggrieved employees to obtain outside assistance.170 It may also,
as previously noted, affect public perceptions of the prevalence of
employment discrimination. The next sections will review the con-
tent of defense advice with this key question in mind.
C.   Scripting Reality with Litigation Prevention Advice
Perhaps the most interesting attribute of litigation prevention
advice is the degree to which it consciously advocates the creation of
beneficial evidence on an ongoing basis and envisions the potential
use of that proof. Indeed, development of a record that can be used by
an employer to defend its employment decisions is the main thrust of
the literature.171 Management attorneys clearly recognize that the
workplace is a fertile site for generating information that both sup-
ports and undermines the goals of their clients. By recommending
various compliance tools, these lawyers attempt to maximize the
amount of data available for the resistance of legal challenges and
minimize the data favorable to a future plaintiff-employee.172
Recognizing that evidence in employment discrimination cases is
not found but created by human beings is important for this discus-
sion.173 Some of it may be produced inadvertently, such as when a
supervisor makes an unthinking derogatory statement about minori-
ties or women.174 Some evidence is created deliberately, for example,
                                                                                                                      
170. See Edelman et al., supra note 78, at 530.
171. See infra Part III.C.1.
172. One attorney put it this way: “Fortunately, employers need not be idle victims. In-
stead, you can review your employment practices and make small changes that will de-
crease the possibility of legal claims and improve your chances of having a successful de-
fense if a dispute cannot be avoided.” Ruffino, supra note 113, at 9.
173. See GARY LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
SEXUAL ASSAULT 106 (1989) (noting that in criminal cases investigators will generate more
or less evidence depending on their interest in winning a case).
174. See, e.g., Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1318 (8th
Cir. 1994) (quoting employer’s admission that “women in sales were the worst thing that
had happened” to the company); EEOC v. Alton Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d 920, 924 (11th
Cir. 1990) (quoting a supervisor’s remark that “if it were his company he would not hire
blacks”). In discrimination cases, these “smoking gun” statements are considered direct
proof of the decisionmaker’s animus toward a protected group. See Mark S. Brodin, The
Demise of Circumstantial Proof in Employment Discrimination Litigation: St. Mary’s Honor
Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the “Personality” Excuse, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 183,
187-88 (1997). Though such statements no doubt are still made, they are today increasingly
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when a plaintiff hires an expert to prepare a report on conditions at
a particular work site.175 Nonetheless, not all parties are equal in
their ability to attract and produce the evidence necessary to sustain
their claims.176 In fact, people and organizations with “elevated social
status” and “extensive social ties” have significant evidentiary ad-
vantages.177
Understanding evidence as the creation of human labor and as
being affected by the litigants’ social attributes highlights the advan-
tages held by management attorneys and their clients. Employment
discrimination cases are unique in that employers typically possess
most of the documents bearing on liability. As one practitioner notes,
“[t]he single biggest advantage an employer has in employment dis-
crimination litigation is control over the facts. By contrast to the
typical commercial litigation, in an employment case the defense
generally controls almost all, if not all, the documents relevant to li-
ability.”178 Significantly, these records, including the employee’s per-
sonnel file, are considered the employer’s property.179 Thus, before
litigation is commenced access to them by the employee may be se-
verely limited.180
Moreover, documents may be created years in advance of any liti-
gation. Therefore, in a dispute, the records can be used by manage-
                                                                                                                      
rare. See Charles A. Edwards, Direct Evidence of Discriminatory Intent and the Burden of
Proof: An Analysis and Critique, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 16 (1986) (noting that direct
evidence of discriminatory intent is seldom available).
175. Plaintiffs have effectively used experts in discrimination suits involving stereo-
typing and glass ceiling issues. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 467
(D.C. Cir. 1987), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 490 U.S. 228, 295 (1989); Robinson
v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1523 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Valdez v. Church’s
Fried Chicken, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 596, 611 (W.D. Tex. 1988); see also Donna M. Ryu, Practice
Pointers for Litigating Glass Ceiling Class Actions, 1998 NINTH ANNUAL CONVENTION 823,
838 (NELA, 1998) (discussing the use of experts to expose stereotyping and bias in defen-
dant’s practices).
176. See Mark Cooney, Evidence as Partisanship, 28 L. & SOC’Y REV. 833, 834 (1994).
177. Id.
178. Martin, supra note 124, at 873.
179. See Barbara A. Caulfied, Employment Law: No “Self-Help” Discovery Allowed, CAL.
LAW., Jan. 1998, at 32; see also Peter M. Panken & Stacey B. Babson, Creating the Person-
nel Paper Trail: Personnel Manuals, in RESOURCE MATERIALS: EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW
5, 36 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, 7th ed. 1995) (providing an example of corporate record
policy that prohibits both unsupervised access to personnel records by employee and record
duplication).
180. Employee advocates Paul Tobias and Susan Sauter caution prospective plaintiffs to
resist the temptation to take company records without authorization.
An employee’s personnel files, including hiring or firing information, salary in-
formation, letters to clients, and internal memoranda are the property of the
company. You do not have the right to take them with you when you go. Except
in [17 states], you do not have the legal right to look at the information in your
file. Your employer may have a policy allowing access or may honor a request to
review the file. Be persistent in your request to copy [the] file, but realize that
your employer may be under no legal obligation to allow you to do so.
See TOBIAS & SAUTER, supra note 132, at 20-21.
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ment to reconstruct what happened years before.181 And if prepared
properly, these records can significantly affect the outcome of a law-
suit.182
Employers are also advantaged in obtaining favorable testimonial
evidence. Mark Cooney notes that the willingness of witnesses to
come forward and the partisanship of their testimony tend to in-
crease with the status of the party requesting the evidentiary assis-
tance.183 This phenomenon certainly appears operative in employ-
ment discrimination litigation, where corporate entities appear to
outrank employees. One advocate observes:
The defense . . . generally controls almost all, if not all, the wit-
nesses other than the plaintiff. One reason for this is that the
witnesses with knowledge of facts that occurred in the workplace
tend to have allegiance to the employer. It is not unusual in an
employment discrimination case for the plaintiff not to be able to
call a single witness other than himself on liability and, indeed,
for the plaintiff to have to call defense witnesses on his case-in-
chief in order to avoid a directed verdict.184
Access to witnesses provides the defense with several evidentiary
advantages.185 Obviously, it enables the employer to enlarge the uni-
verse of supportive evidence. For example, one attorney suggests in
discharge cases that “defense counsel must work with the witnesses
to recall as many specific factual examples of the traits being criti-
                                                                                                                      
181. See Paskoff, supra note 164, at 2.
182. See AUGUST BEQUAI, EVERY MANAGER’S LEGAL GUIDE TO FIRING 57 (1991) (“Rec-
ords can make or break a wrongful discharge case.”); Ralph H. Baxter, Jr. & Thomas P.
Klein, Protecting Against Exposure, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 28, 1994, at S1 (noting that the way
documents are prepared “can have a significant effect on the outcome of a [suit]”). Employ-
ees, too, may create records years before a dispute arises. Unlike employers, however, no
one is training them to do so.
183. See Cooney, supra note 176, at 843.
184. Martin, supra note 124, at 873; see also Vicki Lafer Abrahamson, Trying a Large
Damages Employment Discrimination Case, in THE THIRD ANNUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW &
LITIGATION CONFERENCE 727, 736 (Law Journal Seminars Press, 1994). Abrahamson, a
plaintiffs’ attorney, facetiously notes that highly regimented employers, such as large cor-
porations, “often employ plenty of individuals eager to display loyalty to the employer by
serving as defense witnesses.” Id. Another plaintiffs’ attorney, now a federal district court
judge, complained several years ago that large employers often have “numerous adverse
witnesses who wish to retain their employment and promotional opportunities by being the
employer’s ‘team players.’” Janet Bond Arterton, Case Selection, Negotiation, Settlement
and Ethical Considerations, in 1994 FIFTH ANNUAL CONVENTION §17 (NELA, 1994).
185. The plaintiff’s attorney’s access to witnesses is, in contrast, fraught with limita-
tions. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit ex parte contacts between the
plaintiff’s lawyer and present employees of the defendant who are managers, or whose ac-
tions may be imputed to the employer, or whose statements might constitute an admission
of the employer. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 cmt. 4 (1998); see
also Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Ex Parte Communications with Current and Former Employees,
in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 137, 141 (ALI-ABA Course of Study,
July 17-19, 1997). A few courts even limit ex parte access to certain categories of former
employees. See id. at 141-42.
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cized as possible.”186 This can, she notes, “make the defense story
much more believable.”187 Furthermore, access to cooperative wit-
nesses enables the defense to review and correct inconsistencies be-
tween documentary and testimonial evidence, thus bolstering the
employer’s version of the facts. Finally, by working with favorable
witnesses, defense attorneys may help increase their testimonial
abilities. This intervention may prevent the plaintiff’s attorney from
undermining the probative value of the paper trail by interrogating
on the stand an inarticulate employer witness.188
None of these advantages, however, necessarily mean that de-
fense attorneys will promote symbolic shows of compliance to civil
rights law rather than actual substantive change for the groups
those laws are designed to protect. In fact, some of the advice might
promote symbols and substance simultaneously. The literature I re-
viewed, however, focused far more on appearance than it did on re-
ality. Specifically, it emphasized: (1) the ways to produce favorable
evidence; (2) the importance of timing in employment decision mak-
ing; and (3) the necessity of achieving the proper tone regarding ac-
tions taken. These topics will be discussed respectively in the fol-
lowing sections.
1.   Ensuring the Continual Production of Favorable Evidence
The prototypical employment discrimination case proceeds under
a theory of disparate treatment.189 Employees maintaining these
suits assert that the employer treated some people less favorably
than others because of a protected characteristic, like race, sex, na-
tional origin, religion, age, or disability.190 Employer motivation is
the critical question in such litigation.191 A plaintiff must convince
the fact finder, be it a judge or jury, that bias against a protected
                                                                                                                      
186. Martin, supra note 124, at 874; see also Nancy L. Abell et al., Selected Tips for De-
fending Employment Cases, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 215, 230 (PLI,
1994) (instructing defense attorneys interviewing witnesses, “not [to] leave the time block
until all details necessary to recreate the scene have been established”).
187. Martin, supra note 124, at 874.
188. See Stephen L. Brischetto, Shredding the Paper Trail: Or Strategies for Attacking
in Paper Cases, in 1994 FIFTH ANNUAL CONVENTION § 14, at 7 (NELA, 1994) (discussing a
case in which the author demonstrated that defense witnesses “didn’t take their own rea-
sons seriously”).
189. As previously noted, there are two major theories of discrimination in civil rights
law: disparate treatment and disparate impact. See supra note 30.
190. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (citing Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)).
191. See Brodin, supra note 174, at 187; Martha S. West, Gender Bias in Academic
Robes: The Law’s Failure to Protect Women Faculty, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 67, 100 (1994). This
model of discrimination has been extensively critiqued. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 28;
Lawrence, supra note 28.
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group was a reason for an employment decision.192 To make the req-
uisite showing, the employee must marshal sufficient evidence of the
employer’s state of mind. Evidence may include so-called direct proof
or “smoking gun” statements that reflect the decisionmaker’s animus
toward the protected group.193 Or it may, as is frequently the case,
consist of circumstantial evidence that allows the fact finder to infer
the discriminatory animus.194
Because motive is critical in disparate treatment suits, employers
frequently defend themselves by proffering evidence of a legitimate
and nondiscriminatory reason for their employment decision.195 Most
litigation prevention advice anticipates the need to mount such a de-
fense and recommends implementing systems that will continually
generate favorable documentary evidence. The following advice is
illustrative:
One of the most effective ways for an employer to defend against
employment- related claims is to have a clearly established “paper
trail” which can be used as documentary evidence to support
management decisions which are subsequently the source of liti-
gation. When determining whether or not an employer has suffi-
cient documentation of all employment-related decisions, the em-
ployer should analyze this issue from the standpoint of an “em-
ployment cycle.” This cycle includes all aspects of an employment
relationship—interviewing, hiring, employee performance, and
termination. Each employer must be assured it can adequately
document each decision made at any point during the employment
cycle.196
In other words, protection from suit can be achieved by making the
most of the employer’s evidentiary advantage.
                                                                                                                      
192. In system-wide pattern and practice discrimination cases, the named plaintiffs
must prove that bias is the employer’s “standard operating procedure—the regular rather
than the unusual practice.” International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
336 (1977).
193. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
194. A good example of persuasive evidence of discriminatory intent is when similarly
situated employees outside of the protected class are treated more favorably or are more le-
niently disciplined. See Adam C. Wit, The “Similarly Situated Individual”: Evidence of
Comparable Employees and Its Application in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 23
EMPLOYEE RELS. L.J. 31, 32-33 (1997). The Supreme Court has devised an elaborate and
rather inelegant framework for evaluating circumstantial evidence. See St. Mary’s Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509-12 (1993).
195. See Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 260 (1981) (ex-
plaining that after plaintiff establishes prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to
the employer to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action).
196. Patrick H. Hicks & Neil M. Alexander, The Five Biggest Mistakes Employers Make,
NEVADA LAW., June 1996, at 12, available in WESTLAW, 4-JUN NEV. LAW. 12, at *5; see
also Paskoff, supra note 164, at 2 (advising employers to “keep thorough, accurate, contem-
poraneous records”).
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The records produced, however, are only helpful to the extent that
their contents reflect nondiscriminatory decision making. Therefore,
many management attorneys recommend techniques designed to
create supportive documentation. While the procedures suggested
primarily apply to the employer’s performance evaluation and ter-
mination processes, some defense lawyers recommend regular in-
spection of employment records. One law firm advises:
Personnel files should be “sanitized,” i.e., they should be reviewed
periodically to make sure that the information contained in such
files is not outdated or inaccurate. State and federal statutes pre-
scribe time periods for keeping various types of personnel records.
Once these time periods have elapsed, potentially misleading or
harmful documents should be weeded out.197
Another defense attorney similarly suggests that employers
“[m]aintain well-kept ‘clean’ personnel files; [and] eliminate unnec-
essary references to sex, age, etc.”198
(a)   Performance Review as a Preventative Tool
Establishing a standard performance review system is a preferred
method for generating favorable documentation.199 Attorneys view
evaluations as crucial documentary evidence because the issue of
performance is often paramount in employment litigation.200 Man-
agement lawyers caution, however, that a poorly administered re-
                                                                                                                      
197. GERALD S. HARTMAN ET AL., CURRENT EMPLOYMENT LAW AND RELATED
LITIGATION ISSUES 358 (Wake Forest University School of Law, 1994).
198. Douglas L. Williams, Handling the EEOC Investigation, in ALI-ABA RESOURCE
MATERIALS: EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW 1123, 1145 (7th ed. 1995); see also Baxter & Klein,
supra note 182, at S1 (recommending “periodic internal audits”).
199. See RICHARD H. BLOCK ET AL., AVOIDING LIABILITY IN THE WORKPLACE 58 (Fed-
eral Publications, 1994); Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Reducing Management’s Litigation Exposure
Through Appropriate Personnel Practices and Procedures, in ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAW
AND LITIGATION 691, 698 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Dec. 7-9, 1995) (“Employees should be
evaluated periodically.”); HARTMAN ET AL., supra note 197, at 358 (“Performance reviews
should be done regularly and accurately.”); Hicks & Alexander, supra note 196, at *7 (“In
the present litigious environment for employment-related claims, it is imperative that em-
ployers honestly, accurately, and fairly evaluate employee conduct.”); Ruffino, supra note
113, at 9 (advising that “[i]t’s best to hold reviews on a quarterly basis, but they should be
done at least once a year”).
200. See BEQUAI, supra note 182, at 58 (“[E]valuations eventually become crucial docu-
mentary evidence for employers and employees alike.”); Harry N. Turk, Questions and An-
swers, EMPL. REL. TODAY, Winter 1997, at 105, 105-06 (“[P]erformance reviews document-
ing an employee’s performance are critical in defending any performance related employ-
ment termination.”). Plaintiffs’ attorneys also note the centrality of performance documen-
tation. See Elaine C. Bredehoft, Discovery Issues in Employment Discrimination Litigation,
in TWELFTH ANNUAL MULTI-STATE LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW SEMINAR at B3 (South-
ern Methodist University School of Law, 1994) (noting that the issue of job performance is
“central”); Abrahamson, supra note 184, at 738 (“The performance evaluation has been
deemed by many management colleagues as the critical exhibit in these cases.”).
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view system can do more harm than good.201 Inconsistent evaluations
or highly laudatory reviews cast doubt on the employer’s proffered
explanations for adverse employment actions. As these management
advocates note:
An employer will have great difficulty convincing a jury that an
employee was terminated for poor performance if the employee’s
personnel file contains years of consistently superior or even
merely satisfactory performance appraisals. A terminated em-
ployee can even use non-committal appraisals, either to under-
mine the credibility of the employer’s proffered reason for the
termination or to persuade a jury that the employer did not deal
fairly with the employee because the appraisals failed to point out
the employee’s shortcomings.202
Two other lawyers explain that “[g]ood evaluations do not prove ille-
gal discrimination . . . [but] terminating those with better evaluations
implies a hidden agenda.”203
A number of steps are recommended to ensure that the appraisal
process produces supportive documentation. The first is that super-
visors be carefully trained to conduct performance evaluations.204 De-
fense attorneys perceive many supervisors as “overly generous” in
their appraisals, “gloss[ing] over defects in the work of their subor-
dinates.”205 They see supervisors as reluctant to confront subordi-
                                                                                                                      
201. See, e.g., Nathan Aaron Rosen, Performance Appraisals and Staff Evaluations: A
Reemerging Management Tool or a Legal Mine Field, in MANAGING THE PRIVATE LAW
LIBRARY 1993: MANAGING IN A CHANGING ECONOMY 265, 282 (PLI, 1993) (“The performance
appraisal can be a two-edged sword. It is useful if done right, but damaging if done poorly or
not done at all.”); Millicent N. Sanchez, Hiring, Disciplining, and Firing Employees: Cover-
ing Your Assets, COMPLEAT L., Fall 1997, at 25, 27 (“It is better for an employer to have no
performance review system than to have dishonest reviews.”).
202. Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1.
203. Peter M. Panken & Michael Starr, Terminations Without Tears: Avoiding Litiga-
tion Risks in Reductions in Force, in RESOURCE MATERIALS: EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
1111, 1119 (ALI-ABA, 7th ed. 1997).
204. See, e.g., BEQUAI, supra note 182, at 100 (recommending that employers “[m]ake
sure that supervisors understand the company’s goals”); KAHN ET AL., supra note 112, at 6–
28 (recommending supervisor training); David A. Cathcart & Kathleen Vanderziel, Em-
ployment Options for the Employer in Transition: Age Discrimination, OWBPA, WARN Act,
and NLRA Issues, in RESOURCE MATERIALS: EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW 1171, 1238 (ALI-
ABA, 7th ed. 1997) (recommending that supervisors be given guidelines and briefed); Bax-
ter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1 (arguing that supervisor training is essential); HARTMAN
ET AL., supra note 197, at 359 (recommending that supervisors be provided with written
guidelines); Jonathan A. Segal, Evaluating the Evaluators, HR MAG., Oct. 1995, at 46 (“All
supervisors should receive training on how to conduct performance appraisals.”).
205. HARTMAN ET AL., supra note 197, at 358; see also Martin, supra note 124, at 874
(describing some supervisors as “constitutionally incapable of writing bad performance re-
views, even when clearly warranted”); Panken & Babson, supra note 164, at 76 (lamenting
that “[d]efending discrimination charges often involves cringing over the writings of super-
visors and company officials who are neither trained nor astute in the dangers of discrimi-
nation litigation”); Hicks & Alexander, supra note 196, at *7 (warning against “evaluation
inflation” and “diluted performance criticism”).
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nates with negative feedback206 and to take away from the time nec-
essary to handle more pressing workplace matters.207 Training, how-
ever, is designed to overcome supervisor hesitancy regarding per-
formance review by stressing the importance of this task to the em-
ployer’s litigation prevention effort. Two management lawyers sug-
gest accomplishing this by telling supervisors that their own “per-
formance will be rated, in part, based on how well they handle this
responsibility.”208 Other attorneys advise that instruction emphasize
the evidentiary value of the documents to be produced.209
A review of the literature indicates that a defensible performance
review contains several components. It should, for example, contain
a listing of employee strengths and weaknesses.210 To come up with
that list, management attorneys often recommend that supervisors
evaluate employee performance using “objective, job-related crite-
ria,” though they do not say much about what those criteria might
                                                                                                                      
206. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 199, at 58 (noting that supervisors fail to document
performance problems because they “want to avoid the confrontation”); Cathcart, supra
note 164, at 393 (positing that supervisors “fail to identify job performance problems” be-
cause they wish “not to ‘upset’ an employee” or “interfere with a friendship or with an em-
ployee’s advancement”); Rosen, supra note 201, at 269 (noting that many managers and
employees find the process “distasteful”); Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1 (noting that
“supervisors often are reluctant to criticize the employees under them”); Sanchez, supra
note 201, at 27 (“[S]upervisors may feel it is easier to rate an employee as ‘acceptable’ than
to rate the employee as ‘below requirements’ or ‘unacceptable.’”).
207. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 199, at 58 (noting review “inconsistencies or lack of
documentation often arise because supervisors . . . are too busy to write an accurate or de-
tailed account of a performance problem”); Rosen, supra note 201, at 272 (“For some man-
agers, the performance appraisal process seems like a once-a-year nuisance which takes
time away from more productive activities.”).
208. Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1.
209. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 199, at 58 (“Supervisors should be apprised of the po-
tential evidentiary value of these documents.”); Lynne C. Hermle, Fighting the Personnel
Fires: Dealing with Employment Issues Arising from Mergers and Acquisitions in a High
Tech Environment, in HANDLING MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS IN HIGH-TECH AND EMERGING
GROWTH ENVIRONMENTS 333, 402 (PLI, 1998) (stressing the need for performance review
training and noting “[m]anagers must be made fully aware of the substantial liability aris-
ing from discrimination suits—especially when ‘smoking guns’ exist”); Hicks & Alexander,
supra note 196, at *15 (“Supervisors must understand the importance of accurate evalua-
tions in order to ensure an efficient and productive work force and to avoid problems that
can arise in the context of employment litigation when evaluations have not been properly
conducted.”); Ellen M. Martin, Discrimination Claims Against Law Firms, N.Y. L.J., July
24, 1995, at 7 (“[T]he firm should also remind evaluators of the importance of giving candid
assessments. If evaluators are not candid, their words may come back to haunt them.”);
HARTMAN ET AL., supra note 197, at 358 (noting that “generosity [in evaluation] can come
back to haunt the company”).
210. See Employment Audits, supra note 113, at 16 (recommending “the evaluation list
both the employee’s strengths and weaknesses”); Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1
(stating that “the appraisal document always should provide a space for the evaluator to list
the employee’s principal strengths and weaknesses”); Ruffino, supra note 113, at 9
(“[R]eviews should focus on what the employee has accomplished and what areas he or she
needs to work on.”).
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be.211 Some suggest that appraisals be based on job content, but only
vaguely suggest how one might determine the makeup of a particu-
lar job.212 That management attorneys fail to discuss in detail tasks
that are more appropriately within the expertise of human resource
professionals is not surprising. The invocation of “objective criteria”
as a mechanism for avoiding discrimination, however, is notable and
should be evaluated.
The term “objective criteria” presumably refers to factors subject
to quantification, such as number of absences, sales statistics, and
specific examples of work results achieved.213 These items are seen as
being relatively immune to the effects of bias. Objective measures
stand in contrast to “subjective criteria” or employee traits that defy
simple measurement, such as “common sense, good judgment, origi-
nality, ambition, loyalty, and tact.”214 The ambiguity inherent in
these factors makes them susceptible to discriminatory impulses.
Despite the seemingly straightforward distinction between objec-
tive and subjective criteria, the line between the categories often
blurs. In other words, “[o]stensibly objective criteria can often be-
come subjective in nature.”215 For example, one might establish ob-
jective standards for associate attorneys by evaluating them in terms
of the number of cases handled. However, because some cases are
more difficult than others are, the objectivity of the standard is ques-
tionable.216 Likewise, salespersons may be evaluated in terms of the
dollars they produce for their employers. Yet, the way a sales region
is defined can greatly impact sales results, casting suspicion on the
standard’s objectivity.217 Thus, it is far from clear, despite defense at-
                                                                                                                      
211. See Employment Audits, supra note 113, at 16 (stating that “performance evalua-
tions [must be] based on objective, job-related criteria”); Hicks & Alexander, supra note 196,
at *13 (“[I]t is critical that the evaluator present an objective and accurate analysis.”); Ruf-
fino, supra note 113, at 9 (“You can also outline future goals (concentrating on objective, job-
related criteria), along with a specific time frame for achieving them.”). But cf. Rosen, supra
note 201, at 289 (noting that it is “very important to have clearly defined objectives and
measurable criteria” and providing examples of common measures).
212. See Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S2 (suggesting employers determine
“[p]recisely what . . . the employee [is] expected to do, and what sort of conduct or result
constitutes good performance”); Martin, supra note 209, at 7 (suggesting that the evalua-
tions be “based on the qualifications used to evaluate [employees] for retention and promo-
tion”).
213. See Gerald V. Barrett & Mary C. Kernan, Performance Appraisal and Termina-
tions: A Review of Court Decisions Since Brito v. Zia with Implications for Personnel Prac-
tices, 40 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 489, 491 (1987).
214. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988) (portion of opinion
joined by plurality).
215. Barrett & Kernan, supra note 213, at 495.
216. See id. (noting that in one case a senior EEOC investigator was assigned more dif-
ficult cases than those ostensibly similarly situated).
217. See Arterton, supra note 184, § 16 (noting the potential for “sales managers and
supervisors [to] manipulate regions to favor or disfavor certain employees”).
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torneys’ assumptions, that objective standards are a panacea for
workplace bias.
Perhaps the overlap between the categories explains why those
who recommend the use of “objective criteria” do not belabor the dis-
tinction. A more probable explanation is that the distinction is un-
necessary because courts frequently accept an employer’s assertions
that “certain factors are important to job performance . . . as long as
the factors appear logical.”218
In any case, management lawyers see the performance deficiency
list as very important and not terribly difficult to compile. As one
pair of management lawyers note, “Nearly all employees have at
least some room for improvement.”219 Defense attorneys also recom-
mend that supervisors be instructed to provide examples of the poor
performance they record.220 Specific examples are useful because
they “add weight to the evaluator’s judgment if it is later chal-
lenged.”221 Defense attorneys also suggest a description of areas for
improvement222 because “[w]hen faced with a discrimination and/or
wrongful termination lawsuit, it is helpful if the employer can show
that a terminated employee did not meet objective performance
standards.”223
                                                                                                                      
218. Peter A. Veglahn, Key Issues in Performance Appraisal Challenges: Evidence from
Court and Arbitration Decisions, 44 LAB. L.J. 595, 597 (1993); see infra notes 364-72 and ac-
companying text (discussing courts’ concerns that appraisal systems appear fair and noting
the lack of interest in system accuracy).
219. Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1.
220. See Panken & Starr, supra note 203, at 1120 (noting that when reviewing per-
formance appraisals, one should “[a]sk for . . . specific examples of incompetent, inadequate,
unimaginative or unsatisfactory work.”); Hicks & Alexander, supra note 196, at *13 (“Em-
ployers should teach their supervisors to make evaluations ‘fact oriented’ . . . . For example,
an employee is not just a ‘bad employee,’ but rather, the ‘employee fails to arrive at work on
time and is less productive than other employees’ . . . .”); Martin, supra note 209, at 7
(“[T]he firm should encourage evaluators to give specific examples to back up their evalua-
tions, particular [sic] in areas where the review is negative.”).
221. Martin, supra note 209, at 7 (noting that specific examples also help the employee
to improve.); see also Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1 (“[C]andid and careful perform-
ance appraisals can provide important evidence in support of an employer’s termination de-
cision, especially if the appraisals contain specific indications of the employer’s dissatisfac-
tion with a particular facet of the employee’s performance.”).
222. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 199, at 58 (“A performance appraisal should not only
contain an accurate description of an employee’s performance but it should also describe ar-
eas where improvement is necessary.”); Reginald C. Govan, Employment Issues in RIFS,
Layoffs, and Restructurings, in HANDLING MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS IN HIGH-TECH AND
EMERGING GROWTH ENVIRONMENTS 215, 245 (PLI, 1998) (“Reasonable time should be al-
lowed to improve performance, but the consequences of failure to achieve objectives should
be expressed.”); Hicks & Alexander, supra note 196, at *13 (“It is also a good practice to de-
scribe and set performance goals while providing practical suggestions to accomplish these
objectives.”); Ruffino, supra note 113, at 9 (noting that areas for improvement and “future
goals” can be incorporated).
223. Hicks & Alexander, supra note 196, at *14.
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Interestingly, most of the advice on supervisor training proceeds
on the implicit assumption that supervisors typically do not evaluate
employees through biased lenses.224 There is almost no discussion of
how to train supervisors to avoid stereotyping when evaluating em-
ployees who are members of protected groups, although I did find
two notable exceptions. One commentator suggests that “[t]raining
should remind supervisors not to allow their judgement to be af-
fected by legally impermissible factors and to be aware of subtle in-
fluences.”225 As I will discuss more thoroughly below, this recommen-
dation very closely follows what social scientists deem necessary for
overcoming cognitive biases that all people manifest.226 In contrast,
in the reduction-in-force context, one author suggests, “Instruct all
management/supervisory personnel that age is not a factor to be
taken into account in determining who stays and who goes; further
instruct them to think and be careful about what they say, lest they
create bullets for potential plaintiffs.”227 This advice is not very help-
ful and runs counter to what social psychologists deem necessary to
avoid stereotyping. They argue that ignoring protected characteris-
tics will not eliminate bias.228
In addition to supervisor training, defense attorneys see oversight
of the appraisal process as essential to producing documentation that
                                                                                                                      
224. But cf. Hermle, supra note 209, at 402 (“There should be careful training in this
[performance review] process, because this is an area in which bias or unfairness frequently
arise.”).
225. Rosen, supra note 201, at 293 (emphasis added); see also David A. Copus, Age Bias,
Age Stereotypes and Reduction-in-Force, in EMPLOYMENT LAW: THE BIG CASE 699, 710
(ALI-ABA Course of Study, Oct. 31-Nov. 1996) (suggesting that “[a]dequate human resource
policies contain numerous safeguards to prevent/ameliorate the operation of negative age
stereotypes”); Jackie Hughie Smith & Rick Thaler, Sex Discrimination in the Workplace:
Some Guidelines for Employers and Legal Update, in RESOURCE MATERIALS: EMPLOYMENT
AND LABOR LAW, 135, 153 (ALI-ABA, 7th ed. 1995) (recommending that “the company must
train its employees to avoid sexual stereotyping,” though not specifically in the context of
evaluation). Recently, a few management attorneys have recommended general diversity
training. See, e.g., C. Geoffrey Weirich et al., Employer Strategies for Avoiding the Mega-
Verdict: Learning from Recent High-Profile Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, in 26TH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 31, 41 (PLI, 1997); Gary R. Siniscalco & Jeffrey
D. Wohl, Employment Law: Discrimination Can Be Costly: Avoiding the Texaco Problem,
CAL. LAW., Nov. 1997, at 27. The possible effects of this sensitivity training, including
trainee backlash, remain controversial and in dispute. See Seth Lubove, Damned if You Do,
Damned if You Don’t, FORBES, Dec. 15, 1997, at 122-28 (warning about backlash and de-
scribing diversity training as “moneymaking opportunities for armies of quacks”). One de-
fense lawyer recently cautioned that diversity training could inadvertently end up produc-
ing evidence that may be used by employees in subsequent discrimination suits. See Michael
Delikat, The Texaco Case and Lessons to Learn: How Can Corporations Manage Diversity
Effectively? in LITIGATING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 1997, at 181, 232-33 (PLI,
1997) (warning that “employers should realize that there is a very real possibility that ma-
terials relating to a diversity program . . . may be discoverable and admissible as evidence
against the employer in subsequent employment litigation”).
226. See infra notes 338-48 and accompanying text.
227. Govan, supra note 222, at 240.
228. See infra notes 338-48 and accompanying text.
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will support employer decision making.229 They typically recommend
that either the evaluator’s supervisor or some central screening
authority review all completed appraisals.230 Management lawyers
stress that evaluations be checked for inappropriate comments con-
noting stereotyping or other bias.231 Yet the recommended steps to
take when such comments are found are less clear. Some attorneys
are conspicuously silent on the point.232 Others note that someone in
management can do any editing necessary.233 One attorney indicates
that if the comments were unfortunately chosen rather than actually
biased, the evaluator can “expand upon or clarify the review.”234
However, she also counsels that if true bias is detected, the employer
should exclude the evaluator’s review.235
A final step is necessary to make the performance appraisal as
supportive a document as possible. Once a review has been com-
pleted, it must be presented to the employee in a face-to-face encoun-
ter.236 As these management advocates note, “Not only will this make
it more likely that the employee will regard the appraisal as a sig-
nificant event, it will make it easier to convince a jury that the em-
ployer was engaged in a good-faith effort to communicate its views of
                                                                                                                      
229. See Cathcart & Vanderziel, supra note 204, at 1238 (“Safeguards against arbitrary
evaluations may include review of evaluations by higher level supervisors.”); Fitzpatrick,
supra note 199, at 699 (“The evaluation should be reviewed by the supervisor’s superior.”);
Govan, supra note 222, at 246 (recommending “[m]eaningful second-tier review by next-
level supervisor”); Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1 (“[A]n evaluator should never pre-
sent the results of the evaluation to an employee without discussing the evaluation with the
supervisor at the next-highest level.”); Hicks & Alexander, supra note 196, at *14 (“[I]t is
common for a human resources department or other similar administrator to review per-
formance evaluations before they are actually presented to employees.”); Martin, supra note
209, at 7 (suggesting that “evaluations should be scrutinized” before presented); Segal, su-
pra note 204, at 46 (“Before evaluations are finalized, a designated management oversight
committee should review each one.”).
230. See Govan, supra note 222, at 246; Segal, supra note 204, at 46.
231. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 199, at 700 (“Evaluation forms should be reviewed for
unlawful or otherwise inappropriate inquiries.”); Hicks & Alexander, supra note 196, at *14-
15 (“Such a review will . . . allow for the detection of any inappropriate consideration of or
reference to protected classes . . . .”); Martin, supra note 209, at 7 (“[E]valuations should be
scrutinized for comments that could be construed as evidence of stereotyping or other
bias.”).
232. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 199, at 699; Hicks & Alexander, supra note 196, at *14-
15.
233. See Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1 (“[A]n initial working draft . . . can . . . be
reviewed and, if appropriate, edited by someone else in management.”).
234. Martin, supra note 209, at 7.
235. See id.
236. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 199, at 58 (“Evaluations should be discussed with the
employee.”); Cathcart, supra note 164, at 393 (noting that “[a]n effective and defensible ap-
praisal process” includes “[a]n oral interview with the employee”); Baxter & Klein, supra
note 182, at S1 (“Evaluators should present performance appraisals to employees in a face-
to-face meeting.”); Martin, supra note 209, at 7 (“The firm should also convey the results of
the evaluation to the [employee] evaluated.”); Turk, supra note 200, at 106 (“Supervisors
should discuss the performance review in detail with the employee.”).
1999]                         BULLETPROOFING THE WORKPLACE 1001
the employee’s performance to the employee.”237 When the review is
particularly negative, these same attorneys suggest bringing another
witness to the meeting.238 However, realizing that potential defama-
tion claims are possible where such bad news is delivered, another
lawyer advises that discussion be limited to the employee’s evaluat-
ing supervisor, that supervisor’s immediate supervisor, and the ap-
propriate human resources manager.239
Management lawyers counsel employers to provide the employee
with the opportunity to ask questions and to offer oral and written
comments.240 One attorney explains that if no disagreement is ex-
pressed, “later complaints that the review was without basis will be
less credible.”241 However, when objections are raised, the employer
can investigate and take any remedial actions necessary “before it is
faced with a discrimination suit.”242 A last routine suggestion is that
the employee should sign the form, acknowledging that he or she re-
ceived the review at the end of the review session.243
Several aspects of performance review advice are worth noting.
First there is tremendous uniformity in the recommendations. This
                                                                                                                      
237. Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1.
238. See id.
239. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 199, at 700.
240. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 199, at 58-59 (“The employee should be given an op-
portunity to respond to the evaluation in person or if the employee prefers, in writing.”);
Fitzpatrick, supra note 199, at 700 (“The employee should have the opportunity to make
written comments.”); HARTMAN ET AL., supra note 197, at 359 (employers should “allow em-
ployees to review evaluation [and] comment on them”); KAHN ET AL., supra note 112, at 6-29
(employers should “allow employees to record on the appraisal their reactions and sugges-
tions”); Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1 (“[T]he comment process increases fairness
and the likelihood that a jury will be persuaded that the employer acted fairly.”); Martin,
supra note 209, at 7 (advising that employers give employees “the opportunity to comment
on the review”); Turk, supra note 200, at 106 (“The review should contain an ‘employee
comments’ section to record any comments or suggestions employees have concerning the
review.”).
241. Martin, supra note 209, at 7; see also Veglahn, supra note 218, at 598 (court deci-
sions indicate that “any problem the employee has with a performance appraisal should be
raised at the time of the appraisal, not at a later date”); Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at
S1 (“[I]f the employee does not object to the review, it will be more difficult for the employee
to convince a jury that a negative appraisal was inaccurate.”).
242. Martin, supra note 209, at 7; see also KAHN ET AL., supra note 112, at 6-29 (“If the
employee indicates a belief that the appraisal is inaccurate, the allegations should be pur-
sued before litigation is commenced.”); Govan, supra note 222, at 247 (advising that if the
employee disagrees with the evaluation, there should be “a subsequent investigation or dis-
cussion regarding the employee’s comments”); Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1 (noting
where the employee disagrees “it gives the employer an opportunity to review—and, when
appropriate, to modify—the initial determination”); Hicks & Alexander, supra note 196, at
*14 (“[I]f the employee has a disagreement with the performance assessment, the employee
should be permitted to explain and discuss any such disagreement with the appropriate
manager or supervisor.”).
243. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 199, at 59; HARTMAN ET AL., supra note 197, at 359;
Cathcart, supra note 163, at 393; Fitzpatrick, supra note 199, at 699; Baxter & Klein, supra
note 182, at S1; Sanchez, supra note 201, at 27; Turk, supra note 200, at 106.
1002 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:959
indicates that a kind of consensus has developed among defense at-
torneys as to the proper way to produce supportive documentation.
Next, one should consider that the attorneys quite explicitly promote
performance review as a form of evidence creation. Indeed, they con-
vey to managers a sense of exactly how that proof can be used should
the need arise.
Recognizing the employer’s evidentiary advantage regarding
document production is also important. Employee evaluations, for
the most part, are not created when litigation seems a possible
threat. Rather, they function as a long-term insurance policy safe-
guarding future employment decisions from potential challenge.
Further, much of this advice simply assumes that employers need
not worry about employment discrimination if they follow the law-
yers’ evidentiary prescriptions. In other words, if one cannot find le-
gal evidence of discrimination, it must not be there. After reviewing
the rest of the content analysis results, this last point will be more
carefully considered below.244
(b)   Producing Favorable Evidence for the Problem Case
The advice on handling employee discipline and discharge that
management attorneys offer to employers focuses on creating sup-
portive evidence. To that end, these advisors routinely recommend
three components: the production of written documentation, the need
for progressive discipline,245 and the oversight of the discipline and
discharge process.
Management attorneys strongly advise that employers produce
supportive documentation as part of the their discipline and dis-
charge procedure. Indeed, the mantra of defense lawyers is docu-
                                                                                                                      
244. One might argue that the steps described above reduce evaluation bias as a matter
of course. Research demonstrates that training managers, holding managers accountable
for their decisions, and rewarding managers when their actions positively affect equal em-
ployment opportunity can minimize stereotyping. See M. Acker & M. Manis, Irrepressible
Stereotypes, 32 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 13 (1996); see also Jennifer L. Eberhardt &
Susan T. Fiske, Motivating Individuals to Change: What is a Target to Do?, in
STEREOTYPES AND STEREOTYPING 369, 390-91 (C. Neil Macrae et al. eds., 1996); William T.
Bielby, Can I Get a Witness? Framing Expert Opinion on Employment Discrimination in
the Post-Proposition 209 Era, at 4-5 (1998) (unpublished paper, on file with author). In a
sense, the defense literature recommends the following key components: training, account-
ability, and rewards. The preventative recommendations, however, do not by and large sug-
gest adopting the kinds of proactive, affirmative action-oriented strategies proffered by
those seeking to eradicate stereotyping and further opportunities for minorities and
women. Thus, I question whether the two strategies-–one affirmative, the other preventa-
tive-–affect managers similarly. Nevertheless, I believe that empirical research on litigation
prevention training and corporate preventative activities in general is sorely needed to an-
swer this question definitively. See infra Part VI.
245. Progressive discipline provides “notice to an employee of his or her shortcomings
and one or more opportunities to correct them.” Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1.
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ment, document, document.246 The emphasis on producing a written
record is evident in the following advice:
An employee who is unsatisfactory should be terminated before
he or she becomes a long-term employee and therefore accrues an
unintended employment entitlement. Where there is a problem,
the employee should be warned of a problem in writing, [and] told
of the consequences of failing to correct it. The employee’s success
or failure should be confirmed in writing by his or her supervisor
and higher management.247
Another attorney similarly notes that “[i]t is vital that each discipli-
nary step be documented and that information regarding the date,
time, location, and witnesses of misconduct or examples of poor per-
formance be preserved.”248
By recommending the careful documentation of such decisions,
management attorneys signal their recognition of the evidentiary
advantage that employers enjoy. One attorney envisions the ultimate
maximization of that advantage by describing what employers can
gain by consulting with a lawyer before taking action against
women, minorities, and members of other protected classes. As she
observes:
[I]t is becoming increasingly common for clients to consult defense
counsel before making adverse employment decisions affecting
members of protected groups. When counsel is consulted before
the decision is made, counsel has the rare chance to shape the
facts and create the record before litigation is commenced. This is
an excellent opportunity to plan for summary judgment, for ex-
ample by ensuring that adverse action is not taken until there is
convincing evidence that the plaintiff has performed unsatisfac-
torily, including objective evidence and documentation of the
same.249
                                                                                                                      
246. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 113, at 7 (“Keep a detailed paper trail; you never know
when you’ll need documentation.”); Paul J. Siegel, Workplace Misconduct: The In-House
Counsel’s Role in Handling Complaints and Investigations, in TRENDS IN EMPLOYMENT
LITIGATION, supra note 116, at 14 (advising in the “Ten Commandments of Effective Dis-
charge” that employers “[d]ocument thoroughly”); Williams, supra note 198, at 1145 (advis-
ing employers to “[m]aintain documentation of [the] bases for decisions”); Hicks & Alexan-
der, supra note 196, at *21 (suggesting that the employer make sure “there [are] docu-
mented reasons for the decision to terminate”); Sanchez, supra note 201, at 28 (advising
that in discharge or discipline cases “there should be a documented history of counseling
and honest criticism”); Paskoff, supra note 164, at 2 (“[W]hen a manager has difficulty with
an employee, or is required to initiate discipline, he/she should accurately and contempora-
neously document the matter.”).
247. Fitzpatrick, supra note 199, at 700.
248. HARTMAN ET AL., supra note 197, at 359.
249. Martin, supra note 124, at 873-74. In a checklist of questions to consider before dis-
charge, two attorneys include: “Should I get outside employment counsel involved prior to
the decision to terminate?” Hicks & Alexander, supra note 196, at *21-22; see also Sanchez,
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Management lawyers view progressive discipline as essential to
an employer’s discipline and discharge protocol.250 In this regard, at-
torneys stress that counseling and documentation of those efforts
“establishes a record of fairness.”251 As with performance reviews,
management lawyers continuously emphasize the evidentiary value
of the documents created. This advice is illustrative:
[I]f a manager has to testify in court, he/she can rely on such rec-
ords to reconstruct what happened about an event which may
have occurred years earlier. Such records can be admitted into
evidence and examined by a judge or jury bolstering manage-
ment’s position and credibility. A supervisor who has taken the
time and effort to document a problem can demonstrate that
he/she did not act arbitrarily. Without such information, it is pos-
sible that a legitimate decision will look unfair, inconsistent or
improperly motivated. Since judges and juries expect to see such
records from employers, managers should take the time to prepare
them as significant employment events occur.252
Management attorneys also recommend extensive oversight of the
discipline and discharge process.253 They see supervision as a pri-
                                                                                                                      
supra note 201, at 29 (“A procedure for the utilization of legal counsel during the discipline
or discharge process should be established.”).
250. See Cathcart, supra note 164, at 391 (arguing that due process, and “where appro-
priate, progressive discipline,” are advisable); Fitzpatrick, supra note 199, at 700 (noting,
among other things, that “progressive discipline . . . increases the likelihood of the employer
prevailing.”); HARTMAN ET AL., supra note 197, at 359 (“It is advisable to use progressive
discipline . . . . Such a procedure will supply documentation which will justify a just cause
discharge if necessary.”); Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1 (“[A] progressive discipline
system will provide significant evidence that the stated reason for the termination is the
real reason.”); Sanchez, supra note 201, at 28 (suggesting that in the general case, “coun-
seling” should take place before termination); see also Siegel, supra note 246, at 17-18 (de-
scribing in great detail model progressive discipline policy and documentation accompany-
ing each step).
251. Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1; see also HARTMAN ET AL., supra note 197, at
359–60 (noting the importance of “fair” treatment); Sanchez, supra note 201, at 28 (“[A] his-
tory of counseling and criticism . . . will be very helpful in establishing that the employee
was treated fairly.”).
Some attorneys also note that progressive discipline may provide the opportunity for the
employee to correct the performance deficiencies. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 199, at 700
(noting “[p]rogressive discipline . . . prevents unnecessary termination when performance is
corrected”); HARTMAN ET AL., supra note 197, at 359 (noting that “[p]rogressive discipline
“preserve[s] the possibility that an employee will change his ways”); Baxter & Klein, supra
note 182, at S1 (stating that progressive discipline “may enable an unsatisfactory employee
to improve”); Martin, supra note 209, at 7 (opining that providing specific examples of defi-
ciencies helps the employee to improve).
252. Paskoff, supra note 164, at 2. This attorney further warns against creating false
documentation and back-dating documents, noting that “[t]his practice is fraudulent.” Id.
253. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 199, at 700 (“The authority to fire should not rest with
the employee’s immediate supervisor, but with higher level management in consultation
with the personnel department and, where appropriate . . . with legal counsel.”); Williams,
supra note 198, at 1145 (noting that supervisory decisions should be reviewed); Baxter &
Klein, supra note 182, at S1 (“The most important single procedure an employer can insti-
tute to avoid wrongful termination litigation is a system for the independent review of all
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mary way to ensure that legal claims are not created and that bias
does not infect any given discharge.254 The overseeing authority,
which one attorney refers to as a “termination czar,”255 must execute
a number of steps before granting termination approval. First, he or
she must review the employee’s personnel file and records.256 The
overseeing authority must assess the strength of the documentation
in those files.257 Next, the overseer must ensure that reviewers are
complying with company policies.258 Two management advocates note
in this respect that “[r]eviewers should be concerned about appear-
ances of discrimination as well as actual discrimination—either can
lead to litigation.”259 Reviewers must determine how other “similarly
situated” employees have been treated for the same reasons.260
Finally, the employer must interview witnesses.261 One manage-
ment attorney emphasizes that corroboration between witness testi-
                                                                                                                      
termination decisions before they are carried out.”); Ruffino, supra note 113, at 9 (“[S]end a
memo to all supervisors stipulating that they must obtain prior approval from either the di-
rector of human resources or another top executive before firing anyone.”); Siegel, supra
note 248, at 14 (“Have a trained human resources person review all discipline prior to im-
plementation.”); Paskoff, supra note 164, at 3 (“Before taking action, managers should con-
sult with others, including representatives of the Human Resources Department . . . .”).
254. See Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1 (“The reviewer should look for any indi-
cation that unlawful discrimination or some other statutory violation is associated with the
termination.”); Ruffino, supra note 113, at 9 (noting that oversight can “cut down on unjusti-
fied firings and the discrimination suits that typically follow”); Paskoff, supra note 164, at 3
(“A key issue in discrimination and other employment based litigation is whether the com-
plaining employee received fair, even-handed treatment. Only by checking with other
sources can managers be certain their actions are consistent and in compliance with their
company’s policy.”).
255. Fitzpatrick, supra note 199, at 701.
256. See Cathcart, supra note 163, at 393-95; Fitzpatrick, supra note 199, at 702; Baxter
& Klein, supra note 182, at S1; Sanchez, supra note 201, at 28.
257. See Cathcart, supra note 163, at 395 (noting that employers should determine how
“strong . . . the documentation [is]”); Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1 (noting that
“[t]he better and longer the employee’s service record, the more reluctant the reviewer
should be to approve the termination”).
258. See Cathcart, supra note 163, at 394-95 (noting that review should ensure that
“decision makers followed the company’s own contractual, policy, and/or employee hand-
book procedures”); Fitzpatrick, supra note 199, at 702 (advising that “[t]he authority should
review the employee’s personnel file to determine whether company policies have been fol-
lowed”); Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1 (“The reviewer should check carefully to
make sure the employer’s treatment of the employee and the proposed termination comply
both with the employer’s current personnel policies and with past practices.”); Hicks & Al-
exander, supra note 196, at *21 (listing as an item on the termination checklist “Is the deci-
sion to terminate consistent with company policy?”).
259. Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1.
260. See Cathcart, supra note 163, at 394; Fitzpatrick, supra note 199, at 702; Siegel,
supra note 246, at 14; Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1; Hicks & Alexander, supra note
196, at *14-15; Sanchez, supra note 201, at 27; Paskoff, supra note 164, at 3.
261. See Cathcart & Vanderziel, supra note 204, at 394; Martin, supra note 124, at 874-
75; see also Jo Backer Laird, Conducting a Discrimination or Harassment Investigation, in
RESOURCE MATERIALS: EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW 1085, 1090 (ALI-ABA, 7th ed. 1995)
(suggesting ways to pose questions to witnesses in the context of discrimination investiga-
tions).
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mony and existing documentary evidence is essential.262 Two man-
agement lawyers, however, recommend a skeptical approach to the
interview process. They caution that even if the reviewer cannot be-
lieve that the supervisor in question would discriminate, he or she
must remember that any ensuing litigation could end up before a
jury.263 Thus, “[i]f the supervisor or other personnel involved cannot
explain the problem to the satisfaction of the reviewer, there is little
hope they will be able to explain it to a jury.”264
A notable difference exists between these suggestions and those
regarding performance review. With respect to the latter, the as-
sumption is that trained supervisors preparing evaluations based on
“objective criteria” generally are not biased.265 In contrast, sugges-
tions regarding discipline and discharge take a more skeptical stance
on supervisory decision making. Management attorneys actively at-
tempt to facilitate nondiscriminatory decision making through an
independent, searching review of the proposed employment action.
One must wonder, however, whether the independent review ac-
complishes that goal. To my knowledge, no one has studied this ques-
tion. Therefore, my discussion will be admittedly speculative. How-
ever, it seems clear that as with the discrimination complaint han-
dling procedures studied by Lauren Edelman and her colleagues, the
effectiveness of the review will depend greatly on the individuals
who undertake it.266
It is notable that defense lawyers frequently recommend that
human resource professionals oversee the process.267 Those individu-
als, who occupy relatively peripheral positions in the corporate
structure,268 are likely subject to the same constraints as Edelman’s
                                                                                                                      
262. See Martin, supra note 124, at 875 (advising defense attorneys to “review any ap-
parent inconsistencies between witness recollections and the documents and to attempt to
reconcile any true discrepancies”); see also Abell et al., supra note 186, at 228–29 (urging in
the post-termination context that defense attorneys meet with witnesses to review key
documents, and “[c]onfront the witness[es] with and iron out inconsistencies”); Darrel S.
Gay et al., How to Plan and Prepare for Critical Depositions, in LITIGATING EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CASES 17, 54 (PLI, 1997) (noting in the post termination context that de-
fense counsel must “[t]horougly review all documents or statements prepared by the wit-
ness to ensure they are consistent”); Peter M. Panken et al., Age Discrimination: Selected
Current Topics—Early Retirement, Reductions in Force, Validity of Releases, Damages, and
Class Actions, in EMPLOYMENT & LAB. L. 157, 173 (ALI-ABA, 7th ed., 1995) (advising em-
ployers to make sure personnel documents “do not contradict the employer’s articulated
reason for hiring employees, when those employees will be involved in a force reduction by
the employer”).
263. See Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1.
264. Id.
265. For example, the literature only rarely addressed the issue of stereotyping in
evaluation. See supra notes 224-28, and accompanying discussion.
266. See Edelman et al., supra note 78, at 501.
267. See supra note 253.
268. See Edelman et al., supra note 59, at 74-76.
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complaint handlers. Notwithstanding a commitment to equal em-
ployment opportunity, their ability to bring about significant change
is hampered by their concern for their own positions within the or-
ganization.269 Logically, facilitating the objectives of managers,
rather than obstructing them, might better enhance a personnel spe-
cialist’s career.
This insight does not suggest that, where company policy has
been disregarded or similarly situated employees are treated more
favorably, a discharge will be rubber-stamped. When discrimination
manifests itself in smoking gun statements or extreme forms of har-
assment or retaliation, most reviewers will no doubt forcefully inter-
vene. When bias influences decisions subtly or invisibly, however,
reviewers confronted with facts disadvantageous to employers may
instruct supervisors on how to bulletproof their decisions.270
In fact, if reviewers act like Edelman’s complaint handlers, they
may view many problems they encounter as personality clashes or
management difficulties rather than instances of discrimination.271
The reviewers may feel entirely justified in recommending a course
of action that allows a supervisor to accomplish the sought after goal,
never realizing that the objective is impermissibly motivated. Obvi-
ously, such actions promote symbolic rather than substantive com-
pliance with civil rights law and hamper the ability to discern work-
place discrimination.
If the independent investigation finds that the record sufficiently
supports a termination or adverse action, defense lawyers advise
that authorization be given. Even at this stage, the literature dis-
plays a preoccupation with evidence creation. For example, one law-
yer warns that at this point potential litigation is still a threat.272
Thus, the actual termination meeting must be handled carefully, not
only for the sake of the employee, “but to avoid creating tort
claims.”273 He suggests a videotaped rehearsal of the termination in-
terview with someone playing the role of the employee to “help iron
out the bugs and the discomfort and make it easier and less cumber-
some in the actual termination meeting.”274 Another attorney coun-
sels the supervisor that “when firing someone, speak as though your
                                                                                                                      
269. See Edelman et al., supra note 78, at 501.
270. The defense literature is silent on how employers should proceed after permission
for an adverse employment action has been denied. Because trained reviewers understand
the importance of evidence creation, it is logical that where reviewers fail to perceive dis-
crimination, they will assist supervisors in bulletproofing decisions.
271. See Edelman et al., supra note 78, at 515-16.
272. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 199, at 702.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 703. This advice implies that the supervisor would review the videotape and
correct any elements that might prove useful to a plaintiff in subsequent litigation.
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conversation is being taped for later use in court.”275 Thus, from start
to finish, ensuring the production of favorable evidence is a central
focus of litigation prevention advice.
2.    The Importance of Timing in Employment Decision Making
Another prevalent theme in the defense literature is the need for
attentiveness to the timing of adverse employment decisions. One at-
torney advises that “[i]f a good reason exists to terminate, but the
timing might appear suspect either to the employee or to a jury, de-
lay the termination if possible.”276 Situations that create timing diffi-
culties for employers include when the employee “has just been on
jury duty, returned from sick, disability or maternity leave, or filed a
worker’s compensation claim.”277 Two other attorneys note that
among the issues that should “raise a red flag” to reviewers are pro-
posed terminations “that occur after an employee has exercised a le-
gal right, satisfied a legal obligation, [or] complained to an outside
agency.”278 Delay is important in these instances because the tempo-
ral proximity of those events to a discharge can constitute circum-
stantial evidence of discrimination or otherwise unlawful motiva-
tion.279 Moreover, if the employee files suit, the events themselves
“can generate substantial jury sympathy, even if there is legitimate
reason for the termination.”280
                                                                                                                      
275. Ruffino, supra note 113, at 9. The theme that anything a supervisor says can be
used in court is pervasive in the defense literature. See, e.g., Christopher H. Mills, Selected
Issues Regarding RIFS: Releases, Discovery, “Smoking Guns,” and Statistics in Age Dis-
crimination Challenges to Downsizing and Layoffs, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 189, 242 (ALI-ABA Course of Study,
June 3-5, 1993) (“[A]fter years of age discrimination litigation, repeated RIFs and frequent
legal advice that all managers and executives need to ‘watch their language,’ age discrimi-
nation plaintiffs continue to come up with—or accurately relate—-statements by managers .
. . or recollections of conversations with supervisors . . . in which ‘charged statements’ re-
flective of age-discriminatory motivation were made.”); Paskoff, supra note 164, at 3
(“[A]nything a supervisor says about an employee or, in some instances, others may be ad-
missible in court and cause a judge or a jury to sympathize with a complainant even though
a challenged personnel action was legitimately initiated.”); see also Tristan Brown, The
Dirty Words of Corporate Downsizing: Impermissible Statements of Intent in Reduction-in-
Force Cases, 48 LAB. L.J. 214 (1997) (providing guidance for employers on statements con-
stituting direct evidence of discrimination).
276. Fitzpatrick, supra note 199, at 702.
277. Id.
278. Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1.
279. As two plaintiffs’ attorneys explain to prospective plaintiffs:
The most difficult part of a retaliation claim is showing a causal connection be-
tween your protected conduct and the adverse action taken against you. Timing
can be evidence of a causal connection. If your employer fires you shortly after
you file a charge of discrimination, one can infer that your protected conduct
was the real reason for your termination.
TOBIAS & SAUTER, supra note 132, at 93-94.
280. Sanchez, supra note 201, at 28.
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The issue of timing also underlies the advice to employers that
they implement and carefully monitor a regular performance review
system. The sudden dismissal of an employee before proper docu-
mentation has been prepared is an occurrence to be avoided.281 Par-
ticularly suspect are “terminations recommended by a new supervi-
sor who has a less favorable view of the employee’s performance than
the prior supervisor.”282 Taking the time to ensure the employer’s po-
sition is defensible can avoid the implication that the firing was ille-
gally motivated.
The defense’s emphasis on careful timing seemingly bolsters my
argument in the previous section that independent review of the
termination decision may mask, rather than eliminate, conditions of
inequality.283 When reviewers miss instances of unconscious bias,
perhaps because someone has previously edited the performance
documentation,284 they may suggest delaying the desired action
rather than vetoing the entire decision. Outside forces reviewing the
subsequent termination will lack strong evidence of discrimination
due to these compliance practices and may, therefore, wrongly con-
clude that none took place.285
3.   The Need to Maintain the Proper Tone Regarding Actions
Taken
The final important area in litigation prevention advice is the
matter of tone. Management attorneys stress the importance not
only of what is said to employees, but also the pitch at which it is
conveyed. As one lawyer notes regarding equal opportunity policies
generally:
When your employee brings a discrimination or harassment com-
plaint to a government agency, one of the first things that an in-
vestigator will do is review your company’s EEO policy. A policy
with well-constructed content and tone will create a favorable
first impression. If the content and tone don’t pass muster, you
may be in for trouble.286
A similar concern for tone is evident in discussions concerning
performance evaluation preparation. Defense lawyers note the im-
                                                                                                                      
281. See Martin, supra note 124, at 873-74; Turk, supra note 200, at 106 (noting regular
performance reviews should be conducted so “employers will not be tempted . . . to create
last-minute performance reviews . . . that may be viewed as pretext for terminating the em-
ployee on other grounds”).
282. Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1.
283. See supra notes 253-71 and accompanying text.
284. Recall that one defense recommendation is that performance evaluations be re-
viewed and, if necessary, edited. See supra notes 229-35 and accompanying text.
285. See Edelman et al., supra note 78, at 530.
286. Segal, supra note 113, at 109.
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portance of candor when recording the employee’s weaknesses in
these reviews.287 Yet in expressing candor, the attorneys warn evalu-
ators not to be overzealous.288 As one advocate notes, “petty and in-
consequential evaluations can taint an employer’s position.”289
Another situation where pitch is considered vital is the area of
discipline and discharge. Attorneys counsel supervisors to “avoid
emotional responses to personnel problems.”290 These suggestions il-
lustrate the appropriate tonal parameters of a termination meeting:
“Employers should state reasons consistent with the documentation
in its [sic] files; should be direct, honest, and firm; should avoid ar-
gument; should not sugarcoat the real reasons for termination;
should be humane; but should not be apologetic.”291 Following such
an approach can help the employer demonstrate that it acted fairly
under the circumstances.292
No doubt bad news delivered sensitively is a gain for employees. A
poor performance review, discipline, and discharge are all traumatic
occurrences. By achieving the proper tone, an employer can help the
employee face the inevitable with equanimity.
Nonetheless, might there be ways that a fair sounding adverse ac-
tion could mask discriminatory conditions? One management lawyer
may provide an answer:
                                                                                                                      
287. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 199, at 699 (“Be accurate and candid.”); Hermle, supra
note 209, at 403 (bemoaning the fact that “[m]anagers are more often than not less candid
in performance reviews than they could be”); Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1 (“It is
essential for employers to stress to supervisors the expectation and need for candid per-
formance evaluations.”); Hicks & Alexander, supra note 196, at *12 (advising that employ-
ers “honestly” and “accurately” evaluate employee conduct); Martin, supra note 209, at 7
(“[T]he firm should also remind evaluators of the importance of giving candid assess-
ments.”); Ruffino, supra note 113, at 9 (“[S]tress to managers the importance of giving hon-
est review . . . .”); Sanchez, supra note 201, at 27 (“Performance reviews should be honest.”).
288. See KAHN ET AL., supra note 112, at 6-15 (“Negative over documentation of one
employee can support a finding of intentional discrimination.”); Hicks & Alexander, supra
note 196, at *13 (“Evaluators should . . . avoid insulting, defamatory or inflammatory lan-
guage.”).
289. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 199, at 58; see also Gay et al., supra note 262, at 52-53
(“[A]void presenting a ‘laundry list’ of reasons for an employee’s termination or other ad-
verse employment action. The more reasons an employer gives, the more opportunity a
plaintiff has to create an issue of fact.”); Martin, supra note 124, at 874 (“Assuming there is
a relatively complete written record of plaintiff’s performance, the best strategy . . . is gen-
erally to admit plaintiff has the strengths documented and to stress the deficiencies noted
in the documents and explain why those deficiencies are significant.”); Segal, supra note
113, at 109 (“[I]f the comments are too specific, it may appear that the employer is ‘nickel
and diming’ the employee in the hope of driving the employee from the organization.”).
290. Paskoff, supra note 164, at 5; see also Sanchez, supra note 201, at 27 (“The disci-
pline should always be given privately and not in anger.”).
291. Fitzpatrick, supra note 199, at 703; see also Cathcart & Vanderziel, supra note 204,
at 1240 (instructing employers in reduction-in-force contexts to “[c]ommunicate the decision
humanely”).
292. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 199, at 703; see also Paskoff, supra note 164, at 5 (“[I]f
litigation does arise, by following this rule, the employer can better demonstrate fair treat-
ment.”).
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An ugly termination may come back to haunt your company. Treat
all terminated employees—even those who were terminated for
cause—with respect. . . . [D]on’t humiliate the employee. And al-
ways spell out precisely why he or she is being terminated. Re-
member, the employee who’s been humiliated is the one who’s most
likely to sue.293
If one accepts the idea that managers may fail to discern condi-
tions of inequality in the workplace because they view disputes as
personality clashes rather than potential instances of discrimina-
tion,294 the problem becomes clear. An employer deserving of a law-
suit may avoid litigation by treating an employee nicely. In other
words, this type of compliance mechanism may encourage employees
not to take legal action where there may be grounds for it.295
This argument may make sense in the context of termination
meetings. Yet, can achieving the proper tone in one’s documentation
forestall a worthy lawsuit? I do not doubt that it can. As the attorney
quoted above notes, “[I]f the employee knows you’ve got good docu-
mentation, there’s less incentive to launch a suit.”296 Furthermore,
even if the employee decides to seek legal counsel, “[a] fully docu-
mented personnel file may discourage a former employee’s attorney
from filing prospective litigation.”297
IV.   THE IMPLICATIONS OF SCRIPTING
The discussion thus far has focused on the content of the compli-
ance strategies that management attorneys offer to safeguard em-
ployment decisions from legal challenge. As noted above, litigation-
prevention advice places much greater emphasis on symbolic shows
of compliance with civil rights law than on true substantive change
for the groups that this law is designed to protect. The preoccupation
with maximizing employers’ evidentiary advantages displays an
overriding concern for producing the trappings of an equal opportu-
nity workplace without a concomitant commitment to taking con-
crete steps to achieve it.
No doubt most defense lawyers hope that by following their bul-
letproofing prescriptions employers will eliminate actual workplace
bias along with its fingerprints. In extreme cases, where a pattern of
retaliation or harassment is clear, these suggestions are likely to
work. Oversight of the discipline and discharge process can detect
such problems and ensure that appropriate punishment is meted out
                                                                                                                      
293. Myers, supra note 113, at 7 (emphasis added).
294. See Edelman et al., supra note 78, at 515-16.
295. See id. at 528.
296. Myers, supra note 113, at 7.
297. Hicks & Alexander, supra note 196, at *17.
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to perpetrators. Moreover, in cases where an employee is a horrible
performer, deserving of bad reviews and adverse employment action,
the steps recommended by employer advocates can forestall frivolous
litigation. Thus, the symbolic actions endorsed by defense lawyers
are hardly inconsequential. Both employers and employees may
benefit from them.
Yet, there are ways in which these same actions may actually
mask conditions of inequality furthering the misperception that em-
ployment discrimination is not a pervasive problem.298 This masking
phenomenon likely occurs with respect to employment decisions in-
fluenced by subtle or unconscious bias. The difficulty that human
beings experience in detecting bias299 may lead to the bulletproofing
of decisions that would otherwise be viable claims. For example, to
the extent that a human resource professional reviewing a proposed
termination characterizes the problem as a “personality conflict,”
rather than a manifestation of discrimination,300 the person will sug-
gest a way to accomplish the adverse action that arouses the least
amount of suspicion. Lack of evidence may then affect the actions of
the employee in question or an attorney reviewing the facts to de-
termine whether grounds for suit exist.301
Part of this problem, as previously discussed, is sociologically
based. Organizations wish to honor equal employment opportunity
principles in ways that are the least disruptive of management pre-
rogative.302 However, the problem also has a psychological aspect
that becomes apparent when one focuses on a central litigation
avoidance strategy—the extensive use of neutral evaluation devices.
Defense attorneys recommend liberal use of these tools, advising
employers to turn their attention away from immutable characteris-
tics such as sex and race.303 For example, they recommend that em-
ployers complete performance evaluations by comparing impartial
observations of employee conduct against objective, job-related crite-
ria.304 Yet, some empirical research indicates that these so-called
neutral devices may be subject to pernicious, unconscious influences
that disadvantage women, minorities, and members of other pro-
tected groups. Thus, maybe management lawyers are merely teach-
ing employers how to write and talk about the decisions they make
                                                                                                                      
298. See discussion supra note 2 (describing empirical studies on discrimination).
299. See discussion supra notes 28 & 33.
300. See Edelman et al., supra, note 78, at 517; see also notes 84-90 and accompanying
text.
301. See, e.g., Hicks & Alexander, supra note 196, at *16-17.
302. See supra notes 83–91 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 224-28 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
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in neutral terms without actually altering the impulses that moti-
vate them.
A.   Sex and Race Bias in Performance Evaluation
Over two decades of study on the effects of sex and race bias in
performance evaluation has yielded somewhat mixed results.305 In
the area of gender, for example, some studies detect anti female bias
in evaluation, particularly in male-dominated occupations.306 Other
studies find that gender has no effect on evaluation.307 Yet, others
discern more favorable treatment of women than men.308 These con-
flicting results do not indicate that bias against women is nonexist-
ent. Rather, they demonstrate that evaluation bias is more salient
under some conditions than others.309
Classic laboratory studies demonstrate that work product,
résumés, and performance data receive higher ratings when raters
are told that the creators were men.310 Other studies find bias
against women in causal attribution: when women perform well, for
example, their success is attributed to factors such as luck, rather
than ability.311 Bias against women also tends to appear when the
task being evaluated is perceived to be masculine.312
                                                                                                                      
305. See Robert D. Bretz et al., The Current State of Performance Appraisal Research
and Practice: Concerns, Directions, and Implications, 18 J. MGMT. 321, 324-25 (1992). There
have been far fewer studies of the effect on evaluation of ratee age. See id. at 325 (noting
“[r]atee age received limited research attention”). At least one study found that nursing su-
pervisors rated younger subordinates more highly than older subordinates. See Gerald R.
Ferris et al., The Influence of Subordinate Age on Performance Ratings and Causal Attribu-
tion, 38 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 545, 548-55 (1985). However, a recent study of sales manag-
ers found that older employees performed better with respect to objective measures and
subjective evaluation. See Robert C. Liden et al., The Effects of Supervisor and Subordinate
Age on Objective Performance and Subjective Performance Ratings, 49 HUM. REL. 327, 327
(1996).
306. See Jacqueline Landau, The Relationship of Race and Gender to Managers’ Rating
of Promotion Potential, 16 J. ORG’L BEHAV. 391, 392 (1995); Gregory B. Lewis, Race, Sex,
and Performance Ratings in Federal Service, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 479 (1997), available in
1997 WL 10129659, at *7-12. See generally Ted H. Shore, Subtle Gender Bias in the Assess-
ment of Managerial Potential, 27 SEX ROLES 499 (1992) (noting that some studies indicated
a pro-male bias, some indicated a pro-female bias, and still others indicated no bias at all).
307. See Shore, supra note 306.
308. See id.
309. See Veronica F. Nieva & Barbara A. Gutek, Sex Effects on Evaluation, 5 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 267, 273 (1980).
310. See Lewis, supra note 306, at *7-12; Nieva & Gutek, supra note 309, at 268.
311. See Robert L. Dipboye, Some Neglected Variables in Research on Discrimination in
Appraisals, 10 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 116, 119 (1985); Nieva & Gutek, supra note 309, at 269-
70.
312. See Nieva & Gutek, supra note 309, at 271-73 (“[B]ehaviors that violate societal
sex-role expectations tend to be negatively regarded.”); Michele A. Paludi & Lisa A. Strayer,
What’s in an Author’s Name? Differential Evaluations of Performance as a Function of
Author’s Name, 12 SEX ROLES 353, 359 (1985).
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Critics of these studies argue that the settings in which the stud-
ies were conducted, primarily laboratory settings, do not fairly re-
flect the way evaluation is performed in real-world environments.313
Indeed, numerous field studies indicate that gender is not a strong
evaluative influence.314 These results are thought to be due, in part,
to the fact that field study evaluators typically possess much infor-
mation about the performance of the individuals being rated. Be-
cause raters need infer less about ratees in those situations, bias in
the form of stereotypic assumptions is reduced.315
If these field studies were the end of the matter, my argument
would be far less important. To the extent supervisors observe and
recall significant amounts of information about their subordinates,
gender bias in evaluation should not be a significant problem.316
However, recent field studies argue against complacency. For exam-
ple, the purpose for which a review is performed is found to be a
relevant factor. A number of studies find pro-male bias evident when
appraisals are conducted for promotion or compensation purposes.317
In contrast, evaluations done purely for feedback purposes do not
seem as prone to this effect.318 Thus, where an employer’s perform-
ance review program is tied to compensation and/or promotion prac-
tices, it is not clear that facially neutral reviews will be free from
bias.
Like the studies on gender, studies of the effect of race on evalua-
tion conflict. Unlike gender studies, however, greater racial bias ap-
                                                                                                                      
313. See Dipboye, supra note 311, at 119-20; Lewis, supra note 306, at *7-12.
314. See Landau, supra note 306, at 392; Lewis, supra note 306, at *7-12.
315. See Lewis, supra note 306, at *7-12; Nieva & Gutek, supra note 309, at 270-71.
316. Voluminous literature exists concerning evaluation biases caused by raters’ knowl-
edge of ratees’ prior performance, the order in which good or poor performance is perceived,
raters’ expectations, and memory decay. See Bretz et al., supra note 305, at 323-24. These
factors potentially affect the performance ratings of all employees. See id.
317. See Gregory H. Dobbins et al., The Effects of Purpose of Appraisal and Individual
Differences in Stereotypes of Women on Sex Differences in Performance Ratings: A Labora-
tory and Field Study, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 551, 556-57 (1988) (finding female ratees
evaluated less accurately than men where purpose of evaluation was promotion and pay);
Landau, supra note 306, at 397 (finding both gender and race are significantly related to
promotion potential ratings); Shore, supra note 306, at 508-12 (finding subtle gender bias
affects evaluations of managerial potential and subsequent promotion decisions) Token-
ism—the condition when the proportion of women in a workgroup is small—has also been
found to depress female evaluation. See generally Paul R. Sackett et al., Tokenism in Per-
formance Evaluation: The Effects of Work Group Representation on Male-Female and
White-Black Differences in Performance Ratings, 76 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 263 (1991) (re-
porting the results of a study investigating the difference in ratings of males and females in
486 work groups).
318. See Landau, supra note 306, at 392-93 (noting that potential for biased perceptions
may be greater for the promotion potential rating); Nieva & Gutek, supra note 309, at 270
(“Greater evaluation bias was found in studies on the evaluation of qualifications and on the
causal attributions of performance than in the studies focusing on past performance”).
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pears evident in field studies as compared with laboratory studies.319
Nevertheless, one meta-analysis concluded that in both laboratory
and field studies racial bias is unmistakable.320 More specifically, the
analysis found that in sixty-eight of seventy-four studies reviewed,
white raters rated the performance of whites higher than that of
blacks.321 Moreover, ratings bias may influence both the evaluation of
past performance and promotional promise. One recent study deter-
mined that being African-American or Asian negatively influenced
ratings of promotion potential.322 There are, however, some contrary
findings. For example, two recent studies found the magnitude of the
effect of race on evaluation to be minimal.323
In some cases, status as affirmative action beneficiaries is an ad-
ditional factor that may affect the evaluation of minorities and
women.324 Studies demonstrate that association with affirmative ac-
tion programs produces stigma; specifically, program participants
are inferred to be incompetent.325 One recent study examined
whether this presumption could be overcome with information about
successful performance.326 The results were mixed. When raters were
provided clear, unambiguous information about performance effec-
tiveness, the negative competence inferences were overridden.327
However, more ambiguous success information did not produce a
                                                                                                                      
319. See Lewis, supra note 306, at *7-12.
320. See generally Kurt Kraiger & J. Kevin Ford, A Meta-Analysis of Ratee Race Effects
in Performance Ratings, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 56 (1985). These findings are likely due to
the significant barriers to advancement faced by people of color in American society. See
generally Thomas F. Pettigrew & Joanne Martin, Shaping the Organizational Context for
Black American Inclusion, 43 J. SOC. ISSUES 41 (1987) (discussing barriers to African-
American advancement).
321. See Kraiger & Ford, supra note 320, at 60. One difficulty is determining how much
of the differential in rating is due to bias and how much is due to actual differences in per-
formance. See Lewis, supra note 306, at *9 (noting that while prejudice could be affecting
evaluation, “[r]atings differences could also signal real differences in performance”).
322. See Landau, supra note 306, at 397.
323. See generally Elaine D. Pulakos et al., Examination of Race and Sex Effects on Per-
formance Ratings, 74 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 770 (1989) (finding through a study of U.S. army
supervisors and new enlistees that race and sex had minimal affect on evaluation); David A.
Waldman & Bruce J. Avolio, Race Effects in Performance Evaluations: Controlling for Abil-
ity, Education, and Experience, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 897 (1991) (finding only minor ef-
fects of race on evaluation).
324. See Garcia et al., The Effect of Affirmative Action on Attributions About Minority
Group Members, 49 J. PERSONALITY 427, 436 (1981); Pettigrew & Martin, supra note 320, at
57-60. See generally Madeline E. Heilman et al., Presumed Incompetent? Stigmatization and
Affirmative Action Efforts, 77 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 536 (1992) (reporting the results of two
studies demonstrating negative perceptions of the competence and career progress of indi-
viduals labeled as affirmative action beneficiaries).
325. See Heilman et al., supra note 324.
326. See Madeline E. Heilman et al., The Affirmative Action Stigma of Incompetence: Ef-
fects of Performance Information Ambiguity, 40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 603, 603-05 (1997).
327. See id. at 609. Subjects were told that a supervisor rated the ratee’s performance
within the top five percent range.
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disconfirming effect.328 The study authors voiced concern about these
findings, noting that precise performance information is not avail-
able in many work settings, especially when people work in teams.329
In light of the above-described empirical findings, the argument
that race and sex bias may taint performance evaluation appears
persuasive. A recent turn in the direction of performance review re-
search provides additional cause for concern. In 1985 Robert Dipboye
challenged the research community to turn its attention to the be-
havioral and social determinants of appraisal bias.330 He admonished
his colleagues to be mindful that evaluation does not take place in a
vacuum. Rather, supervisors and subordinates “typically interact
face-to-face, and in the process of interacting they form relationships
that vary in intimacy and attachment.”331
Those relationships can profoundly impact performance appraisal.
Rating bias may occur, for example, because the supervisor is am-
bivalent toward a minority subordinate and hesitates to provide
feedback necessary for improvement.332 Subtle bias may also mani-
fest itself in the behavior of a rater toward a subordinate, thereby af-
fecting the performance of the underling.333 These sorts of effects, ar-
gued Dipboye, were not captured by much of the appraisal bias re-
search.
Since then, a number of studies have examined the social and
situational factors that influence performance ratings. Not surpris-
ingly, the studies find that the quality of the relationship between a
supervisor and subordinate can have a significant effect.334 One par-
ticular study highlights the potential implications of this research. It
found that demographic similarity between a supervisor and subor-
dinate positively influences the impressions the superior has of the
underling.335 That impression, or affect, “exerted a significant, albeit
                                                                                                                      
328. See id. Subjects were told that a supervisor rated the ratee’s performance as
within the top 50%, the highest rating category available.
329. See id.
330. See generally Dipboye, supra note 311, at 120-24.
331. Id. at 120.
332. See id. at 123.
333. See id. at 120-21.
334. See, e.g., Neville T. Duarte et al., Effects of Dyadic Quality and Duration on Per-
formance Appraisal, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 499 (1994) (finding that the employee performance
is generally rated high when the supervisor-subordinate relationship is good, regardless of
objective performance); Timothy A. Judge & Gerald R. Ferris, Social Context of Perform-
ance Evaluation Decisions, 36 ACAD. MGMT. J. 80 (1993) (finding that a close supervisor-
subordinate work relationship positively influences ratings); Barry R. Nathan et al., Inter-
personal Relations as a Context for the Effects of Appraisal Interviews on Performance and
Satisfaction: A Longitudinal Study, 34 ACAD. MGMT. J. 352 (1991) (finding that subordinate
reactions to performance review are affected by interpersonal relations).
335. See Judge & Ferris, supra note 334, at 97-98.
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modest, indirect effect on performance rating.”336 Thus, when white
male managers view their demographically similar white male sub-
ordinates as the “in group,” one might expect to find a negative in-
fluence on the ratings of outsiders.337
B.   Trying to Eliminate Bias by Ignoring It
The discussion thus far makes clear that a central litigation pre-
vention mechanism, the evaluation device, is actually vulnerable to
the pernicious influence of largely unconscious race and sex bias. To
the extent that compliance strategies obscure the actions of those
forces in the ways described above, conditions of inequality will re-
main without legal remedy. Moreover, public perception that em-
ployment discrimination is no longer a significant problem may be
influenced as well.
Further adding to the potential that management attorneys’ ad-
vice may mask discriminatory conditions is the implicit suggestion
that managers can eliminate discriminatory impulses by ignoring
the immutable characteristics of the subordinates they evaluate.338
Linda Hamilton Krieger has recently argued that the colorblind ap-
proach to decision making advocated by the foes of affirmative action
cannot eliminate discriminatory decisions produced by unconscious
bias.339 Drawing from the work of Timothy Wilson and Nancy
Brekke,340 Krieger notes that four steps are necessary to correct “bi-
ases caused by emotional discomfort, the subconscious effects of
stereotypes, [or] causal attribution.”341 First, the rater must be aware
of the mental process that produces the bias. Second, the rater must
want to correct for the unwanted influence. Third, the rater must
discern the magnitude of the bias to avoid “overcorrecting” for it. Fi-
nally, the rater must be able to sufficiently control his or her mental
processes to execute the correction.342 As this enumeration amply
demonstrates, “one must think about race in order not to discrimi-
nate.”343 Ironically, then, litigation prevention advice may simulta-
neously ensure that subconscious bias will not be eliminated from
                                                                                                                      
336. Id. at 98.
337. See Dipboye, supra note 311, at 121 (“[W]hite male managers have been found to
treat white male subordinates as the “in-group.”).
338. See supra note 224-228 and accompanying text.
339. See Krieger, supra note 5, at 1276-77.
340. See Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Cor-
rection: Unwanted Influences on Judgements and Evaluations, 116 PSYCH. BULL. 117
(1994).
341. Krieger, supra note 5, at 1286.
342. See id.
343. Id. at 1288.
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employment decision making and inoculate decision making from
challenge as biased.
Patricia Devine’s work also stresses the necessity of conscious ef-
fort to reduce bias. She and her colleagues developed the “disassocia-
tion model” to explain unconscious prejudice and stereotyping.344
This model distinguishes between cultural stereotypes, which are
learned in childhood and are activated automatically, and personal
beliefs, which often express egalitarian norms.345 Both high- and low-
prejudice individuals experience conflict between these intra-psychic
forces.346 However, low-prejudice individuals experience guilt that
motivates a conscious process of prejudice reduction.347 The impor-
tant point to note here is the requirement of consciousness as a pre-
requisite to the elimination of stereotypical responses.348 Defense at-
torneys incorporate no such notion in their litigation prevention ad-
vice. Rather, as noted above, they dispense their advice with the im-
plicit assumption that one eliminates prejudice by ignoring it and fo-
cusing instead on neutral, job-related criteria.
Again, I do not question that many of the suggestions proffered by
defense lawyers are well intentioned. Rather, my concern is that by
teaching employers how to script the story of an adverse employment
action, management attorneys are unwittingly instructing them on
how to mask the biases they presumably seek to eliminate. The next
section considers the impact that these practices might have on dis-
crimination claims generally by focusing on the effects of paper rec-
ords and other compliance strategies on plaintiffs’ attorneys.
V.   RESPONSE OF THE PLAINTIFFS’ BAR
One way to evaluate the efficacy of litigation prevention strate-
gies is to examine published case law and assess the reactions of
                                                                                                                      
344. Eberhardt & Fiske, supra note 244, at 378-81 (explaining the model).
345. See Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled
Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 6-7 (1989).
346. See Patricia G. Devine & M.J. Monteith, The Role of Discrepancy-Associated Affect
in Prejudice Reduction, in AFFECT, COGNITION, AND STEREOTYPING: INTERACTIVE
PROCESSES IN GROUP PERCEPTION 317, 323 (Diane M. Mackie & David L. Hamilton eds.,
1993).
347. See id. at 324-26.
348. A recent study examined the relationship between “identity blind” personnel poli-
cies, which scrupulously avoid consideration of immutable characteristics, and the employ-
ment status of women and people of color in the organizations that use such policies. See
Alison M. Konrad & Frank Linnehan, Formalized HRM Structures: Coordinating Equal
Employment Opportunity or Concealing Organizational Practices?, 38 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
787 (1995). The study found that “identity conscious” policies, like affirmative action pro-
grams, were positively associated with the employment status of women and minorities. See
id. at 805-07. However, “identity blind” structures, including performance review programs,
were not. See id. The study authors posit that “identity-conscious structures are needed to
ameliorate the biases of decisionmakers and reward systems.” Id. at 807.
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judges to the documentary and testimonial evidence proffered by
employers.349 This approach, however, overlooks a significant fact:
many employment disputes fail to become formal legal proceedings.
In fact, litigation encompasses a mere fraction of the events that ac-
tually might mature into bona fide legal disputes.350 The problems
employees experience are anything but static. Perceptions of em-
ployment disputes change over time. Many an aggrieved employee
decides to take the lumps and move on.
Lawyers, the gatekeepers of legal institutions, play an essential
role in this process of dispute transformation.351 They do so by help-
ing those they accept as clients understand their problems as formal
legal claims. By the same token, attorneys may arrest dispute devel-
opment when they reject the pleas of individuals seeking legal assis-
tance.352
With these precepts in mind, the plaintiffs’ bar would seem a logi-
cal place to begin to gauge the impact of the defense strategies de-
scribed above. To challenge an employment decision in court, an em-
ployee must generally obtain the assistance of an attorney; that is
the employee must get a lawyer to believe in and accept the case.
Thus, it is vitally important to consider how plaintiffs’ attorneys
evaluate and react to the techniques advocated by management law-
yers.
How does performance-based documentary evidence impact the
case selection process? Does such evidence affect the tactics that will
be used if a case is accepted? Can plaintiffs’ lawyers turn litigation
prevention strategies against employers? I developed and distributed
a survey to a sample of plaintiffs’ attorneys to explore these and
other, related questions.353
The survey results cannot demonstrate as empirical fact the cen-
tral concern of this Article: that litigation prevention advice may
mask workplace bias. Nor can they directly measure the influence of
compliance mechanisms on the plaintiffs’ bar. However, they can
provide a window on the thinking of a large group of plaintiffs’ law-
yers. Moreover, that collective estimation of the state of discrimina-
tion law practice can be compared against the themes contained in
                                                                                                                      
349. See infra notes 364-72 and accompanying text (discussing recent study of federal
circuit court decisions involving performance reviews). Post-trial jury interviews are an-
other way to gauge the impact of defense strategies.
350. See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . . , 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631, 636 (1980) (discussing an analyti-
cal framework for understanding the emergence and transformation of disputes).
351. See id. at 645 (“Of all of the agents of dispute transformation lawyers are probably
the most important.”)
352. See id. at 646.
353. The survey questions are reproduced infra Appendix I.
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the defense literature. To the extent that the views of the plaintiffs’
and defense bars coincide, one gains a sense of the efficacy of the
compliance mechanisms recommended by management lawyers.
The greater the similarity of viewpoints between the two sides,
the more potent the techniques would appear to be. In other words, if
the employment bar as a whole shares a set of analytical constructs
that are used to distinguish between viable and fruitless discrimina-
tion claims, then litigation prevention methods, by drawing from
those constructs, should be relatively effective. Although more re-
search should be done in this area, it is my hope that this Article
makes evident the need for such work.
An analysis of the survey data reveals that plaintiffs’ lawyers
conceptualize claim viability in ways strikingly similar to the de-
fense bar. Plaintiffs’ lawyers not only agree with management attor-
neys that employers possess the evidentiary advantage in employ-
ment cases, they articulate the parameters of that advantage using
the same lexicon. The themes that predominate are those that were
present in the defense literature: (1) the value to employers of ongo-
ing evidence production; (2) the significance of the timing of em-
ployment decisions; and (3) the consequence of tone. These similari-
ties demonstrate the integral part that compliance principles play in
employment discrimination law practice today.
After a brief discussion of the survey data and design, the sections
below provide my analysis of the respondents’ perspectives on these
issues. Thereafter, Part V.D. considers the strategies plaintiffs’ at-
torneys use in order to re-script the stories of the adverse actions
suffered by their clients. There are many ways in which this task can
be accomplished, as the survey results illustrate. Even so, the supe-
riority of the defense position should be kept in mind because it may
limit the extent to which employee counternarratives are capable of
success.
A.   Survey Data and Design
The data for the analysis below are drawn from a survey of mem-
bers of the National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA), a na-
tionwide organization representing more than 3500 plaintiffs’ em-
ployment lawyers. A geographically stratified sample was achieved
by dividing NELA’s membership list by federal circuit and selecting
from each circuit every third name. Out of 1213 surveys mailed, 479
responses were received.354 This represents a thirty-nine percent re-
sponse rate—a rate considered favorable by social scientists.355
                                                                                                                      
354. Due to limitations on the type of data the National Employment Lawyers Associa-
tion (NELA) kept on its members at the time of the survey, I cannot demonstrate that the
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The survey was three pages long and was divided into two sec-
tions. Its first section solicited general information from each re-
spondent. Some of the information sought included: law firm size,
years of experience in legal practice, the percentage of the attorney’s
caseload devoted to representing employees, whether the attorney
has represented employers, and whether the attorney ever consults
with employees before adverse action is taken against them. The re-
sults of that section are summarized in Appendix II.
 The second section of the survey was designed to elicit in-
formation about the impact of written performance-related documen-
tation and other defense strategies.  Attorneys were asked to rate
how important documentation is to a decision to accept or reject a
case.  They were also asked to evaluate a series of statements about
documentary evidence; to appraise the ability of various factors to
undercut an employer’s explanation for an adverse action; and to de-
scribe, in textual form, how effective performance-related documen-
tation is as a defense strategy in litigation. I now turn to the results
of this section.
B.   Giving Voice to the Plaintiffs’ Bar
Perhaps the most revealing part of the survey results were the
answers to a question allowing for extended written response. The
survey asked whether the respondents considered the proffer of per-
formance-related documentation to be an effective defense strategy
in litigation. There was very little disagreement on the matter. Most
of the respondents indicated that when documentation of poor per-
formance is prepared properly, it is extremely persuasive. Respon-
dents also evidenced fairly uniform views about the factors impact-
ing the strategy’s effectiveness. Moreover, those opinions correspond
with the defense literature on the steps that can be taken to reduce
employer vulnerability to suit.356 These findings indicate shared
                                                                                                                      
demographic characteristics of the respondent population approximate those of the mem-
bership at-large. This does not represent a flaw in the study because I make no claim that
the results are representative of that organization. The survey’s goal was to gain a sense of
how plaintiffs’ attorneys evaluate claims and react to defense strategies. The striking simi-
larity between the survey results and the content analysis described above strongly suggest
a conception of claim viability that is shared by members of both the plaintiffs’ and defense
bars.
355. See Sutton et al., The Legalization of the Workplace, supra note 39, at 952-53 (dis-
cussing response rates for several organizational studies, all of which fell between 35% and
54%).
356. The same phenomenon was present regarding the results from other portions of
the survey. For example, 97% of the respondents expressed agreement with the statement
that specific examples of performance deficiencies bolster an employer’s explanation for an
adverse employment action. Similarly, 97% agreed with the statement that evidence of pro-
gressive discipline bolsters an employer’s explanation. Both factors appear in defense litera-
ture as steps employers should take to reduce their vulnerability to litigation.
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thinking about these issues by the practicing employment bar as a
whole.
The commentary contained various recurring topics. Themati-
cally, these subjects fall into the three categories emphasized by the
preventative literature: (1) the strength of evidence produced in an
ongoing, regular fashion; (2) the significance of timing; and (3) the
importance of tone. Because emphasis was placed on timing, I will
discuss that theme first.
1.   The Significance of Timing
Many respondents emphasized that timing is linked to the effi-
cacy of performance documentation as a defense strategy. Specifi-
cally, they noted that documentation is most effective as a defense
weapon when prepared as part of an ongoing review process over a
long period of time. “Any employer which can document consistent
criticism of an employee’s performance over time has a strong de-
fense,” noted one respondent. Another remarked, “[A] consistent rec-
ord of poor performance throughout a career may be a strong defense
tool.” Yet, another opined, “If the documentation is consistently done
over a considerable length of time, then it is probably the most
problematic defense strategy.” A fourth wrote: “A series of low
evaluations or a record of disciplinary incidents is very effective. I
would not represent an employee with such a record.”
Notably, plaintiffs’ bar publications describing case intake factors
echo these sentiments. For example, one attorney notes: “[A] well-
documented personnel file showing repeated warnings of misconduct
or substandard performance is a major deterrent to accepting the
case for litigation . . . . A history of marginal or substandard per-
formance can rarely be overcome in a courtroom.”357 Thus, the de-
fense bar’s repeated suggestions that litigation can be avoided by
adopting and carefully administering an ongoing performance re-
view system appear, at least in general, to be sound.
In comments that comport with litigation prevention advice,
many survey respondents stated that negative documentation pre-
pared too close to the time of the adverse action is suspect and sub-
ject to attack. One attorney noted that performance documentation
“can backfire with a long-term employee who has a history of good
reviews and suddenly receives several horrible ones.” A second at-
                                                                                                                      
357. Joseph A. Golden, Pre-Complaint Activity in a Wrongful Discharge Claim, in 1997
SEVENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION 539, 543 (NELA, 1997); see also Wayne N. Outten, Evaluat-
ing Plaintiff’s Case and Settlement Opportunities: Plaintiff’s Perspective, in LITIGATING
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 7, 14 (PLI, 1996) (listing questions to ask prospective
clients including, “What are the worst things the employer may say about the employee or
his/her work?”).
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torney suggested that “great reviews for a long time make a sudden
decline highly suspicious.” Another wrote that documentation of per-
formance is “least effective when a plaintiff has consistently positive
evaluations and then the evaluations drop drastically at the same
time that he or she complains about adverse treatment.” If the re-
view was done “close in time to the discharge, then it is subject to at-
tack as calculated to build a case against the plaintiff, especially if it
was out of line with past evaluations,” noted a fourth.
Again, the plaintiff’s bar provides similar advice regarding case
intake:
[A] series of above standard evaluations followed by a sudden drop
in performance rating raises additional questions. Was there a
change in supervision? Was there a change in the performance
standards while the potential client’s performance remained con-
stant? Did something happen to the potential client which af-
fected her ability to meet the standards of the job?358
The attorney goes on to suggest that if analysis fails to establish a
plausible explanation for the adverse action, one can consider ac-
cepting the case.359
Interestingly, in focusing on timing, the attorneys seem to be
looking for patterns or story lines into which they can fit a given
complaint. Neither pattern described above, however, necessarily in-
dicates the presence or absence of discrimination. A supervisor who
stereotypes may produce years of critical performance documenta-
tion. Likewise, there may be a drop in an employee’s performance
ratings because a new supervisor pays more attention to preparing
evaluations than did his or her predecessor. That new boss may be
entirely unbiased. Yet the search for symbols of fidelity (or lack of fi-
delity) to equal employment opportunity principles continues apace.
One cannot fault the attorneys for this, however. As will be described
more fully below, the judiciary seems to respond to symbols.
2.   The Value to Employers of Ongoing Evidence Production
A great deal of the defense literature emphasizes the importance
of the continual production of favorable evidence. For example, a
common refrain is that employers can safeguard the decisions they
make by creating “paper trails.”360 The steps necessary for bullet-
proofing decisions, from regular performance reviews to termination
meeting rehearsals, are often provided in detail. Respondents to my
survey discussed the value this evidence production has to employers
                                                                                                                      
358. Golden, supra note 357, at 543.
359. See id. at 544.
360. See supra note 196 and accompanying text; see also generally supra Part III.C.1.
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and referenced many of the steps described in the litigation preven-
tion advice. Their comments seem to affirm the validity of the pre-
scriptions dispensed by management attorneys.
Many respondents noted the difficulty of refuting negative per-
formance documentation. “Such a strategy is extremely effective be-
cause it forces the plaintiff to address and refute often numerous and
diverse allegations of faulty performance,” observed one. Another
noted, “It is an important aspect of defense strategy because it bol-
sters ‘for cause’ termination and makes the plaintiffs’ burden more
difficult.” A third respondent asserted, “A thick personnel file with
lots of warnings can hurt the plaintiff badly, even if the warnings are
disputed or minor because it puts he/she [sic] in the position of hav-
ing to defend many things.” Yet another noted that negative per-
formance documentation “forces plaintiff to expend time and energy
defending performance rather than proving discrimination.”361
In a related theme, a number of respondents referenced the credi-
bility that attaches to writings. “[P]eople tend to believe ‘the written
word,’ even if it is a totally ‘written lie,’” noted one. Another opined,
“Pieces of paper are given more weight than testimonial evidence.” A
third offered that proffering negative performance documentation “is
a useful defense tool because juries like things they can touch.” “Ju-
rors like to see a paper trail—as long as it appears to be genuine,”
said yet another. Another noted cynically: “[E]veryone knows what
‘CYA’362 means these days, in management especially. The greater
the effort to produce ‘CYA’ documentation, the more effective it is in
their defense.”
As noted above, the survey respondents directly and indirectly
referenced several of the procedural steps recommended by man-
agement attorneys. For example, evidence of progressive discipline is
perceived as enhancing the effectiveness of performance-related
documentation as a defense tool. One respondent declared, for exam-
ple, that documentation is a powerful defense tool “if it shows a rea-
                                                                                                                      
361. Of course, document trails can be turned against employers where they are not
prepared properly, a point made extensively by management lawyers. This theme appears
in the plaintiffs’ bar’s literature as well. See Richard T. Seymour, Summary Judgment Mo-
tions After Hicks, in ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION 167, 174 (ALI-ABA
Course of Study, Dec. 1-3, 1993) (noting that a “laundry-list approach usually means that
some of the stated reasons [for termination] will be thin, maximizing the plaintiffs’ opportu-
nity to prove pretext”); Kent Spriggs, Probative Value of Statistical Proof, in EMPLOYMENT
LAW: THE BIG CASE 505, 512 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Oct. 31-Nov. 2, 1996) (“The docu-
ment trail of personnel records and employment policies is generally of great value in ex-
amining the decision makers in the employment process.”).
362. “CYA” presumably an abbreviation for the term “cover your ass,” a slang term for
the process that involves creating written memoranda that explain and provide a rationale
for one’s actions. The writings memorializing decisions represent an effort to forestall chal-
lenge to those actions.
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sonable amount of concern to give the employee a chance to im-
prove.” This attorney added, “I will not even consider taking a case if
the documentation, on its face, shows such consideration by the em-
ployer.” Another wrote that performance documentation “can be very
effective, especially when detailed with supporting documentation,
such as memos of counseling and discussion showing the employer’s
attempts to ‘help’ the employee.” “Evidence of a history of progres-
sive discipline, warnings and employee admissions of shortcomings
can be very persuasive,” said another.
Like their defense counterparts, a number of survey respondents
said that it is essential that negative performance reviews be pre-
sented directly to employees. “[Performance documentation] is use-
less if the employer never shared his concerns with the employee,”
noted an attorney. Several respondents also opined that an employee
signature and lack of formal protest enhances a document’s value to
the employer. One wrote that negative performance documentation
is an effective defense strategy, “especially when the employee signs
a form agreeing with the negative aspects of the evaluation.” “It is
very effective,” said another, “if there is no response filed by the em-
ployee.” “If the employee did not oppose the performance related is-
sues before he/she agreed to the performance review,” said yet an-
other respondent, “the employer’s explanation, though pretextual,
may seem legitimate.”
Additionally, survey respondent commentary underscored the de-
fense advice that employers interview witnesses before authorizing a
termination. Those remarks described the link between document
strength and witness testimony. As noted by one respondent: “[Nega-
tive performance documentation] is important if it is corroborated by
supervisor and coworker testimony. If it looks ‘cooked,’ the plaintiff
has an opportunity to demonstrate inconsistencies and obvious fraud
or manipulation.” Another wrote: “[The value of documentation] de-
pends on the overall credibility of the presenting witnesses. A super-
visor with an apparent axe to grind can ruin otherwise good docu-
mentation.” A third astutely noted that documentary evidence can
assist the employer in the development of testimonial evidence that
will corroborate it: “[Performance documentation is] effective in pro-
viding employer witnesses with ‘script’ for testimony.”
Finally, some respondents commented that performance docu-
mentation is often crucial to judges’ decisions to grant defense mo-
tions for summary judgment, preventing disputes from ever reaching
a jury through case dismissal. “Timely, well-documented negative
performance evaluations are very effective in getting summary
judgments in favor of the defense,” said one. Another noted that
“[performance documentation] is more effective with judges on sum-
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mary judgment motions than with the jury at trial, which tends to
take it with a grain of salt.” A third wrote, “If the documentation ap-
pears legitimate, it can be a nearly conclusive defense to discrimina-
tion at the summary judgment stage.” “It is very effective in the
Fifth Circuit if [the documentation] is negative,” remarked a respon-
dent, “[because] the Fifth Circuit looks for any reason to throw out
these cases.” A final respondent opined: “Unfortunately, I see it as
being very effective because judges are so anxious to reduce their
caseload. Given any excuse, they will throw cases out on summary
judgment.”363
What is one to make of this last set of comments? Some might
characterize them as merely the frustrated expressions of disap-
pointed advocates. Yet there may well be truth in the remarks if
judges are more responsive to the symbols of equal opportunity than
they are to substance. A recent study of judicial decisions involving
performance appraisal provides a partial answer.364 Although it ex-
amined decisions at the appellate level, rather than the trial level
where motions for summary judgment are heard, it offers some fas-
cinating conclusions about the factors that motivate those who sit on
the bench.
Jon Werner and Mark Bolino examined 295 U.S. circuit court em-
ployment discrimination cases decided between 1980 and 1995.365 All
of these cases mentioned either the term “performance appraisal” or
“performance evaluation.”366 The study used the court’s decision as
its dependent variable, either favorable to the plaintiff or favorable
to the defendant.367 A number of variables were then examined to de-
termine their potential influence on case outcome.368
                                                                                                                      
363. While these quotes indicate that judges are more likely than jurors to accept
documentation at face value, a split of opinion on this issue appeared in answer to a ques-
tion in a different portion of the survey. Asked whether judges are more likely than jurors
to credit performance-related documentation, 58% expressed agreement, while 32.4% indi-
cated disagreement. These opinions are, no doubt, the products of individual personal expe-
rience.
364. See Jon M. Werner & Mark C. Bolino, Explaining U.S. Courts of Appeals Decisions
Involving Performance Appraisal: Accuracy, Fairness, and Validation, 50 PERSONNEL
PSYCHOL. 1 (1997).
365. See id. at 8-9.
366. See id. at 8.
367. See id. at 9. In all, 58.6% of the cases were decided in favor of defendants. See id. at
12. Circuit variation was evident. The First, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits had the highest win
rates for defendants (88%, 68%, and 71% respectively). See id. at 13. The D.C. Circuit had
the lowest success rate for employers (44%). See id.
368. The control variables included: organization type; race and sex of evaluators; geo-
graphic location of the suit; appraisal purpose; decision year; whether the suit used dispa-
rate treatment or impact theory; whether the suit was an individual claim or class action;
the protected category forming the basis of the suit (e.g. race, sex, age, disability); the cir-
cuit in which the decision was rendered; and whether information was presented concern-
ing the reliability of the appraisal system. See id. at 9-11.
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Of particular interest for the purpose of this Article were the
study’s findings on the performance appraisal system factors that
were significantly related to employer success. The authors noted
that “defendants were more likely to win their cases when: (a) [t]hey
had conducted job analysis and included written rater instructions;
(b) they had allowed employees the opportunity to review appraisal
results; and (c) there was evidence that more than one rater con-
curred with the performance assessment.”369 The existence of rater
training also approached statistical significance.370
The performance system variables considered strongest in their
predictive ability were those affecting procedural fairness.371 In fact,
a key variable relevant to appraisal system accuracy and potential
bias was not significantly related to case outcome. Specifically,
whether the appraisal system emphasized employee traits (consid-
ered prone to inaccuracy and bias) versus employee behaviors and
results (recommended to increase accuracy and reduce bias) did not
influence the judges.372
Thus, it does appear that judges are far more persuaded by sym-
bols and process than they are by substance. Furthermore, while
procedural fairness can be considered a gain for employees, it does
not guarantee substantive change for the members of groups that
civil rights law is designed to protect.
3.   The Importance of Tone
Given the penchant of the judiciary for symbols, it is not surpris-
ing that survey commentary referred to the issue of tone. Tone, it
should be recalled, was also an area of emphasis in the defense lit-
erature. Many respondents perceive the effectiveness of negative
performance documentation to depend, in part, upon the language
used in the reviews themselves. Performance documentation is an ef-
fective defense strategy when “neutral language is used making it
appear to be balanced and fair,” stated a respondent. One attorney
noted that “[c]learly biased evaluations are bad for the employer.”
Another weighed in with, “[I]t is excellent if it is not exaggerated.” A
fourth opined that “jurors, in particular, are suspicious of documen-
tation that is too self-serving.”
                                                                                                                      
369. Id. at 16.
370. However, the authors noted that the small sample size regarding this factor was a
study limitation. See id. at 17.
371. See id. at 17-18. Job analysis, which enhances rater accuracy, was found to be
weaker in predictive ability than employee review and concurrence by multiple raters. See
id. at 17.
372. See id. at 18-19.
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These comments lend credence to the defense advice that employ-
ers use care in formulating performance criticism. A plaintiff’s at-
torney can use documentation that appears immoderate to turn the
jury against the employer. As one practitioner noted: “To the extent
that the defendant can be portrayed as someone who is looking to
find fault and going out of their way to criticize, they effectively
commit suicide. The more they trash the plaintiff, the more they un-
dermine their case.”373 Once again, the thinking of plaintiffs’ attor-
neys on this matter mirrors the thinking of their management coun-
terparts.
C.   Assessing the Evidentiary Advantage of Employers
Up to this point, the survey analysis has implied that plaintiffs’
attorneys see employers as systematically advantaged in their ability
to create narratives that will be accepted as true. This section re-
views the survey results that highlight the respondents’ perceptions
of the evidentiary imbalance in employment discrimination litiga-
tion. It then considers whether current doctrinal frameworks for
evaluating evidence account for that imbalance.
As noted above, one possible effect of litigation prevention advice
is that it may mask bias, thereby affecting employees’ access to legal
representation. Because the employment bar as a whole conceptual-
izes claim viability so similarly, employee advocates may consider
bulletproofed employment decisions groundless or very difficult to
challenge.374 The survey sought the perceptions of plaintiffs’ lawyers
on this matter by asking them whether performance-related docu-
mentation, a central focus of the compliance literature, affects the
decision to accept or reject a case. Not surprisingly, the respondents
overwhelmingly report that it does: 41.3% said documentation has a
strong influence on the decision; 49.5% reported that it has a moder-
ate influence.
The survey results cannot empirically demonstrate the strength
of the effect on the plaintiffs’ bar, a topic worthy of further study.
Nonetheless, this finding does suggest the potential power of litiga-
tion prevention strategies. Employers that deploy such techniques
effectively may prevent the transformation of employee complaints
into formal legal claims by influencing the responses of plaintiffs’ at-
torneys to potential clients.
                                                                                                                      
373. Jeffrey L. Needle, The Overzealous Defendant or Trashing the Plaintiff, in 1994
FIFTH ANNUAL CONVENTION § 14, at 3 (NELA, 1994).
374. Indeed, this was suggested by the survey’s textual responses described in the pre-
vious section. See supra Part V.B.
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Employers not only hold the evidentiary edge in terms of docu-
mentary evidence. They are also advantaged in litigation by their
greater access to witnesses. Corporate defendants in employment
cases can generally rely on their supervisors to provide testimonial
support for their employment decisions.375 Moreover, cautious em-
ployers and their attorneys will work to ensure that supervisors’ tes-
timonial evidence comports with performance-related documentary
evidence.376
Employees, on the other hand, may encounter difficulty in at-
tracting witnesses, a fact noted by the literature of both the defense
and plaintiffs’ bars and confirmed by the survey. The reasons for this
result are not difficult to surmise. As one employee advocate notes:
The plaintiff in a discrimination case often faces [an] immense
problem in that fact witnesses who are fellow employees may still
be subject to the ‘command influence’ because of their employee
status with the defendant company. Even if not threatened, they
may feel very constrained against testifying candidly for the
plaintiff if such testimony would injure the company’s litigation
position. It is only natural for them to be concerned that they not
anger management and injure their chance for promotion or,
worse, be deemed a ‘troublemaker’ who is seen by management as
being a natural object for discipline.377
To gauge the feelings of plaintiffs’ attorneys on the matter, they
were asked to respond to the statement that current employees are
reluctant to testify. The bulk of the respondents agreed with the
statement: 50.9% strongly agreed with the assertion; 45.5% indicated
simple agreement. This is not to say that plaintiffs never attract
helpful witnesses, but that there is a systemic imbalance in the liti-
gation playing field.
Do plaintiffs’ attorneys perceive the overall evidentiary disparity
that this Article has attempted to demonstrate? The defense litera-
ture discussed previously exhibited both a sense of employer vulner-
ability to suit and the recognition that this weakness could be over-
come through preventative strategies.378 Most of the survey respon-
                                                                                                                      
375. Employers may experience problems in this respect where a supervisor has left the
employ of the company.
376. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
377. Spriggs, supra note 361, at 511; see also John D. Sloan, Jr. & John Graves, Age
Discrimination: A Trial Lawyer’s Guide for Bringing Suit, TRIAL, Mar. 1995, at 48, 50
(“[P]eople who still work for the defendant may be reluctant to tell all they know because
they may fear losing their jobs.”).
378. See, e.g., Baxter & Klein, supra note 182, at S1 (noting that if oversight steps are
followed “the prospects for a successful defense are likely to be good”); Hicks & Alexander,
supra note 196, at *22 (noting that if you can answer the questions in a termination “check-
list” the employer “will be able to avoid employment-related litigation or, at the very least,
significantly minimize its exposure”); Myers, supra note 113, at 7 (“It’s impossible to shield a
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dents do see employers as having the upper hand. Asked to respond
to the statement that employers have the evidentiary advantage in
discrimination cases, 55.9% strongly agreed and 37.8% expressed
agreement.
While some of the advantage is clearly due to factors discussed
above, most of the plaintiffs’ attorneys agreed that a more insidious
factor is sometimes in play. About 80% of the respondents signaled
their agreement with the statement that employers withhold impor-
tant documentary evidence in discovery.379 Whether this perception
is grounded in real experience or in much less easily validated folk
wisdom remains to be seen. However, it is interesting that some de-
fense attorneys in the wake of the Texaco debacle380 have specifically
cautioned employers about document destruction.381
Of course, plaintiffs might also obtain valuable employer-created
documents from the investigative files of the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC), the agency charged with enforcing
Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the
Americans with Disabilities Act. Employees must exhaust their ad-
ministrative remedies before filing suit under these statutes.382 As
part of its investigation into a charge of discrimination, an agent of
the agency can request and obtain documentary evidence, which in
theory is available to the employee.383 To determine whether plain-
tiffs’ attorneys believe that in practice this is so, the survey asked for
a response to the statement that documents are routinely available
                                                                                                                      
company from the risk—but a well-informed company that maintains good records may be
just too efficient for the angry employee with an axe to grind.”); Sanchez, supra note 201, at
29 (“With proper planning, it is highly probable that litigation can be avoided.”). While one
might initially assume that these optimistic claims are exaggerations, Werner and Bolino’s
case law study underscores the potential effectiveness of preventative techniques. See su-
pra notes 365-72 and accompanying text.
379. See generally William J. Talbott & Alvin I. Goldman, Games Lawyers Play: Legal
Discovery and Social Epistemology, 4 LEGAL THEORY 93 (1998) (using game theory to ex-
plain why lawyers are motivated to “duck and dodge” discovery requests for important,
known negative evidence).
380. See supra note 3 (describing the allegations of document tampering against the
company).
381. See, e.g., Susan McGolrick, Attorneys Stress Preventative Steps in Aftermath of
Charges at Texaco, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) C1 (Mar. 28, 1997) (quoting management attor-
ney Joyce Margulies who notes that after a claim is made steps must be taken to preserve
documents); Weirich et al., supra note 225, at 42 (“Once a claim is made, relevant docu-
ments should be collected and protected from destruction.”).
382. See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 1078-80 (1997) (describing administrative procedures for enforcing anti-
discrimination law).
383. In fact, the plaintiffs’ bar literature routinely counsels employee advocates to re-
quest EEOC and other administrative files. See, e.g., Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Plaintiff’s Pre-
Trial Strategies, in BASIC EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW—IN-DEPTH 75, 80 (ALI-ABA
Course of Study, July 8-12, 1996) (advising plaintiffs’ attorneys to obtain investigative files
from EEOC and other agencies); Truhlar, supra note 124, at 144-45 (recommending that
evidence be obtained from antidiscrimination and other agencies).
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from the EEOC and other agency files. That question produced a
strong split of opinion. Close to 50% agreed with the statement (3.8%
strongly), while about 50% disagreed with the statement (6.5%
strongly).
This finding is interesting because the evidentiary burden-
shifting framework in disparate treatment cases is in part justified
by the assumption that employees are able to obtain evidence from
the EEOC’s files. Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, the employer’s evidentiary obligation is limited to a
burden of production rather than persuasion. In setting forth this
standard, the Supreme Court noted that “the liberal discovery rules
applicable to any civil suit in federal court are supplemented in a Ti-
tle VII suit by the plaintiff’s access to the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission’s investigatory files concerning her complaint.”384
The response to this portion of the survey may bring that assump-
tion into question.385
Moreover, the overall evidentiary advantage of employers casts
doubt on the Supreme Court’s controversial decision in St. Mary’s
Honor Center v. Hicks.386 That much criticized decision addressed the
question of the inference to be drawn when a plaintiff successfully
demonstrates that the employer’s proffered reason for an employ-
ment decision is not true. Rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that dis-
proving the employer’s explanation is tantamount to proving dis-
crimination, the Court held that such a finding does not compel
judgment for the plaintiff. While it may in some cases suffice to
prove discrimination, the determination is best left to the discretion
of the fact finder.387
Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion expressed a view of em-
ployer practices distinctly at odds with that of this Article. To ex-
                                                                                                                      
384. Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981).
385. A report funded by the Federal Glass Ceiling Commission notes that, historically,
the EEOC has been inundated with employee complaints and “has never had sufficient
manpower or budget to investigate these complaints thoroughly.” JONATHAN S. LEONARD,
USE OF ENFORCEMENT TECHNIQUES ELIMINATING GLASS CEILING BARRIERS 3 (Apr. 1994)
(report funded by U.S. Department of Labor, Glass Ceiling Commission).
386. 509 U.S. 502 (1993). For critiques of Hicks, see Brodin, supra note 174; Deborah A.
Calloway, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic Assumption, 26 CONN.
L. REV. 997 (1994); William R. Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, the Rise of “Pretext Plus,”
and the Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law to Employ-
ment at Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305, 342-58 (1996); Melissa
A. Essary, The Dismantling of McDonnell Douglas v. Green: The High Court Muddies the
Evidentiary Waters in Circumstantial Discrimination Cases, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 385 (1994);
Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric,
86 GEO. L.J. 279, 328-34 (1997). But see generally Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet:
Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229 (1993) (defending the Hicks deci-
sion as sound).
387. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
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plain the rationale for the decision, Scalia offered a hypothetical in
which a rejected minority job applicant sues an employer whose
workforce is overwhelmingly made up of minorities.388 The hiring of-
ficer who rejected the plaintiff—a member of the same minority
group—has been fired, leaving this “now antagonistic former em-
ployee” as the employer’s only source of information for the appli-
cant’s rejection.389 Were the majority to rule as the plaintiff argued,
Scalia mused, the jury would be instructed to find for the plaintiff if
it disbelieved the hiring officer “whether or not they believe[d] the
company was guilty of racial discrimination.”390 That the employer
might keep records on applicants that it did not hire seemed to the
majority to be “highly fanciful—or for the sake of American business
we hope it is.”391
Leaving aside for a moment the fact that hiring discrimination
claims are fairly uncommon,392 this notion of an employer being at a
loss for evidence is quite extraordinary. Indeed, Justice David Souter
in dissent noted:
Most companies, of course, keep personnel records, and such rec-
ords generally are admissible under Rule 803(6) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Even those employers who do not keep records
of their decisions will have other means of discovering the likely
reasons for a personnel action by, for example, interviewing co-
workers, examining employment records, and identifying stan-
dard personnel policies.393
To base Supreme Court precedent on a hypothetical that bears little
resemblance to reality is strikingly ill advised.
A careful look at the evidentiary imbalance in discrimination
cases makes the outcome in Hicks hard to justify. Employers in these
suits typically create and control most of the relevant documents.394
They also generally count on the allegiance and/or cooperation of
most witnesses.395 The superiority of employers in these respects is
conceded by management attorneys and acknowledged by the plain-
tiffs’ bar. When the defendant is in such a dominant position re-
                                                                                                                      
388. See id. at 513.
389. Id. at 513-14.
390. Id. at 514.
391. Id. at 514 n.5.
392. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1014-16 (1991) (noting a dramatic shift in
the types of discrimination cases being filed from hiring challenges to termination chal-
lenges).
393. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 539 n.12 (citations omitted).
394. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
395. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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garding evidence, a plaintiff who demonstrates that the evidence is
not credible should win as a matter of law.
Had Melvin Hicks prevailed, however, there would still be cause
for concern with Justice Scalia’s hypothetical suit. Both Scalia and
Souter assume that personnel records, to the extent they are avail-
able, embody “true” reasons for the applicant’s rejection. This Article
has tried to demonstrate that such faith may be misplaced. Employ-
ers practicing litigation avoidance techniques, including the produc-
tion of documentary evidence, may unwittingly mask conditions of
inequality. If we assume for the sake of argument that the hypo-
thetical hiring officer was both subconsciously biased396 and litiga-
tion prevention savvy, plaintiffs’ attorneys and judges may well re-
gard the applicant’s claim as groundless because adequate documen-
tation for the refusal to hire has been created.
D.   Undermining the Employer’s Explanation
While employers and their representatives are advantaged oppo-
nents in employment discrimination litigation, plaintiffs’ attorneys
are by no means powerless. They are active agents who seek to cre-
ate counternarratives on behalf of their clients. In fact, a majority of
the respondents voiced agreement with the statement that plaintiff
credibility is the most important determinant of success in an em-
ployment discrimination case: 48% expressed agreement; 35.7% ex-
pressed strong agreement. Only 13.8% disagreed. This finding is no-
table because plaintiff credibility is not a factor within the control of
the employer. Instead, through the client selection process, plaintiffs’
attorneys attempt to choose clients who present themselves in a
forthright and believable manner.
Indeed, literature of the plaintiffs’ bar repeatedly stresses the
need for advocates to select clients who score high on credibility. As
one commentator notes: “Ultimately, the plaintiff’s case is going to
rest upon the impression the plaintiff makes with the jury. There-
fore, it is important for an attorney to feel comfortable with a client,
and to trust that a jury will be favorably impressed with the plain-
tiff.”397 Another suggests that the attorney formulate an opinion
about “the client’s ability to articulate, follow directions, cooperate,
                                                                                                                      
396. Just because the hiring officer was a minority from the same group as the plaintiff
does not mean that the rejection was bias-free. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
523 U.S. 75 (1998) (refusing to adopt a categorical rule that the perpetrator of sexual har-
assment cannot be of the same sex as the victim).
397. Kyle M. Francis, What a Plaintiff’s Lawyer Looks for When Evaluating a Potential
Lawsuit, in AVOIDING WORKPLACE LITIGATION: STRATEGIES FOR LAWYERS AND HUMAN
RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS 9, 20 (PLI, 1997).
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and generally make a good appearance.”398 These subjective factors
are not subject to the bulletproofing efforts of employers.
Of course, there is more to creating a counternarrative than se-
lecting a credible client. To determine how employee advocates ac-
complish this, the survey asked them to rate the ability of a number
of factors to undercut the employer’s explanation for an adverse ac-
tion. Four possible ratings were available for each factor: (1) great
ability to undercut the explanation; (2) some ability to undercut the
explanation; (3) little ability to undercut the explanation; and (4) no
ability to undercut the explanation. The respondents were also asked
to list other factors of use in weakening the employer’s account.
Even more interesting than the respondents’ ratings is the fact
that most of the factors that the plaintiffs’ attorneys deemed effec-
tive are within the initial control of employers. Moreover, litigation
prevention techniques seek to guard against the creation of evidence
useful to plaintiffs. Yet, as noted above, a lack of viable evidence does
not necessarily represent an absence of bias. In short, the efficacy of
any given factor must be viewed with the imbalance in the litigation
playing field and the implications of that disparity in mind.
The factor that was rated most effective at undermining the em-
ployer’s story was inconsistency between performance-related docu-
mentation and supervisor testimony: 68.1% of the respondents rated
it as great; almost 30% rated it as having some ability to undermine
the company’s explanation.
Inconsistency can occur in two ways. First, the documents may
indicate that the employee’s performance was satisfactory while the
supervisor’s testimony is that performance was poor. When this is
the case, the plaintiffs’ attorney can use the reviews and memoranda
themselves to impugn the supervisor’s credibility and give credence
to the counternarrative. In other words, if the plaintiff truly per-
formed so poorly, documents surely would have been created to sub-
stantiate that fact. Since they were not, the employer must be offer-
ing an explanation that is a pretext for discrimination.399
                                                                                                                      
398. William J. Smith, SEC Harassment Litigation, A Plaintiff’s Perspective, in
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 519, 521 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, July
25-27, 1996); see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 384, at 78 (“Is your client convincing? likeable?
credible? sympathetic? endearing? attractive? articulate? Does she present well? Would you
(do you?) believe her if you were the judge or jury?”). The emphasis on the impression the
potential client will make with a jury or judge has a troubling side. Class, race, and ethnic
biases on the part of judges or jurors may make it more difficult for poor, minority plaintiffs
to obtain compensation for their injuries in comparison to more affluent, white plaintiffs.
See Spriggs, supra note 361, at 511 (noting that jurors and judges may favor witnesses who
are “like them”); Brown, supra note 275, at 215 (noting that jurors may view evidence
through cognitively biased lenses).
399. See Turk, supra note 200, at 106 (“[A]n employer’s reason for discharge may ap-
pear pretextual if the former employee consistently received satisfactory or good perform-
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On the other hand, the documents may describe the performance
as poor and the supervisor might testify to the contrary or offer a
conflicting account of the facts. One respondent noted in written
commentary that while performance documentation is generally an
effective defense tool, “one honest supervisor can burst that bubble
in a hurry.” Supervisor testimony in this situation makes the paper
trail appear fabricated, increasing the likelihood that the employee’s
story will be believed.
Inconsistency between documentary and testimonial evidence is
useful in advancing a plaintiff’s claim. However, the availability of
this technique should be assessed in light of the defense bar’s bullet-
proofing prescriptions. Supervisors taught and required to describe
employee weaknesses are less likely to create useful documentation
for potential plaintiffs.400 Additionally, properly functioning perform-
ance review oversight can catch and correct any appraisal deficien-
cies when supervisors err.401 Finally, oversight of the discharge and
discipline procedure is specifically designed to avoid inconsistency
between supervisor testimony and documentary evidence.402
These steps, however, are not guaranteed to ferret out and elimi-
nate discrimination. In fact, they may mask conditions of inequality
where subtle, unconscious influences are operative. Thus, the plain-
tiff’s position in creating a counternarrative is essentially reactive: to
the extent that employers neglect their evidentiary advantage, their
carelessness can be used against them.403
Rated next in effectiveness was inconsistent treatment of the
plaintiff and similarly evaluated coworkers: 53.7% gave this factor a
great rating; almost 40% said it had some value; and only 5.2% rated
it as being of little value. If the difference between the plaintiff and
the coworkers is that the plaintiff is of a different race, sex, or age,
for example, this is strong circumstantial evidence of discrimination.
This factor, too, must be evaluated with litigation prevention ad-
vice in mind. Defense attorneys specifically instruct employers not to
take adverse action against an employee until the treatment of
similarly situated employees has been considered.404 In truly flagrant
                                                                                                                      
ance reviews.”). One defense attorney offers the following hypothetical cross-examination of
a supervisor: “You have indicated that the employee was discharged for substandard per-
formance, yet you gave her stellar performance appraisals. In terms of her performance,
were you lying then or now?” Segal, supra note 204, at 47. The supervisor’s credibility is
damaged no matter which way that question is answered.
400. See supra notes 204-23 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 229-35 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 253-64 and accompanying text.
403. I do not doubt that many employers do make such mistakes. Clearly, plaintiffs’ at-
torneys continue to find clients with grounds for suit.
404. See Hicks & Alexander, supra note 196, at *21 (advising that employers should de-
termine whether “actions taken against this employee [are] consistent with treatment ac-
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cases of discrimination, such a review may prevent a biased dis-
charge. However, in subtle cases, where individuals experience diffi-
culty detecting bias (and events are easily characterized as “person-
ality difficulties”), the individual responsible for oversight may coun-
sel a supervisor to bulletproof the decision.
The supervisor might, for example, be told to continue a program
of progressive discipline until the employee no longer appears simi-
larly situated to others. At that point, the errant employee may be
characterized as having a significant number of warnings about poor
performance, making discharge seem justified.405 Or, perhaps, the
supervisor will be told that before termination is approved, a par-
ticular company rule or policy must be followed because that is how
the situation was handled in the past. The point here is that either of
these suggestions may make the employee appear to be similarly
situated to some employees and different from others, but neither
symbolic gesture will obliterate unconscious discriminatory influ-
ences that may have influenced the supervisor’s perceptions in the
first place.
Internally inconsistent performance-related documentation was
judged the next most helpful factor: 41% rated its usefulness as
great; 51.8% rated it as being somewhat useful; and 5.2% said it had
little ability to undercut the employer’s explanation. Discrepancies
may appear within a specific document. In such cases, the document
itself can be made to appear of dubious validity. Many respondents,
however, noted another kind of inconsistency: a sudden change in
review ratings after years of positive reviews, sometimes accompa-
nied by the appearance of a new supervisor or after the plaintiff
complains about discrimination. The argument to make in these cir-
cumstances was aptly put by one respondent: “[H]ow could a 15 year
employee turn into the worst employee in the company?”
Still, while apparently a helpful factor in demonstrating that a
given decision was made with a discriminatory state of mind, this
kind of evidence may be on the wane. Employers that practice litiga-
tion prevention may avoid making the kind of mistake that accrues
to the plaintiff’s advantage. For example, oversight of the employee
evaluation process may catch internal inconsistencies within a single
document. Additionally, requiring the regular documentation of em-
ployee weaknesses or areas for improvement may forestall drastic
changes in performance ratings from evaluation to evaluation. Fi-
nally, instituting a policy of management approval of discipline and
                                                                                                                      
corded other employees”); Paskoff, supra note 164, at 4 (recommending that supervisors
consult with human resource representatives who “may have knowledge concerning how
other similar situations were handled”).
405. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
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discharge may prevent the timing of punitive action from becoming
an issue.
Following internally inconsistent performance-related documen-
tation in effectiveness was inconsistency between performance-
related documentation and written policies relevant to the employ-
ment decision: 33.6% rated this factor as great at undermining the
employer’s story, 57% said it had some ability, and 8% rated it as
being of little value. The fact that an employee in a protected class is
subject to treatment contrary to company policy may give rise to an
inference of discriminatory animus. An employer who ignores its
policies is certainly likely to be put on the defensive. Once again,
however, only a negligent employer will find its rationale for an ad-
verse action subject to vigorous challenge. As noted above, the em-
ployer who implements a discharge and discipline oversight proce-
dure should avoid such a blunder entirely.
The next most effective factor was inconsistency between per-
formance-related documentation and current coworker testimony:
almost 26% gave it a great rating; 61.4% rated it as having some
value; and 10.4% found it of little use. This factor may be viewed as
effective because it takes courage for a coworker to get involved in a
discrimination suit. While an employer does not control the plain-
tiff’s coworkers, there clearly are disincentives to speaking out. Fur-
thermore, the infrequency with which such testimony is available
should be considered.406 As previously noted, the respondents over-
whelmingly expressed agreement with the statement that coworkers
are reluctant to testify.407 Thus, this admittedly useful factor should
not be viewed as a standard tool in the employee advocate’s arsenal.
Of much less usefulness was inaccurate objective information,
such as dates, names, and job titles: only 13.2% viewed such informa-
tion as great; 45.7% said it was somewhat useful; 34.4% rated it as of
little use; and 4% said it had no value. This factor is obviously under
the initial control of the employer. Routine oversight of the evalua-
tion process should be able to avoid this problem altogether.
Somewhat similarly situated on the value scale was inconsistency
between performance-related documentation and former coworker
testimony: 10.9% gave it a great rating; 64.5% rated it as having
some ability to undercut the employer’s explanation; 21.3% saw it as
of little value; and 1.3% rated it as having no use whatsoever.408 A
                                                                                                                      
406. A number of respondents noted that the testimony of current satisfied customers
could be useful to the plaintiff’s case. I did not ask about the general availability of such in-
dividuals.
407. See supra note 377 and accompanying text.
408. One plaintiffs’ lawyer writes that employers “dread the appearance of former em-
ployees’ names on the plaintiff’s witness list.” Ruth M. Benien, When to Initiate Settlement
in Employment Cases, TRIAL, June 1996, at 34, 36.
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few respondents noted that the value of such testimony depends
upon the circumstances under which the individual left the defen-
dant’s employ. Discharged employees, for example, have limited
credibility; they may be characterized as disgruntled individuals
with distorted views or a motive to lie. Former supervisors who left
voluntarily, on the other hand, can provide useful testimony that
supports the plaintiff’s account.
The very bottom ratings went to two rather revealing factors. Re-
spondents saw little utility in the fact that performance-related
documentation is prepared by the adverse party in the litigation: 6%
rated it as of great use; 36.7% found it to be of some value; 48.2%
said it was of little use; and 5.2% rated it as useless. This is signifi-
cant for even though many employers prepare documentation to
forestall litigation, that fact is not generally perceived as very useful
in impugning the validity of this evidence.
Close in its relatively limited ability to provide significant support
for the plaintiffs’ story is inconsistency between the performance-
related documentation and the plaintiff’s testimony. A mere 4%
rated it as of great use; almost 46% said it was of some value; 43.8%
found it to be of little value; and 2.7% gave it the no value score. This
factor stands in contrast to the previous one. Performance documen-
tation generated by a party to forestall litigation is generally not
seen by the respondents as rendering it suspect, unless of course
there are inconsistencies as noted above. Yet testimony by a plaintiff
that attempts to counter that documentation is perceived of as fairly
limited in value. Implicit here is the notion that an employee may be
viewed by judges and juries as a poor source of information on his or
her own performance.409
In sum, a review of the techniques used by plaintiffs’ lawyers to
construct counternarratives for their clients provides an interesting
counterpoint to the defense bar’s litigation prevention advice. On one
hand, it demonstrates that employers do not hold all the cards in dis-
crimination litigation. The playing field, though uneven, is obviously
not insurmountable. On the other, analysis reveals that many of the
factors deemed effective by employee advocates are subject to em-
ployers’ bulletproofing efforts.
VI.   CONCLUSION
The results of my content analysis and survey represent the first
step in describing what could be a significant limitation on the effi-
                                                                                                                      
409. A number of respondents did note that employees could counter poor performance
evaluations by pointing to objective performance measures such as sales statistics or the re-
ceipt of salary increases and bonuses.
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cacy of antidiscrimination law: that the largely well-meaning actions
of management lawyers and their clients result in masking rather
than eliminating workplace bias. This troubling assessment of the
ability of formal law to address the problem of workplace discrimina-
tion raises a host of questions deserving of further study.
How the systems recommended by defense attorneys actually
work is paramount among subjects ripe for investigation. An empiri-
cal investigation of corporate discharge and discipline oversight pro-
cedures, akin to Lauren Edelman’s study of complaint handling pro-
cedures, would shed light on the phenomenon this Article has de-
lineated. Such a study could determine the extent to which oversight
identifies truly biased decision making and the steps taken when
discrimination is discerned. A finding that oversight functions as a
truly corrective mechanism would significantly undermine my the-
sis. If, on the other hand, oversight tends to obscure systemic prob-
lems that would otherwise be evident, the assertions in this Article
would be strengthened.
An investigation of the effects on managers of litigation preven-
tion training sessions would also be helpful in evaluating the validity
of my contentions. That study should focus on whether teaching su-
pervisors to consider their actions as potential evidence improves
their ability to impartially evaluate their subordinates. Moreover,
any study should consider the implications of recommending that
supervisors ignore the immutable traits of their subordinates such as
race and sex. Is discrimination thereby eliminated or merely
masked? Do the sessions themselves produce a kind of supervisory
backlash against women, minorities, and members of other protected
groups?
Finally, because attorneys and jurists appear to conceptualize
claim viability in symbolic terms, field studies of corporate environ-
ments should be done to interrogate those symbols. These studies
might examine the extent to which one can conflate neutral docu-
mentation and testimonial evidence with what a social scientist
would consider nondiscriminatory workplace conditions. There is
clearly an overlap between symbolic and substantive compliance.
The problem is determining the extent of that overlap.
Before such empirical work is completed, I am loath to propose
sweeping changes in substantive law to address the problem this Ar-
ticle has identified. Ultimately, restructuring the burden-shifting
framework of antidiscrimination law might be advisable. I might
recommend, for example, that once the employee establishes that
bulletproofing efforts were taken with regard to an adverse action,
the burden of proof rather than production would shift to the em-
ployer to demonstrate that the action was motivated by a legitimate,
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nondiscriminatory reason. One might also address the problem by
creating a rebuttable presumption of invalidity for evidence pro-
duced as part of a litigation avoidance effort. Such undoubtedly con-
troversial suggestions would only be appropriate if there is a firm
empirical basis for my thesis.
In future work, I will focus more intently on another phenomenon
identified by this project. The employment bar as a whole has pro-
duced a series of story lines, some of which symbolize discriminatory
decision making, some that are equated with nondiscrimination. The
soundness and implications of evaluating claims through a process of
pattern recognition will be examined. Why should one assume, for
example, that a sudden drop in performance evaluation represents
bias on the part of a new supervisor? Is it not equally possible that
prior managers refused to document true performance deficiencies?
It is necessary to shake up current understandings of how dis-
crimination evidences itself in the workplace. Perhaps one can begin
to erode the advantage held by employers by challenging the symbols
themselves. It is certainly possible that bias affected an employment
decision memorialized in years of “neutral” documentation. It is also
possible that there is no prejudice involved in the negative evalua-
tions of a new supervisor whose estimation of an employee differs
markedly from that of his or her predecessor.
What counts more than the symbols themselves, are the work en-
vironments in which they are produced. Sociological research dem-
onstrates that firm culture tends to become “indelibly imprinted” on
organizational policies and practices.410 These personnel practices,
once entrenched, come to be taken for granted as natural and inevi-
table.411 Thus, discriminatory conditions like job segregation, bol-
stered through seemingly neutral practices, are quite resistant to
change without extensive management intervention.412 Even when
formal policies are altered to eliminate biased conditions, the pace of
job integration is often quite slow due to organizational inertia.413
Likewise, experience indicates that corporate glass ceilings can be
difficult to eliminate. To be successful, corporate glass ceiling initia-
tives require both strong, sustained support from senior executives
                                                                                                                      
410. See James N. Baron, Organizational Evidence of Ascription in Labor Markets, in
NEW APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ANALYSES OF DISCRIMINATION 113, 125 (R.
Comwall & P. Wunnava eds., 1991).
411. See id. at 125-26; William T. Bielby, The Structure and Process of Sex Segregation,
in NEW APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ANALYSES OF DISCRIMINATION, supra note
410, at 97, 105-06.
412. See Baron, supra note 410, at 125-27; William T. Bielby, Modern Prejudice and In-
stitutional Barriers to Equal Employment Opportunity for Minorities, 43 J. SOC. ISSUES 79,
81 (1987); Barbara Reskin, Sex Segregation in the Workplace, 19 ANN. REV. SOC. 241, 255
(1993).
413. See Reskin, supra note 412, at 256.
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and supervisor accountability.414 Organizations that lack a commit-
ment to integrating the workplace, that, for example, exhibit job seg-
regation or glass ceilings, may produce neutral-looking documenta-
tion. We should not allow the documentary evidence to convince us
that these work environments are truly nondiscriminatory.415
Many plaintiffs’ attorneys undoubtedly realize that workplace
culture is an important element in employment decision making. My
hope is that in the everyday rush of legal practice, they not reflex-
ively discern discrimination only by way of symbols and story lines.
Making social science evidence on discrimination more readily avail-
able to practicing lawyers might assist them in fashioning legal ar-
guments. A solution might be for psychologists and sociologists to es-
tablish a data bank of current research.416 I do not suggest that the
generalized information in the data bank be admissible at trial on
the issue of employer liability.417 Rather, my goal is to afford attor-
neys access to different ways of conceptualizing the phenomenon of
discrimination.418
Moreover, plaintiffs’ attorneys should approach client representa-
tion with a sound appreciation of how employers produce neutral
documentary and testimonial evidence. This recommendation does
not imply that employee advocates at present ignore this fact en-
tirely. Instead, I suggest they be mindful of the panoply of litigation
prevention techniques described herein. These defensive strategies
may in some cases prove useful fodder for fashioning a plaintiff’s
counternarrative. The fact that performance reviews are scrutinized
                                                                                                                      
414. See, e.g., FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMM’N, supra note 2, at 39-46.
415. In order to identify culturally biased organizations, plaintiffs’ attorneys must make
use of statistical proof. See Spriggs, supra note 361, at 508 (“[P]atterns of employer behavior
should always be discovered and examined in each case.”). One difficulty a plaintiff may
confront, however, is the defense argument that “statistical evidence in a disparate treat-
ment case . . . rarely suffices to rebut an employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory rationale
for its decision to dismiss an individual employee.” Mills, supra note 275, at 253.
416. This idea is an extension of the neutral expert assistance that a few judges have
relied on in scientifically complex cases. See Justice Breyer Calls for Experts to Aid Courts
in Complex Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1998, at A17.
417. See Brown et al., supra note 2, at 1513 (noting that a proposed jury instruction on
racial stereotyping “may be criticized for allowing generalized social guilt to serve as a
foundation for individual liability”); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
276 (1986) (“Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a
racially classified remedy.”).
418. NELA encourages plaintiffs’ attorneys to “think out of the box” by inviting social
scientists to serve on educational panels at the organization’s annual convention and semi-
nars. For example, sociologist William Bielby presented a paper on social science expertise
in glass ceiling suits at NELA’s 1998 convention. See William T. Bielby, Social Science Ex-
pertise in Glass Ceiling Litigation, in 1998 NINTH ANNUAL CONVENTION 843 (NELA, 1998).
Psychologist Barbara Gutek addressed “empirically-demonstrated facts and some myths”
relevant to sex harassment and discrimination claims at the 1996 Convention. See Barbara
A. Gutek, Bibliography of Books and Articles, in 1996 SEVENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION 897
(NELA, 1996).
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for comments connoting stereotyping and then edited to remove
those remarks might significantly undermine the validity of the
documents.419 That a termination meeting was rehearsed on video-
tape before the plaintiff was informed of the discharge might be ef-
fectively used in the cross-examination of a supervisor. In short, it
may be possible to turn litigation avoidance against those who prac-
tice it.
These suggestions may do little to correct the evidentiary imbal-
ance that this Article has described. Thus, my final suggestion fo-
cuses on employees themselves. Employers have access to preventa-
tive legal advice that allows them to maximize their evidentiary ad-
vantage. Most employees, in contrast, lack a basic understanding of
how employment law functions. Indeed a recent study by Pauline
Kim found that workers greatly overestimate the protection that
employment law affords them.420 One way to address the information
asymmetry is to provide training classes to employees. The Detroit
Chapter of the National Lawyers’ Guild has sponsored an employee
rights seminar that, if replicated extensively elsewhere, may repre-
sent at least a partial antidote to the problem.421
In closing, I should note that it is entirely natural for employers
subject to civil rights law to endeavor to demonstrate their compli-
ance with it. As a policy matter, however, it is vital to scrutinize the
forms that legal conformity takes. Antidiscrimination law compli-
ance must be substantive as well as symbolic. A society that allows
symbol to stand for substance surely avoids the appearance of ineq-
uity without changing the conditions that produce it.
                                                                                                                      
419. Imagine, for a moment, challenging as untrustworthy an entire corporate perform-
ance evaluation system because it generates documents prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion! Courts, under FRE 803(6), have discretion to exclude business records on such
grounds. See Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 983 (2d Cir. 1942); GLEN WEISSENBERGER,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RULES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMENTARY AND
AUTHORITY 485-86 (1997).
420. See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 106 (1997).
421. See Tammy Joyner, People’s ‘Law School’ Answers Workers’ Questions About
Rights, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 11, 1994, at 8.
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APPENDIX I
BEST PRACTICES & PERFORMANCE-RELATED
DOCUMENTATION SURVEY
General Information
1. Which best describes your principal position?
(check all that apply)
a. q Private Law Practice q Solo q Partner q Associate
Firm size: q 2-5 lawyers q 6-19 lawyers q 20-49 lawyers
q 50-100 lawyers q Over 100 lawyers
b. q Non-profit or public interest organization
c. q Federal, state or local government
d. q Law School or academic setting
e. q Other (explain)________________________
2. How many years have you practiced law?
q less than one year q 1-5 years q 6-10 years
q 11-20 years q 21-30 years q over 30 years
3. Indicate the percentage of your caseload that is devoted to:
Employment law matters representing employees:
q 0% q 1-10% q 11-50% q 51-90% q 91-100%
Employment law matters representing employers:
q 0% q 1-10% q 11-50% q 51-90% q 91-100%
Other matters:
q 0% q 1-10% q 11-50% q 51-90% q 91-100%
4. If you do not currently represent employers, have you ever
represented them in the past?
 q Yes q No
5. Do you ever advise employees before adverse action is taken
against them?
   q Frequently q Occasionally  q Rarely  q Never
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Impact of Documentation and Other Factors
6. On average, how important is performance-related documen-
tation (e.g., performance evaluation and disciplinary memos)
to your decision to accept or reject an employment discrimi-
nation case?
q strong influence q moderate influence
q slight influence q no influence
7. Evaluate the following statements regarding employers based
on your experience:
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree
· Employers have the evidentiary advantage in employment
discrimination cases
· Employers withhold important documentary
· evidence in discovery.
· The quality of the documentary evidence affects an em-
ployer’s willingness to settle.
· Employers are increasingly unwilling to settle employ-
ment discrimination cases.
· The existence of specific examples in performance-related
documentation is likely to bolster the employer’s explana-
tion for the adverse action.
· Documents evidencing efforts at progressive discipline are
likely to bolster the employer’s explanation for the adverse
action.
· Large employers produce performance-related documenta-
tion that is less vulnerable to challenge than documenta-
tion produced by small employers.
8. Evaluate the following statements based on your experience:
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree
· Judges are more likely than jurors to credit performance-
related documentation.
· Current employees are reluctant to testify on behalf of
plaintiffs.
· The plaintiff’s own diary notes, letters, or memorandum
discussing the dispute are persuasive evidence in employ-
ment discrimination cases.
· Many employer-created documents are routinely available
from EEOC and other agency investigative files.
· The most important determinant of success in an employ-
ment discrimination case is the credibility of the plaintiff.
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9. Do you perceive a change in the amount of documentation
produced by employers over time?
1 2 3 4 5
dramatic increase no increase
· Within the last twenty years?
· Within the last ten years?
· Within the last five years?
10. Rate the ability of the following factors to undercut the em-
ployer’s explanation for the adverse action:
Rate according to great ability to undercut the explanation, some ability to
undercut the explanation, little ability to undercut explanation, or no abil-
ity to undercut the explanation.
· Inconsistency between the performance-related documen-
tation and supervisor testimony.
· Inconsistency between performance-related documenta-
tion and current co-worker testimony.
· Inconsistency between performance-related documenta-
tion and former co-worker testimony.
· Inconsistency between the performance-related documen-
tation and the plaintiff’s testimony.
· Inaccurate objective information in the documentation
and such as dates, names, and job titles.
· Inconsistency between performance-related documenta-
tion and written policies relevant to the employment de-
cision.
· Inconsistent treatment of the plaintiff and similarly
evaluated co-workers.
· Internally inconsistent performance-related documenta-
tion.
· The fact that performance-related documentation is pre-
pared by the adverse party in the litigation.
· Other factors that undercut the employer’s explanation
(describe):
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
___
11. How effective is performance-related documentation as a de-
fense strategy in litigation?
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
___
12. It would be helpful to know who you are because I will be con-
ducting follow up interviews for this study. If you are willing
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to be interviewed, please include your name, address, and
telephone number below.
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APPENDIX II
THE DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS
As a group, the respondents have significant practice experience.
Almost 70% have practiced 11 years or more: 42.2% have practiced
11-20 years; 23.2% have practiced 21-30 years; and 3.5% have prac-
ticed over 30 years. While it is reassuring to know that my data em-
bodies the perceptions of a group of skilled, experienced practitio-
ners, there is a troubling side to the numbers: they may confirm the
conventional wisdom of the plaintiffs’ bar that young lawyers are not
choosing this type of work. Of course, the numbers may simply indi-
cate that NELA members, in general, are very experienced attor-
neys. Another possible explanation is that less experienced lawyers
did not feel as compelled to respond to the survey as their more sea-
soned counterparts.
The respondents, by and large, practice in small firm settings.
The vast majority are either solo practitioners or practice in firms
with nine or fewer lawyers: 30.2% are solo practitioners; 46.6% work
in firms of between two to five attorneys; 17.9% work in firms of be-
tween six to nine attorneys. These numbers are important, for they
reveal a potential imbalance in the litigation playing field.
Large corporate firms, which frequently house labor and employ-
ment law departments representing management, have tremendous
resources that may be deployed on behalf of their clients.422 The same
is generally true for management-oriented labor and employment
law boutique firms423 and in-house attorneys tending to the employ-
ment needs of their corporate employers.424 Indeed, because delay in
litigation often accrues to the benefit of the defendant, there is an in-
centive for employers to use legal services when a dispute has be-
come formal. In contrast, a small plaintiff’s-side practice, which re-
lies on contingency fees to make ends meet, is under tremendous
pressure to conserve resources.425
                                                                                                                      
422. Large firms offer to their clients “one stop” shopping for all their legal needs. See
Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, The Many Futures of the Big Law Firm, 45 S.C. L. REV.
905, 909 (1994).
423. Boutique firms are small firms that specialize in specific substantive areas of law
and often rely on large firms for business referral. See id. at 916-17. They frequently model
their style of practice on that of the large law firm. See id. at 909.
424. Many in-house departments are modeled on large law firm principles. See id. at
923.
425. As one commentator noted:
Large firms take care of many if not most of the basic requirements that enable
lawyers to practice law. They hire associates, secretaries and messengers. They
come equipped with phone systems, supplies, the newest technology and soft-
ware and research capabilities . . . . They obtain malpractice, health and life in-
surance. They even typically complete the biennial registration form required of
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The survey respondents have significant exposure to representing
employees in employment law matters. Almost 70% report that em-
ployee representation comprises more than half of their caseload,
with 25% indicating that over 90% of their legal work is on behalf of
employees. A significant number practice law in other areas as well.
Close to 70% report that they handle other types of legal work.
A surprisingly large percentage of the respondents are experi-
enced in representing employers as well as employees: 44.9% report
that between 1-10% of their caseload is devoted to handling employ-
ment matters for employers; an additional 7.5% indicate that such
matters make up between 11-50% of their work. This finding is in-
triguing because NELA, as an organization, is very much ideologi-
cally committed to the representation of employees. That commit-
ment often expresses itself in overtly political terms. Be that as it
may, the exposure of plaintiffs’ attorneys to employer representation
may provide insight into defense strategies that can be turned to the
advantage of employee clients. It might also explain, in part, why
members of the defense and plaintiffs’ bars hold strikingly similar
views on employment discrimination litigation.426
Another surprise was the number of respondents who report con-
sulting with employees before adverse action is taken against them. I
had assumed that this was one area where employers clearly are ad-
vantaged; i.e., they have access to lawyers before an employment de-
cision is made.427 Yet 37.8% of the attorneys said that they frequently
advise employees in such circumstances, and 52.6% reported occa-
sionally advising employees before action is taken. This may well be
an illustration of the increasing legal sophistication of employees.
Thus, when one’s head appears to be on the chopping block, it may
appear prudent to visit an attorney to discuss how to extricate one-
self with a minimum level of damage.
Nevertheless, the fact that an employee seeks counsel in advance
of an adverse decision does not mean that his or her ability to affect
the direction of the case is commensurate with the employer’s ability.
Employees may harbor imperfect or unrealistic beliefs about the ex-
                                                                                                                      
every lawyer by the Office of Court Administration. When lawyers go out on
their own, though, they have to plan for these issues.
Steven A. Meyerowitz, How to Go from a Big Firm to a Solo Practice, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 28,
1997, at 5.
426. One could use regression analysis to determine whether experience representing
employers constitutes a significant influence on the response of those surveyed. That ques-
tion, however, is beyond the scope of my study.
427. Indeed, I made that point expressly in a recent article. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note
29, at 359. (“Unlike employers, employees typically do not retain counsel to advise them
years in advance of litigation. Rather, they hire lawyers after adverse actions have been
taken against them.”).
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tent of protection the law affords them.428 A consultation with an at-
torney may significantly alter those perceptions. Many attorneys
may decline, for example, to accept a client who has years of poor
performance reviews.
                                                                                                                      
428. As noted above, Pauline Kim has concluded that workers greatly overestimate the
degree of job protection afforded by law. See Kim, supra note 420, at 133-46.
